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Abstract  
 
This thesis examines the extent to which Major Depressive Disorder was recognised in fifth- 
and fourth-century Athens. The aims of this thesis are to show that, within their discussions 
of psychological disturbance, Plato and Aristotle identify clusters of symptoms that typically 
occur together, and that these symptoms have a positive correlation with the categorisation of 
depression as expressed in DSM-V. Both of these areas are currently undiscussed in 
scholarship. I begin by discussing the historical healing context in which these philosophers 
were writing. I then examine how each philosopher viewed the existing healing methods and 
discuss their individual conceptions of virtue to explain why they evidently felt justified in 
contributing to these discussions. In Chapter 3, I show that, in Timaeus 86b1-87a9, Plato 
identifies four out of the nine DSM symptoms of depression and that he presents a 
symptomatic model that requires these symptoms to occur simultaneously. I then suggest that 
this Timaean symptomatic model is represented in the characterisation of Apollodorus in 
Phaedo and Symposium. Finally, I argue that Plato gives these symptoms a physical origin, 
suggesting that diseases of the soul originate in the body. In Chapter 4, I show that Aristotle 
identifies eight out of the nine DSM-V symptoms of depression and that he recognises the 
tendency for these symptoms to occur together. He consistently attributes this clustering of 
symptoms to distinct groups of people who are connected only by their cool physiology; once 
again suggesting a physical origin for psychological disturbance. The final chapter explores 
the treatments recommended by both philosophers. In line with my aims, I conclude that 
Plato and Aristotle identify clusters of symptoms associated with psychological disturbance 
that have a positive correlation with depression, and that they recognise that these symptoms 
tend to occur together.  
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Introduction 
 
In modern medical thought, depression is considered to be an inherent, biological pre-
disposition, often precipitated by adverse life events. Due to the biological feature of the 
illness, psychiatric studies have consistently found depression to be a disease experienced 
cross-culturally, despite differing social and environmental factors, and even in societies in 
which depression is not recognised. If, as the evidence suggests, depression is a condition that 
has a degree of cultural universality, then we can also expect it to be temporally universal. 
Therefore, it is likely that depression will have been a condition experienced by individuals in 
fifth- and fourth-century Athens.  
Since my enquiry is into behaviours and moods that are psychological in nature, I 
judged that the corpora of Plato and Aristotle would be good starting points, as both 
philosophers concern themselves with the effect of various behaviours and moods on the 
agent’s ability to become virtuous. An additional benefit is the large number of extant texts 
for both authors, from which I am able to draw evidence of intertextuality, offering further 
support to my interpretations. Ultimately, this thesis aims to show that Plato and Aristotle 
recognised the symptoms of depression, as they are categorised today, and the tendency for 
these symptoms to occur together. 
However, the study of mental illness in ancient societies is potentially hazardous and 
contentious, and the attempt to transpose a modern categorisation of a mental illness such as 
depression directly onto a society so far removed from our own can be problematic. Can we 
be sure that these illnesses existed? The scholars most resistant to this idea have expressed 
opinions that affective disorders, especially any condition that is characterised by depressive 
episodes, are a symptom of the pressures of the modern world and are not to be found in 
antiquity.1 Additionally, since our modern understanding of mood disorders is still relatively 
poor, there is no scientific consensus on causation or symptomatic categorisation of 
depression. As a result, the classifications of these conditions differ between medical 
diagnostic committees, and between publications by the same committee, in response to rapid 
developments in psychiatric and psychological theory. Therefore, to a degree, research of this 
type is time sensitive and as quickly as the writer could map a specific categorisation of 
                                               
1 Padel 1995 p.53-9, 224-7. 
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depression onto ancient sources, a new modern categorisation could emerge, leaving the 
classical research out-dated. This introduction will address each of these objections.  
First, I will provide a framework for the topic-specific terminology to be used 
throughout this thesis. Second, I will review the existing literature in the field to show how 
this thesis builds on the research in the area, whilst providing a new insight into the ancient 
recognition of depression as a specific illness. I will then address the question of existence. 
Based on a wide-reading of psychiatric and psychological studies, which aimed to further our 
understanding of the mechanism and prevalence of depression, I will show that, due to the 
high rate of genetic inheritance and despite societal factors, it is logical to assume that 
depression existed in fifth-century Athens with a similar rate of incidence as the modern 
world. Then I will briefly discuss the limitations of my chosen source material. In Sections 5 
and 6, I will provide a modern classification of depression with descriptions of the 
behavioural manifestation of each symptom and explain my approach to applying these 
modern parameters to ancient texts. I then note the artificiality of separating medicine, 
philosophy, and religion into different disciplines when thinking about the ancient world. I 
will acknowledge the significant overlap that existed but concede that, for the sake of clarity 
in my discussion, it will be necessary to deal with each ‘discipline’ separately. Finally, I will 
provide a summary of the chapters to follow. 
 
 
1. Terminology 
This study will explore whether there is recognition of the symptoms that are currently 
categorised as clinical depression in the works of Plato, Aristotle, the Hippocratics and on 
cure inscriptions found at the sanctuary of Asklepios at Epidaurus. Therefore, it is crucial that 
my choice of language is precise. There are four terminological decisions I have made that 
will be carried through this thesis. 
 
1.1. Terms for Major Depressive Disorder 
In this thesis I will make use of the terms ‘depression’, ‘depressive illness’, ‘clinical 
depression’, ‘depressive disorder’, ‘depressed’, and ‘despondent’. While these terms are very 
similar, they will be used with very particular connotations. I use ‘depression’ or ‘depressive 
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illness’ when I am talking about Major Depressive Disorder as categorised by DSM-V.2 
Although these two terms are virtually synonymous, ‘depressive illness’ will be used when I 
want to draw attention to the medical nature of the disease and its physiological origin. 
‘Clinical depression’ will be used synonymously with ‘depression’, but I will only include 
this detail when I want to add clarity to my terminology. On the other hand, ‘depressive 
disorder’ will be used where a medical origin was not assumed. ‘Depressive disorder’ is a 
broader term aimed at capturing other potential origins of the depressive features.3 Finally, 
the word ‘depressed’ will only be used to describe the mood of someone exhibiting one of the 
key symptoms of clinical depression. If someone is experiencing normal sadness, or where 
extended periods of sadness cannot necessarily be ascribed to an illness, I will use the word 
‘despondent’. I have amended the ancient Greek translations of other readers throughout this 
thesis in accordance with these terminological decisions.  
 
1.2. Symptoms 
The very use of the word ‘symptom’ implies a medical origin. Thumiger suggests ‘sign’ as a 
more neutral alternative,4 and I would add that ‘feature’ would be equally neutral.5 However, 
the focus of this thesis is identifying the recognition of the symptoms of clinical depression, 
as the disease is categorised today. Therefore, whether or not the ancient authors envisaged a 
medical origin when discussing the various behavioural and emotional manifestations of 
depression, we do associate this with a medical origin. So, frequently I will be using the term 
‘symptom’ to reflect our modern understanding of the behaviours and moods discussed. On 
occasion, if I do wish to differentiate between our understanding of these emotional and 
behavioural manifestations as ‘symptoms’ and ancient views that might not necessarily 
associate them with a medical illness, I will either use the word ‘manifestation’ or ‘sign’. 
 
1.3. Psychological disturbance  
When I researched Plato and Aristotle’s views on the cause of the symptoms we now 
categorise as depression, it became necessary to use slightly different terminology which will 
be evident in these discussions. The options considered to describe the origin of these 
                                               
2 The Diagnostic Statistical Manual- 5th Edition (2013). This is one of the most widely used 
diagnostic manuals by mental health professionals worldwide. 
3 These distinctions were influenced by DSM-III’s (1980) definition of disorder and Thumiger’s 
discussion of the implications of the various terminologies available (2017 p.52-3). 
4 Thumiger 2017 p.54 
5 Thumiger 2017 p.54-5 
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symptoms were ‘emotional disturbance’, ‘mental disturbance’ and ‘psychological 
disturbance’. For the most part, I eliminated emotional disturbance as too narrow, since the 
symptoms described by both philosophers include behavioural and physical symptoms as 
well as emotional symptoms. However, it was necessary to use this term when discussing 
Aristotle’s akratic man. I also decided against ‘mental disturbance’, since this implies 
disturbance of the mind specifically, whereas the philosophers are talking about the soul, and 
the two are not strictly synonymous. Usually, ‘psychological disturbance’, seemed to be the 
most accurate descriptor, since this suggests a disturbance of the psyche.   
 
1.4. Psychic illness 
When discussing Plato’s theories on the origins of the type of psychological disturbance that 
results in the moods and behaviours that correlated with depression, it seems appropriate to 
refer to the disease as a psychic illness. This suggests a disease of the soul, which has a 
bodily origin.  
  
Every effort has been made to maintain these terminological decisions throughout the 
thesis. Therefore, any alternative terms that are used should be assumed to be deliberate 
choices to emphasise a slightly different aspect of ancient thought. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
Early notable publications which examined ancient conceptions of mental disorders, tended 
to look specifically at the concepts of madness, insanity, mania, and melancholia. Jackie 
Pigeaud’s monographs exemplify this trend. La maladie de l’âme (1981), Folie et cures de la 
folie chez les médecins de l’antiquité greco-romaine (1987) and, more recently, Melancholia: 
Le  malaise de l’individu (2008) specifically examine the conceptions of mania and 
melancholia in the medical and philosophical writings of antiquity. Bennett Simon’s Mind 
and Madness in Classical Greece (1978) examines ancient descriptions of madness and the 
treatments and cures suggested, and Ruth Padel’s In and Out of the Mind (1992) and Whom 
Gods Destroy (1995) explore the language of mental life and the experience of madness in 
Greek literature. Each of these authors chose to focus their attentions on attempting to 
develop our comprehension of one particular ancient expression used to describe mental 
disorder. 
 5 
In recent years, the study of mental disorders in antiquity has been rapidly increasing 
in popularity, which likely reflects the improving societal awareness of mental illness today, 
but the scholarly trend has been moving away from specific illnesses and towards general 
discussions of conceptualisation and methodology.  Since his publication of Medicine and 
Philosophy in Classical Antiquity in 2005, Philip van der Eijk has become perhaps the most 
prominent researcher in the field of mental disorders in the Classical world. His research 
project Medicine of the Mind, Philosophy of the Body: Discourses of Health and Well-Being 
in the Ancient World has been running since 2010 and has, so far, resulted in the contribution 
of articles in edited volumes, is credited in Thumiger’s 2017 monograph, and more research 
can be expected to emerge in the coming years. This project is breaking important ground on 
the ancient discourse between medicine and philosophy with regard to both mental and 
physical health, but has, so far, avoided discussions of specific mental illnesses, instead 
opting to focus on the general conceptualisation of the relationship between disease and the 
mind, the language used to discuss mental life in antiquity, and appropriate methodologies for 
analysing the relevant source material. 
This trend of conceptual generality is further reflected in the recently published edited 
volume Mental Disorders in the Classical World (2013) by William Harris, which features 
contributions by van der Eijk, Toohey, Nutton, King, Thumiger, and Gill (to name but a few), 
all familiar names in the field of ancient medicine and mental illness. The contributors tend 
towards understanding how ancient authors conceptualised the nature of mental disorder. 
Approaches include discussion of the vocabulary used to describe particular features of the 
disorders across literary sources, how these disorders were categorised, and how these 
disorders intersect different genres of ancient writing. Of the twenty-one papers in the 
volume, just four are grouped by the editor under the heading ‘Particular syndromes’, but 
even these papers avoid modern medical classifications. Of the papers in question, two 
discuss melancholy, one looks at fear, and the other ancient characterisations of epilepsy.   
While discussions of methodological approaches have been popular in recent years, 
the desire to fully comprehend ancient conceptions of specific types of mental disorder in 
isolation from modern concepts persists in a small number of recent publications. Marke 
Ahonen’s Mental Disorders in Ancient Philosophy (2014) performs a similar role to 
Pigeaud’s first monograph. She surveys the conceptualisation of mental disorders such as 
melancholia and mania by the medical writers and philosophers of antiquity and explores the 
assumed origins of these disorders by each writer. Most recently, in 2017 Chiara Thumiger 
published A History of the Mind and Mental Health in Classical Greek Medical Thought, 
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which aims to survey ancient concepts of insanity. In Thumiger’s own words, this book 
offers ‘an account of mental health and disorder in the medical texts, mostly Hippocratic, of 
the Classicalera, including a survey of scientific thought in Platonic and Aristotelian passages 
regarding medical topics, and offering a comparison with non-medical sources of the same 
period, especially tragedy and Herodotus, but also Homer and lyric poetry.’6   
While this thesis will draw on the groundwork these previous studies provide, I will 
be diverting from this established trend of either examining specific ancient concepts 
(madness, insanity etc.) or abstract discussions of methodological approaches in favour of 
exploring the extent to which there was a recognition of depression, as it is categorised in the 
modern world, in fifth- and fourth-century Athens. This is an approach to which many 
scholars in the field are resistant. In his introduction to Mental Disorders in the Classical 
World (2013), Harris makes his thoughts towards this approach clear: 
It will be noticed incidentally that the contributors of this book have in general 
avoided the sort of retrospective diagnosis of individual cases that has plagued the 
study of mental illness in antiquity. 
(Harris 2013, p.11) 
Harris evidently feels that there is little to be gained from attempting to search for evidence 
of an ancient recognition of mental illnesses as they are categorised today. This is not an 
uncommon objection. Pigeaud was strongly opposed to applying modern conceptualisations 
of mental disorders to ancient understandings7 and Ahonen volunteers a similar objection: 
 
No disorder acknowledged by the ancient medical authors can be directly identified 
with any one item in the classifications of DSM or ICD. Even though we may, for 
example, recognise features of modern mania and depression in the ancient notions of 
mania and melancholy, the ancient categories were much broader. 
(Ahonen 2014, p.7.) 
 
However, certain scholars are more receptive to this possibility. Even though Thumiger 
(2017) does not go on to focus on any specific illness within the broad field of ‘mental 
                                               
6 Thumiger 2017 p.419. 
7 Pigeaud 1981, p.24. 
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health’, in her introduction she does address some of the key questions regarding the cross-
cultural constancy and universality of mental disorders. Thumiger asks: 
 
 
 
When we address concepts of mental life and health, can we rely on the universality 
of human mental functioning and disorders? Or should our main object be taken as 
entirely culturally and socially determined? 
(Thumiger 2017 p.23) 
To answer these questions, Thumiger looks to the research of prominent psychiatrist and 
social anthropologist Arthur Kleinman. Over the course of five decades, Kleinman has been 
attempting to improve the understanding of the degree to which manifestations of depression 
are affected by societal and cultural factors and how far the illness is deterministic (i.e. is 
entirely biological).8  Thumiger notes that after decades of field research and study, 
Kleinman’s results do not offer simple or final answers to these questions.9 He thinks that 
both biology and society play a role and must both be considered. Following Kleinman, 
Thumiger notes that there is no reason to think that these diseases did not exist in the ancient 
world in the same way as they do today, an assumption that I will be exploring in more 
detail.10  
Even though my research topic differs from the work of these scholars, each has 
influenced this thesis in its own way. The works of Pigeaud, van der Eijk, and Ahonen are 
responsible for alerting me to the significance of the intertextuality between the medical and 
philosophical writings I will be examining. The methodological discussions found in Harris’ 
edited volume encouraged me to think carefully about the way in which I was applying a 
modern categorisation of an illness to ancient texts and led me to focus on individual 
symptomatic representation rather than the disease as a whole. Finally, my lexical approach 
to the Platonic and Aristotelian corpora owes a debt to the methodology Thumiger used in her 
contribution to Harris’ 2013 edited volume. In ‘The Early Greek Medical Vocabulary of 
Insanity’, Thumiger generated a list of Greek terms that mean something approximating 
                                               
8 Kleinman 1980; 1986; 1991. 
9 Thumiger 2017 p.24. 
10 The question of universality of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is another area of contention 
currently. This was strongly opposed by Jason Crowley in 2014, but Crowley’s stance is being refuted 
on a scientific basis by Crowley’s supervisee, Owen Rees, in his ongoing doctoral thesis. 
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‘insanity’ and then searched for these terms in the Hippocratic corpus and examined the 
context in which they are used.11 Thumiger did this in order to develop a broader definition of 
what was meant when the medical writers talk of ‘insanity.’ It was this methodology that 
inspired my lexical approach to the philosophic texts (to be discussed later).  
The attempt to explore ancient recognition of the illness we now refer to as depression 
inevitably invites the assumption that the primary focus of the study will be an attempt to 
comprehend the ancient concept of melancholia.12 This is a reasonable assumption, since 
most of the prior, reputable studies of depressive illness in the ancient world have taken this 
approach. 
Jennifer Radden has been one of the most influential contributors to the discussion of 
associating historical melancholy with clinical depression and her methodological discussions 
have had a great influence on this thesis. In The Nature of Melancholy (2000), Radden traces 
the development of the concept of melancholia from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata 
30.1, through the Renaissance, and up to the modern conceptions of clinical depression by the 
prominent psychiatrists Goodwin and Jamison. This anthology traces the conception of 
melancholy and melancholia in the works of 31 authors across 24 centuries. In her 
introductory essay, Radden poses a number of research questions, of which one is most 
pertinent for this study: ‘How much do any descriptions of melancholia as a disorder 
foreshadow what later came to be known as clinical depression?’13 Radden notes that any 
study into this question is fundamentally anthropological and must first ascertain whether or 
not depression is a constant across cultures.14  She suggests that discussions relating to 
foreshadowing are as far as one can go without drastically oversimplifying the research into 
the biomedical origins and cultural effect on manifestations of clinical depression in the 
twentieth century.15 I appreciate Radden’s respect for the complexity of the vast numbers of 
scientific studies that have emerged over the last fifty years or so, which aim to shed light on 
both the biomedical functioning of depression and the extent to which cultural influences 
play a role in its manifestation, but I would note that she draws this conclusion without any 
reference to scientific research. For the rest of the book, Radden’s focus, when thinking about 
melancholy before the twentieth century and its relationship with clinical depression, is on 
                                               
11 Thumiger 2013, p.61. 
12 This term will be italicised only when referring to the Ancient Greek term µελαγχολικὸς. The 
concept of melancholia after this time period will not be italicised. 
13 Radden 2000 p.3. 
14 Radden 2000 p.50-1. 
15 Radden 2000 p.51. 
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conceptual foreshadowing rather than whether depression was actually recognised earlier. 
Sadly, the book does not offer any concluding statements. Therefore, there is no answer 
provided to the question posed at the beginning, which asked how far earlier descriptions of 
melancholia foreshadowed modern day depression.  
In 2009, Radden published a collection of twelve of her own essays entitled Moody 
Minds Distempered, which she says are developments of the research undertaken for her 
2000 monograph.16 Many of the essays in this collection again examine conceptions of 
melancholy from the sixteenth century onwards, but a small number address the wider issues 
of retrospection and cultural boundaries when thinking about clinical depression in other 
historical contexts. These essays helped shape my approach when thinking about depression 
in antiquity.  Of particular interest to my research was the essay ‘Is this Dame Melancholy: 
equating today’s depression and past melancholia.’  
‘Is this Dame Melancholy?’ revisits the issue of equating historical melancholia with 
clinical depression and within this discussion Radden addresses the issue of cross-cultural 
diagnosis of depression. She, like Thumiger, highlights the observation of Kleinman that 
there is a distinct cultural divide in the symptomatic manifestation of depression. For people 
with depression in Western countries, diagnoses are common and usually based on emotional 
and behavioural factors, whereas in China, diagnoses of depression are virtually non-existent. 
During the course of his field research, Kleinman observed that while diagnoses of 
depression were largely absent from Chinese culture, many people were diagnosed with a 
condition called neurasthenia based on their complaints of somatic symptoms such as 
headaches, appetite change and insomnia. Neurasthenia is said to be a condition of the 
connecting tissues within the body and was commonly diagnosed in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries but has since been removed from Western diagnostic manuals. However, 
due to the perceived somatic nature of neurasthenia, this diagnosis avoids the stigma carried 
by mental illnesses in Eastern culture.17 Kleinman argues that occurrences of depression are 
being disguised as neurasthenia in Eastern countries. Radden proposes that this cross-cultural 
divide is a result of the model on which the diagnostic manuals are currently written in which 
diagnoses are based on descriptions of symptoms. She argues that the cross-cultural divide 
might be eliminated if diagnosis was approached on the basis of causation. However, she 
                                               
16 Radden 2009 p.4. 
17 Kleinman 1980, p.119-78; 1986, p.14-5. Neurasthenia is no longer a disease accepted by either the 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual or the International Classification of Diseases. It means something 
akin to a nervous breakdown but, crucially for Eastern culture, is a physical rather than mental illness.  
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does acknowledge that our current understanding of the causes of depression is still very 
much in its youth, and so this is not yet a practical solution.  
Radden’s discussions on the issue of how depression may be a constant phenomenon 
across cultures has caused me to think carefully about my approach to the ancient texts I 
examine. Although Radden offers a compelling argument in favour of a causal over a 
descriptive approach to diagnosing depression, as she concedes, this is not currently a viable 
option. Therefore, I will be taking a descriptive symptomatic approach, but with the 
awareness that different cultures can, and do, vary in their symptomatic focus.  
While Radden has been a significant contributor to the field of melancholy and 
depression in modern philosophy, comparative literature, and anthropology, within classical 
scholarship there do exist scholars who have produced publications on similar themes in the 
ancient world. In 2004, Peter Toohey published a monograph entitled Melancholy Love and 
Time, in which the first chapter ‘Sorrow Without Cause: Periodizing Melancholia and 
Depression’ aims to refute the common perception, bolstered by Padel’s Whom Gods Destroy 
(1995), that in the ancient world, melancholia was an illness associated with anger. Toohey 
endeavours to demonstrate that ancient medical, dramatic, and prose writers were conscious 
of depressive melancholia. It is encouraging to see a shift in scholarly opinion in favour of 
accepting that ancient authors may have been alert to depressive disorders, and Toohey 
identifies many promising ancient descriptions of depressive features, but I find the ease with 
which he uses the term ‘depression’ problematic. The following examples from his first 
chapter are typical of the manner in which Toohey uses the term: 
Euripides sequentializes and so flattens the complexity. This tendency persists in 
many of the outstanding descriptions of melancholy and depression in the ancient 
world.  
(Toohey 2004 p.24) 
There can be little doubt that Rutilius saw Bellerophon’s condition, like that of the 
monks, as driven by a deep depression. 
(Toohey 2004 p.38) 
 
 Jason is clearly of a melancholic disposition, and he is evidently depressed. 
 
(Toohey 2004 p.45) 
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Toohey does not provide anywhere in his book a framework for his terminological uses of 
‘depression’ or ‘depressed’. It becomes apparent while reading this chapter that he uses the 
terms loosely, to refer to prolonged periods of sadness, regardless of cause or medical 
association. But I find this insufficient for a book written in a time in which depression is 
recognised as a complex illness with a specific symptomatology. Stating that a mythological 
character is ‘evidently depressed’ based on his representation in poetry is even more 
problematic; evidently despondent, evidently downcast, or even evidently feeling depressed 
would all be acceptable alternatives, but ‘evidently depressed’ suggests that Jason is 
experiencing the medically-accepted illness that we call depression. It was upon reading 
Toohey’s book that I fully realised the importance of linguistic precision in this area of 
research. 
 As demonstrated with the works of Radden and Toohey, when approaching clinical 
depression in the ancient world, the assumption is that melancholia will be the comparative 
focus. Therefore, the existing literature has left the field open for a study on the specific 
illness of depression as understood in ancient Greece. In contrast to any existing work that 
attempts to look at depressive disorder in the ancient world, I will not aim for a 
conceptualisation of melancholia, nor will I be thinking of depression as a subsection of 
melancholia. Instead, I will be thinking of melancholia as one potential representative tool 
that the ancient writers used in describing manifestations of the illness we now call 
depression, or more specifically, Major Depressive Disorder. My aims are to demonstrate that 
there was ancient recognition of the symptoms of depression, as they are categorised today, 
and to show that Plato and Aristotle recognised the tendency for these symptoms to occur 
together. In doing so, I will enrich the existing picture of the lived experience of mood 
disorders in the ancient world by focusing on depression in its modern classification. I aim to 
understand how the ancient Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. suffering with 
depression might have attempted to alleviate their symptoms. How were the symptoms 
associated with depression perceived? Were they medicalised? Were they considered a divine 
affliction? Or even an ethical failing? And how far did the educated elite of Athens 
demonstrate an alertness to the actual condition we now call depression? And were all the 
symptoms recognised, or was it only the most debilitating? To answer these questions, I will 
offer new readings of the works of Plato and Aristotle, which will demonstrate how both 
philosophers show nuanced sensitivity to the experience of emotional disturbance, a field in 
which they evidently felt entitled to offer their advice.  
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3. Was there depressive illness in antiquity? 
I will begin by addressing the point most able to undercut my entire project: whether or not 
depressive conditions existed in the ancient world. Despite the movement of classicists such 
as Thumiger towards accepting a degree of universality in mental illnesses, frequently during 
the period of my research, when attending conferences and other networking events, I have 
faced the objection that depression is a condition exclusive to the modern world, and 
particularly urbanised societies. While I have found people to be forthcoming with this 
opinion in person, it is rare to find such statements made explicitly in scholarship. Toohey 
also discusses this objection in general terms and believes it is because of the association of 
depression with psychological features like ‘alienation, helplessness, anomie, and 
reification’18 that some people believe were far less prominent, if not altogether absent, in 
antiquity — a belief without scientific grounding. As commented on by Radden and 
Thumiger, Kleinman has approached the questions on cross-cultural constancy from a 
psychiatric and anthropological perspective, which has the advantage of attempting to marry 
the results of scientific, deterministic study with the issues of cultural effect. However, 
Kleinman asks why the disease manifests differently in different cultures, whereas my 
question relates to the universality of the disease itself. Therefore, I have surveyed the 
existing psychiatric and anthropological research myself so that, as far as possible, I can 
make sense of the interaction between deterministic models and societal impact on the rate of 
incidence in any society. 19 
 The evidence presented by psychiatric and psychological research suggests that 
depressive illness is likely to have changed very little in the human experience of the last 
2,500 years. Of course, it is not possible to find a scientific study that explicitly states that 
depression would have existed in the ancient world, since this is not their focus, but from a 
wide reading of the current research and dominant theories on cause and mechanism, it is 
possible to make a strong case in favour of depression existing in antiquity with a similar rate 
of incidence as it does today. 
                                               
18 Toohey 2004, p.26.  
19 Rate of incidence refers to the frequency with which a disease occurs across a population. 
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I began this project by reading extensively on the study of biological models of 
depression, which include genetic inheritance, under-secretion of the ‘happiness hormone’ 
serotonin, and over-secretion of the stress hormone cortisol (hypercortisolaemia). Genetic 
inheritance was the only area in which I could find relative agreement across many studies.  
It is widely accepted within psychiatric scholarship that there is a degree of genetic 
inheritance of depression in children who have one biological parent who suffers from a 
depressive disorder. This degree of parent-to-offspring inheritance has not yet been 
conclusively quantified, but a large number of studies performed between the 1970s and 
2000s returned results confirming that the rate of inheritance is high,20 with one study 
performed by Craddock et al. (1999) presenting findings of a 51% rate of inheritance. It is, of 
course, accepted that environmental factors are likely to have an effect on the manifestation 
of the illness, but current scholarly conclusions are that ‘the tendency to become depressed in 
response to life events is inherited.’21 Crucially, it is clear that the prevalence of depression in 
the population is too high for the disorder to be the result of a genetic error or mutation.22 So, 
because the condition has not arisen by genetic error, and studies have shown a significant 
rate of genetic inheritance, if genetics were the only factor affecting the rates of incidence, we 
could conclude that depressive illness would have been present in ancient society with a 
similar rate of incidence as is found today.  
In support of this deduction, Sherman hypothesises that depressive episodes may have 
evolved as a cold-adaptive mechanism in Homo neanderthalensis during the last ice age. The 
symptoms associated with depressive episodes, such as social withdrawal and reduced 
appetite, would have conserved energy and prevented in-fighting among members of the 
community during long periods of food scarcity and living in crowded environments with 
few stimuli.23 This adaptation would have been passed down to their offspring during periods 
of interbreeding with Homo sapiens. Despite this mechanism no longer being climatically 
advantageous, the 10,000 years since the end of the ice age is simply too short a time for any 
genetic trait to have been selected against and the trait to have been eliminated, so the 
                                               
20 Gershon et al. 1976, p.227-261; Mendelwicz et al. 1977, p.327-9; Jakimow-Venulet 1981, p.450-6; 
Torgersen 1986, p.222-226; McGuffin et al. 1989, p.294-304; Craddock et al. 1999, p.585-594; Jones 
et al. 2002; McGuffin et al. 2003, p.497-502; Hayden et al. 2006, p.70; Swann 2006, p.51. 
21 Cleare 2004, p.30; Jakimow-Venulet 1981, p.450-6. 
22 Sherman 2012, p.115 following Wilson 1998, p.375-95. 
23 Sherman 2012, p.113-122. 
 14 
condition is still experienced today.24 If this hypothesis has weight25 and selection against this 
trait is occurring very slowly over time, it is logical that depressive illness would have been 
present in ancient societies.  
So, genetically, there is no reason to doubt the existence of depressive illness in the 
ancient world, but this does not account for social and environmental factors, which are 
thought to play a role in the manifestation of these conditions. In How Sadness Survived: the 
evolutionary basis of depression (2008), psychiatrist Paul Keedwell puts rather more weight 
on the effect of societal factors on the prevalence of depressive disorders, arguing that the 
incidence of depressive disorders is likely to have increased with the modern reduction in 
familial and community emotional support, due to increased numbers of broken families and 
urban dwelling.26 It is very difficult to assess the effect of societal factors on rates of 
incidence simply because there are so many variables at play. Keedwell’s observation that 
reduced familial support and increased feelings of isolation when living in cities seem to 
correlate with increased rates of depression may be true, but this woefully under-represents 
the other potential factors that may affect this rate. Cultural awareness and non-stigmatised 
acceptance of mental illnesses within a culture are likely to increase the chances of people 
recognising an abnormality in their behaviour and seeking medical assistance, thus increasing 
reported rates. This increasingly-accepting attitude towards depression is most likely to be 
found in high-income, westernised countries, which incidentally, tend to have increased 
urbanisation. So, we could equally argue that it is the urban dwelling causing the increased 
rates of depression, or that the cultural acceptance of mental illness in urbanised areas 
encourages disclosure of the conditions. The statistics also tell us that someone living in a 
high-income country is more likely to suffer from depression than someone living in a low-
income country. But, it is much more likely that someone with relative financial security and 
a good quality of life will report their depressed mood to an enquiring specialist. Someone 
living on the brink of poverty may be unlikely to think of their depressed mood as abnormal. 
So, clearly it is very difficult to accurately assess the effect of societal and environmental 
factors on rate of incidence.  
However, one study does exist which has been able to place controls on several 
societal factors, such as: the absence of urban dwelling; a strong sense of emotional support 
                                               
24 Sherman 2012, p.119. 
25 It is worth noting that despite a current lack of scholarly response to Sherman’s article, I am 
conscious that the arguments are merely hypothetical and the conclusions drawn are circumstantial. 
26 Keedwell 2008, p.27-8. 
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within the community; and the virtual absence of potential triggers for episodes that may 
skew data, such as alcohol or substance abuse and traumatic childhood experiences. This on-
going study is conducted by J. Egeland and her team and began in 1976 on the Amish 
community of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.27 The community has remained almost 
wholly a closed gene pool since their settlement in the eighteenth century, and as a result of 
their strict religious culture and close relationships within the community, violent and 
criminal acts are rare, and alcohol or substance abuse is virtually non-existent. Therefore, this 
community would seem to offer the best chance of establishing the extent to which these 
environmental factors affect the level of incidence of mood-disorders in a population. 12,500 
residents of the Amish community were studied between 1976 and 1985 and, of these, 107 
cases of depressive mood disorders were identified, which is around 1% of the participating 
population. In comparison to the lower estimate from DSM-III-R28 of 3.5% for the whole of 
the U.S.A. in 1987,29 it would seem that these societal factors do have an effect on the rate of 
incidence. But it is not as straightforward as simply stating that these societal factors increase 
the prevalence 3.5 times. If we look at the rates reported in DSM-V, published in 2013, the 
prevalence increases to 7%, with little change in the rates of the societal factors considered.30 
So there must be something else impacting on these results. It would seem from these crude 
statistics that societal factors have a huge impact on prevalence. It is likely that it is not the 
illness that is becoming more prevalent, but rather that public awareness is increasing and 
stigmatisation decreasing, and in line with this, more people are beginning to report their 
depression. This phenomenon is commented upon by DSM-V, which states that ‘the 
prevalence in 18 to 29 year-old individuals is threefold higher than the prevalence in 
individuals age 60 years or older.’31 So the only safe assumption that can be taken away from 
Egeland’s study, is that societal and environmental factors certainly have an effect on rates of 
incidence, but by how much we still cannot be certain. 
                                               
27 Egeland 1990, p.147-157. 
28 The Diagnostic Statistical Manual 3rd edition revised.  
29 DSM-III-R 1987, p.229. In order to present comparable figures I have had to adjust the actual 
reported rates of incidence. DSM-III-R reports different figures for men and women; 4.5-9.3% for 
women, and 2.3-3.2% for men. In recent editions this distinction has been eliminated, since it became 
clear that, due to societal influences, men were just much less likely to speak out about their 
depression and so diagnosis was under-representative. So to arrive at the figure I simply found the 
average of the two figures based on a 50:50 male:female population. 
30 DSM-V 2013, p.165. 
31 DSM-V 2013, p.165. 
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Since the interest of psychiatric and psychological research lies in understanding the 
mechanism and causes of depressive conditions, rather than in definitively establishing their 
existence in particular historical periods, it is not possible to find an explicit statement within 
current studies that confirms scholarly acceptance in the field of psychiatry that the ancient 
Greeks, particularly, were likely to have experienced depression. What is abundantly clear, 
however, is that psychiatric experts in depressive disorders consider these conditions to have 
been prevalent in the human experience for many hundreds, and likely thousands, of years 
and not merely a symptom of modern, developed society or culture. Even where societal 
factors are considered to be worsening the rates of incidence, genetic inheritance of 
predisposition is still accepted.  
Therefore, based on the scientific evidence to date, it seems reasonable to accept that 
there existed ancient Athenian inhabitants who suffered from depression. Having reached this 
conclusion, the overarching questions of this thesis relate to recognition rather than existence. 
Was anyone in antiquity alert to depression? Based on variant opinions on the origins of 
mental illness from different sectors of ancient society, what options were available in terms 
of treatment or alleviation of symptoms?  
 
 
4. Where to look for recognition? 
The sources available from which we can learn about the ancient psychological environment 
are largely written. Despite the obvious issue that these sources have been transcribed 
numerous times, even upon first composition they were not intended as a personal and private 
record of the individuals’ thoughts and feelings. On the whole, the texts I will be using were 
intended either for publication or for public consumption through performance or lectures. 
Where they do discuss the author and his thoughts or opinions, it is the image he wishes to 
portray of himself to his audience, and where others are presented, it is the author’s selective 
impression of the person, manipulated to support his eventual point. Therefore, the authors of 
these sources, or the subjects of their material, cannot be ‘diagnosed’, insofar as any literary 
subject ever could be.  
The focal texts to be examined are the works of Plato and Aristotle, but in addition, I 
look to the Hippocratic treatises to provide medical context for the environment in which the 
philosophers were writing and for the existing thought regarding depressive illness. 
Evidently, these sources are overwhelmingly representative of the thoughts and opinions of 
the wealthy, Athenian, intellectual elite and are unlikely to give much insight into the 
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psychological awareness or experience of the Athenian masses. The only real evidence we 
have that may reasonably have come directly from poorer citizens are the many cure 
inscriptions left at the sanctuary of Asclepius at Epidaurus. These cure inscriptions will be 
discussed when looking at religious healing options (Chapter 1).  
 
 
 
5. Classifying depressive illness 
In order to begin thinking about depression in an ancient Greek context, I must define exactly 
what I mean when talking about depression. Depressive disorder is a condition for which 
current diagnostic classifications vary between medical advisory bodies. Furthermore, since 
the condition is still not fully understood, even within a particular advisory body the 
classifications can vary significantly between editions. Therefore, the classification provided 
by the most recent edition of a particular manual should be used in order to give the most 
current comparison between the modern categorisation of Major Depressive Disorder and the 
ancient recognition of the symptoms that make up this categorisation.  
The texts most widely used by medical professionals around the world in diagnosing 
depressive disorders are the Diagnostic Statistical Manual and the International 
Classification of Diseases. It would be acceptable to use either text as a baseline in this study, 
but DSM provides a much more detailed description of each symptom and information on 
what is commonly observed in someone displaying each symptom. This information is 
crucial to my study, since the philosophers will be describing behaviour that they may have 
observed in others, and so, in order to align these descriptions with a particular symptom 
from modern Major Depressive Disorder, I will need a precise definition and understanding 
of each symptom. Therefore, for this study I will be using the most recently published DSM-
V (2013). 
Major Depressive Disorder (henceforth referred to as MDD) is diagnosed by 
identifying the presence of a number of symptoms, which are split into key and ancillary 
symptoms. For a diagnosis of MDD, the patient must be experiencing at least 1 key symptom 
and 4 ancillary symptoms, or 2 key and 3 ancillary. The presence of these symptoms must 
also be causing the patient significant distress or be affecting social functioning. Table 1 is a 
summary of the key and ancillary symptoms of MDD as detailed by DSM-V. It also shows 
the criteria for diagnosis: 
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Table 1: The classification of Major Depressive Disorder as suggested by DSM-V.32 
Key symptoms Ancillary Symptoms Criteria for diagnosis 
1. Depressed mood 
2. Anhedonia 
1. Fatigue/loss of energy 
2. Insomnia/hypersomnia 
3. Weight/appetite Loss/gain 
4. Observed agitation/retardation 
5. Low self-esteem/guilt 
6. Impaired thinking/concentration 
7. Suicidal thoughts 
1 key, 5 symptoms in total 
Plus 
Significant distress 
Or 
Social impairment 
 
 
Definition of symptoms 
Depressed Mood: Depressed mood refers to either feeling sad, empty or hopeless or to 
feeling irritable. This sadness or irritability must last for a prolonged period of time, 
specifically, almost every day for at least two weeks, although episodes usually last much 
longer than this.33 This can be reported by the patient, concluded through interview or 
observed by a clinician in facial expressions and demeanour.34  
DSM identifies significant loss (e.g. financial ruin, disability) and grief as problematic 
in a diagnosis of depressed mood manifesting as sadness. To a degree, sadness is an expected 
and appropriate response to significant loss, and often other symptoms of Major Depressive 
Disorder can be exhibited, such as insomnia or loss of appetite, so clinical judgement is 
required in diagnosing Major Depressive Disorder in instances of significant personal loss. It 
is recommended by DSM that the individual’s history be taken into account alongside ‘the 
cultural norms for the expression of distress’,35 which will be a crucial consideration for this 
study.  
On the other hand, a sufferer of the symptom depressed mood may instead ‘respond to 
events with angry outbursts or blaming others’36 or display ‘an exaggerated sense of 
                                               
32 DSM-V 2013, p.160-1.  
33 DSM-V 2013, p.160. 
34 DSM-V 2013, p.162. 
35 DSM-V 2013, p.161. 
36 DSM-V 2013, p.163. 
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frustration over minor matters.’37 Therefore, this aspect of the symptom will also be taken 
into account.   
 
Anhedonia: Anhedonia is defined as ‘the loss of interest or pleasure… in activities that were 
previously considered pleasurable.’38 This can cause the sufferer to withdraw socially or 
avoid taking part in activities that they used to enjoy. While becoming bored or uninterested 
in activities one once enjoyed is common without being a result of mental illness, there are a 
number of differences between naturally losing interest and symptomatic anhedonia. One 
notable difference is that anhedonia is not activity specific. The sufferer is likely to lose 
interest with almost all enjoyable activities, rather than just one particular activity. 
Additionally, with symptomatic anhedonia, the sufferer’s enjoyment of these activities will 
return as the depressive episode subsides, leading them to once again seek social interaction 
where they have previously withdrawn.39  
 
Fatigue: Fatigue is characterised by a persistent lack of energy or tiredness that cannot be 
ascribed to physical exertion.40  Symptomatically this is considered distinct from sleep 
disturbance, since it is not necessarily connected to a lack of sleep. However, in the event of 
insomnia, fatigue is also likely to occur.  
 
Sleep Disturbance: Individuals suffering with insomnia are most likely to experience either 
middle or terminal insomnia, which are characterised by waking up in the night and finding it 
difficult to fall asleep again, or waking too early and being unable to fall asleep again.41 On 
the other hand the individual might experience hypersomnia and complain of a need to sleep 
during the day as well as for prolonged periods at night.42  
 
Appetite change: If a sufferer of depression experiences changes to their appetite, it is usual 
that this takes the form of reduced appetite, and often sufferers will feel that they have to 
force themselves to eat.43 
                                               
37 DSM-V 2013, p.163. 
38 DSM-V 2013, p.163. 
39 Blanchard et al. 2001, p.369; Rottenbery et al. 2004, p.70. 
40 DSM-V 2013, p.163-4. 
41 DSM-V 2013, p.163. 
42 DSM-V 2013, p.163. 
43 DSM-V 2013, p.163. 
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Observed agitation/retardation: This symptom refers to psychomotor changes that must be 
severe enough to be observed by others. Agitation could present as pacing, rubbing the skin 
or clothes, rocking, or hand-wringing. Retardation could lead to slowed speech, long pauses 
before answering, speech decreased in volume or slowed movements.44  
 
Low self-esteem/guilt: This symptom is associated with feelings of worthlessness and an 
unrealistically negative self-assessment. Sufferers are likely to dwell disproportionately on 
very minor past failings and consider trivial daily events to be evidence for their defects. 
They may also experience delusional feelings of guilt towards events for which, realistically, 
they cannot be held responsible.45  
 
Impaired thinking/concentration: Sufferers of MDD who exhibit this symptom report an 
‘impaired ability to think, concentrate, or make even minor decisions. They may appear 
easily distracted or complain of memory difficulties.’46 This is particularly apparent in 
individuals who work in intellectually demanding or academic environments and find it very 
difficult to function effectively even when their concentration problems are mild.47 
 
Suicidal thoughts: A sufferer of MDD may experience ‘thoughts of death, suicidal ideation, 
or suicide attempts.’48 These thoughts may be simply feeling that loved ones would be better 
off if they, the sufferer, were dead, or the sufferer may set in place specific plans for a 
suicide.49 At the extreme, an individual may follow through with these plans and attempt, or 
succeed in, suicide.  
 
6. Searching for symptoms 
In order to undertake a thorough search of the Platonic and Aristotelian corpora for 
references to emotional states and behaviours that could align with the symptoms presented 
in DSM-V, a number of Greek terms were considered. Following Thumiger (2013),50 I began 
                                               
44 DSM-V 2013, p.163. 
45 DSM-V 2013, p.164. 
46 DSM-V 2013, p.164. 
47 DSM-V 2013, p.164. 
48 DSM-V 2013, p.164. 
49 DSM-V 2013, p.164. 
50 Thumiger 2013, p.61. As discussed in section 3. 
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by compiling a list of as many synonyms for the symptom in English as possible. These 
synonyms were then searched for in the Woodhouse English-Greek Lexicon and all the 
entries present were noted.51 These were as follows: 
 
- Depressed mood: athumia, anelpistos, baruthumeo/baruthumia, dakruo, duselpis, 
dusthumia, katephes, klaio, kopheia, lupe, melancholia (which requires separate 
examination), odurtikos.  
- Irritability: duskolia, kineo, orge.  
- Anhedonia: anhedonos, akinetos, aorgesia, analgesia, narkao, psychros, rhathumia.  
- Fatigue: apoknaio, kopos, truo.  
- Sleep disturbance: agrupnia, koimao, opsikoitos, hupnotikos.  
- Appetite change: epithumia, peina.  
- Low self-esteem/guilt: aitia, mikropsychia.  
- Inability to concentrate: amathes, aphyes, nothes.  
- Suicidal thoughts: autosphages, apokteino.  
 
These terms were the starting point for the study, with the expectation that other relevant 
terms were likely to appear as it progressed. The root of each term was then searched for 
using Thesaurus Linguae Graecae in order to reveal every use of the term in both the 
Platonic and Aristotelian corpora in all noun declensions and their verbal and adjectival 
counterparts. Every result returned was translated and, where references seemed promising, I 
then read the entirety of that book or section. 
Although this terminological approach was a useful starting point for my research, I 
acknowledge that this methodology cannot capture the complexity of language. There will 
have been many different phrases, idioms, and euphemisms used in Ancient Greek, like any 
other language, in reference to these types of behaviours and emotional states.52 Therefore, in 
an attempt to minimise the impact of this approach, I used the terms to highlight potential 
works, and then ensured I read the work or book in its entirety to avoid overlooking any other 
useful descriptions. 
The lexical method was rather effective with Aristotle’s texts, many of which are 
definitive in their approach, but it was found to be reductive of the complexity of Plato’s 
                                               
51 Woodhouse 1910. 
52 A problem also raised by Thumiger 2017, p.52. 
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literary characterisations. Therefore, I used this lexical method to identify likely dialogues 
from Plato’s works but then read these in their entirety in order to get a sense of the 
personality of the characters Plato presents.  
 
 
7. Separating the disciplines 
In this thesis, I will explore medicine, temple healing, magic, and philosophy as distinct areas 
of thought, but it is worth noting the artificiality of this separation of the ‘disciplines’, since it 
is not at all representative of ancient thinking. In reality, thoughts surrounding healing 
practices were much more likely to be something of a blend of medicine, religion and 
philosophical theories. Métraux comments, for example, that ‘it is not possible to disengage 
the history of medicine from the history of natural philosophy’53 or indeed, we might add, 
religion. The disciplines of medicine and philosophy developed alongside one another and 
usually authors acknowledge the interrelationship.  Philosophical interest in medicine can be 
seen as far back as Parmenides, and possibly even Pythagoras54 and it is thought that the 
Hippocratic theories, especially humoral theory, likely developed from the work of Alcmaeon 
of Croton, supposedly the founder of the medical School of Knidos.55 But, while being 
credited with founding a successful school of physicians, Alcmaeon was thought by the 
ancients to have been primarily a philosopher,56 not a practicing physician. But as well as 
Hippocratic medical theory owing a debt to Alcmaeon, from the biological theories presented 
in Timaeus, Lloyd believes Plato reveals his influence from the works of Alcmaeon, as well 
as Diogenes of Apollonia (a philosopher with medical interests) and physician Philiston of 
Locri.57 Plato also acknowledges his familiarity with the Hippocratic corpus in Protagoras 
and Phaedrus.58 The medical influence in Aristotle’s works is hardly a point of contention, 
since his own father was a practicing physician. So, it is apparent that the influence between 
secular medicine and philosophy ran in both directions, with surviving evidence to suggest 
each discipline shared common roots in the work of Alcmaeon of Croton. 
                                               
53 Métraux 1995, p.x. See also, Oberhelman 1990, p.141; van der Eijk 1999 p.3; Vlahogiannis 2005, 
p.184. 
54 Nutton 2004, p.46. 
55 The extent of this influence is debated based on the uncertainty of dating his life. See. Aristotle 
Meta. 1.986a25-30 ; Aetius Plac. Philo. 5.30.1; Edelstein 1942, p.371; Longrigg 1963, p.167; Nutton 
2004, p.47; Ross 1952.; Stella 1939; Wellman 1929. 
56 Anonymus Londinensis p.162; Aristotle Meta. 1.986a25. 
57 Lloyd 1968, p.84. 
58 Pl. Phaedrus 270c-d; Pl. Protag. 310b-328d. 
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The influence of religion on both medicine and philosophical theory is exceptionally 
complex and cannot be ignored or its significance understated. Religion was ‘inextricably 
bound up with all aspects of life’59 in ancient Athens and so we should fully expect religious 
elements to be present in our readings of medical and philosophical theories. To begin with 
the influence of religion on secular medicine (which is a paradox in itself), it cannot go 
unnoticed that the Hippocratics proudly assert that their founder is descended from the god 
Asclepius. But despite this ancestry, the Hippocratics are not uncritical of religious matters, 
and are very particular about the religious practices they are content to endorse. The authors 
are particularly skeptical of divination and quasi-religious methods, most famously seen in 
On the Sacred Disease:  
 
οὐδέν τί µοι δοκεῖ τῶν ἄλλων θειοτέρη εἶναι νούσων οὐδὲ ἱερωτέρη, ἀλλὰ φύσιν µὲν 
ἔχει καὶ πρόφασιν, οἱ δ᾿ ἄνθρωποι ἐνόµισαν θεῖόν τι πρῆγµα εἶναι ὑπὸ ἀπειρίης καὶ 
θαυµασιότητος, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν ἑτέροισι· καὶ κατὰ µὲν τὴν ἀπορίην αὐτοῖσι τοῦ µὴ 
γινώσκειν τὸ θεῖον διασῴζεται, κατὰ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίην τοῦ τρόπου τῆς ἰήσιος ᾧ ἰῶνται, 
ἀπόλλυται, ὅτι καθαρµοῖσί τε ἰῶνται καὶ ἐπαοιδῇσιν… Ἐµοὶ δὲ δοκέουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι 
τοῦτο τὸ νόσηµα ἱερώσαντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι ἄνθρωποι οἷοι καὶ νῦν εἰσι µάγοι τε καὶ 
καθάρται καὶ ἀγύρται καὶ ἀλαζόνες, οὗτοι δὲ καὶ προσποιέονται σφόδρα θεοσεβέες 
εἶναι καὶ πλέον τι εἰδέναι. οὗτοι τοίνυν παραµπεχόµενοι καὶ προβαλλόµενοι τὸ θεῖον 
τῆς ἀµηχανίης τοῦ µὴ ἔχειν ὅ τι προσενέγκαντες ὠφελήσουσι… καθαρµοῖσί τε 
χρέονται καὶ ἐπαοιδῇσι, καὶ ἀνοσιώτατόν τε καὶ ἀθεώτατον πρῆγµα ποιέουσιν, ὡς 
ἔµοιγε δοκεῖ· 
 
It is not, in my opinion, any more divine or more sacred than other diseases, but has a 
natural cause, and its supposed divine origin is due to men’s inexperience, and to their 
wonder at its peculiar character. Now while men continue to believe in its divine 
origin because they are at a loss to understand it, they really disprove its divinity by 
the facile method of healing which they adopt, consisting as it does of purifications 
and incantations… My own view is that those who first attributed a sacred character 
to this malady were like the magicians, purifiers, charlatans and quacks of our own 
day, men who claim great piety and superior knowledge. Being at a loss, and having 
no treatment which would help, they concealed and sheltered themselves behind 
                                               
59 Wilson, 1996, p.7. 
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superstition, and called this illness sacred…making use, too, of purifications and 
incantations they do what I think is a very unholy and irreligious thing.’ 
(Hipp. On the Sacred Disease 1.1; 1.2; 1.4) 
 
As Hankinson notes, scholars have usually assumed that the Hippocratics rejected all forms 
of religious healing and sought to wholly discredit religious methods when it came to disease. 
But, from this extract, I believe it is evident that the author is in fact being rather selective in 
the kind of religious medicine he attacks. It is the religious charlatans who are to be avoided 
in seeking a cure for this illness. They shroud their ignorance in mystical rituals and 
incantations and by blaming the gods they can avoid all responsibility if their healing 
methods fail. But the author notes that if the gods were responsible for this illness, they 
should rather be appeasing the gods with sacrifices,60 than trying to purify the patient: 
 
θύειν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι καὶ ἐς τὰ ἱερὰ φέροντας ἱκετεύειν τοὺς θεούς· νῦν δὲ τούτων 
µὲν ποιέουσιν οὐδέν, καθαίρουσι δέ. 
 
They should have brought them to the sanctuaries, with sacrifices and prayers, in 
supplication to the gods. As it is, however, they do nothing of the kind, but merely 
purify them. 
(Hipp. On the Sacred Disease 4.40) 
 
The author goes so far as to call this manipulation of religious practices ‘unholy and 
irreligious’, suggesting that there could be an appropriate way to approach religious healing if 
one suspected the origin to be divine. He is not discounting the value of all religious healing, 
only the practices based in superstition and magic. The author of On Regimen 4 confirms this 
suggested interpretation when he acknowledges the validity of some religious methods of 
diagnosis and treatment that should be employed alongside the regimen recommended by the 
physician. For example:  
περὶ µὲν οὖν τῶν οὐρανίων σηµείων οὕτω γινώσκοντα χρὴ προµηθεῖσθαι καὶ 
ἐκδιαιτῆσθαι καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσιν εὔχεσθαι, ἐπὶ µὲν τοῖσι ἀγαθοῖσι Ἡλίῳ, Διὶ οὐρανίῳ, 
                                               
60 We know this to be the accepted course of action when a disease is thought to be inflicted by a god 
from the opening of the Iliad. The god must be appeased. 
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Διὶ κτησίῳ, Ἀθηνᾷ κτησίῃ, Ἑρµῇ, Ἀπόλλωνι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖσι ἐναντίοισι τοῖσι 
ἀποτροπαίοισι, καὶ Γῇ καὶ ἥρωσιν, ἀποτρόπαια τὰ χαλεπὰ εἶναι πάντα. 
So with this knowledge about the heavenly bodies, precautions must be taken, with 
change of regimen and prayers to the gods; in the case of good signs, to the Sun, to 
Heavenly Zeus, to Zeus, Protector of Home, to Athena, Protectress of Home, to 
Hermes and to Apollo; in the case of adverse signs, to the Averters of evil, to Earth 
and to the Heroes, that all dangers may be averted. 
(On Regimen 4 128-33) 
So, it is apparent that while intellectual physicians were skeptical of the religious practices 
that erred on the side of divination and magic that lay on the fringes of appropriate religion, 
they were seemingly accepting of mainstream religion and its role in medicine. However, it is 
worth noting that a majority of the major symptomological and theoretical treatises make no 
reference to divine medicine at all. These include; Prorrhetic, Regimen in Acute Diseases, 
Regimen in Health, On Nutrition, On Diseases, On Affections, Diseases of Women, On the 
Nature of Man, On Breaths, and On Ancient Medicine.61 This does not necessarily mean that 
the authors intended to completely separate themselves from all religious influence, but 
evidently any association was not deemed relevant to their medical observations.  
Religious influence on the works of the philosophers is a complex matter, but within 
the Platonic dialogues, theological discussions are evidently considered to be a crucial part of 
philosophical thought and vital in the life of the virtuous citizen. References to the gods are 
widespread across the corpus, and while they are sometimes used as figures of speech to 
illustrate a point to the reader, more often these allusions are part of a serious philosophical 
point.62 In particular, Laws 10 and Republic 10 demonstrate the importance of proper 
religious observance in the kallipolis and that the virtuous citizen must be truly pious. But 
while piety is a crucial aspect of Platonic virtue, he is overtly critical of contemporary 
religious consideration of the gods. In the utopian state of Republic, Plato criticises the epic 
poets Homer and Hesiod, whose works were a crucial part of every Athenian’s religious 
education.63 His disapproval comes from the suggestions of the poets that the gods are not 
entirely just, which might lead to citizens believing they should behave in the same way. 
                                               
61 Hankinson 1998, p.7. 
62 McPherran 2006, p.244. 
63 McPherran 2006, p.245. 
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Plato concludes that in the absence of a convincing argument to the contrary, ‘the only poetry 
that should be allowed in a state is hymns to the gods and paeans in praise of good men.’64 
Laws 10 equally emphasises the importance of the acceptance of the gods, proper observance 
of religious practice, and the absence of hubris. Impiety is seemingly viewed as a crime 
comparable to acts of violence. Mayhew highlights this pairing since Plato has dealt with 
violent acts in Book 9 and then, in the opening of Book 10, effectively says ‘having dealt 
with one kind of serious crime, let’s look at impiety.’65 So while religion evidently plays a 
vital role in the life of the virtuous man, Plato suggests that the way in which the gods were 
presented to his fellow Greeks through epic poetry and thus treated in mainstream religious 
practice was misleading and impious. 
The gods had just as important a role to play in the philosophy of Aristotle, but like 
Plato, he also expresses his disagreement with the treatment of the gods in common religion. 
He agrees with Plato’s views expressed in Republic that the gods do not act like humans,66 
but in his Metaphysics he takes this further and entirely rejects the anthropomorphism of the 
Olympian gods, instead viewing them as purely contemplative beings.67 But these challenges 
to traditional religious thought and practices do not necessarily signal a complete departure, 
and contemporary religion still played an important role in the thought of both philosophers. 
So as demonstrated, it is extremely difficult to neatly extract the disciplines from one 
another. This difficulty is also evident from the secondary literature. When attempting to 
discuss the various areas of ancient medicine, scholars have tried to incorporate defined lines 
of division. Haliday employs a similar set of divisions as myself (the secular, the magical and 
the religious)68 whereas Grube, twenty years later, refined ‘medicine’ to include three 
subsections itself: Temple-medicine, physical training, and the medical schools. But this 
subset, in its attempt to be more precise, omits important areas of ancient medicine, magic or 
soothsayers, specifically the magoi, and medicine focused on drugs, the pharmakeia. 
Edelstein has expressed his discomfort with the various attempts to fit ancient medicine into 
three distinct categories.69 I am in agreement that the significant mutual influence of each 
area requires acknowledgement, but for the sake of ease of expression, I am forced to once 
again attempt to discuss each “area” or “discipline” separately, to some extent. So, while I 
                                               
64 Pl. Rep. 10.607a. 
65 Mayhew 2008, p.47. 
66 Ar. Met. 983a6. 
67 Ar. Met.1072b13; 1074b; Anagnostopoulos 2009, p.10; Bodéüs 2000, p.131. 
68 Haliday 1936, p.277. 
69 Edelstein 1967, p.207. van der Eijk 2005, p.10 expresses the same sentiment.  
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will be examining secular medicine, religious healing and temple-medicine, magic, and 
philosophic ethical healing as separate sections within this thesis, I will endeavour to remain 
alert to the profound overlap between areas and will comment on this influence where 
appropriate. 
 
 
8. Summary of Chapters 
The aim of Chapter 1: ‘Historical context’ is to examine the pre-Platonic understanding of 
depressive disorder and identify the treatment options available. I will first discuss the 
likelihood of Athenian citizens identifying depression as a medical illness and look for 
evidence within the Hippocratic corpus for whether medical options were sought out by 
sufferers of psychological conditions generally, and depression specifically.  I will then turn 
to religious options and temple-medicine. I will begin by briefly discussing why the cult of 
Asclepius became so popular, so rapidly, taking over from Apollo in his role as healer almost 
entirely. I will discuss the process by which ordinary people sought a cure for their ailments 
and why this might have been an attractive healing option. I will also discuss the surviving 
cure inscriptions from the sanctuary at Epidaurus and explore evidence of people seeking 
treatment for psychological disorders. Next, I will examine the practices of other healers, in 
particular the manteis (seers) and the magoi (magicians). I will examine how these pseudo-
religious healers were viewed by the intellectual elite and the general populous and why they 
might have been approached in the place of qualified physicians or sanctioned religious 
healers such as the priests of Asclepius. Finally, I will look to the philosophers as 
representatives of differing intellectual thought. This might seem to be a strange divergence 
from the secular and religious medical routes, but I believe this could have been an obvious 
route to explore to the educated Athenian citizen. Plato and Aristotle’s preoccupation with 
living the virtuous life make them ideal candidates to express a concern towards people who 
behaviour is periodically altered due to mental illness.  
Chapter 2: ‘Plato and Aristotle’s cultural inheritance and philosophical responses to 
the ancient healing environment’ explores the philosophers’ attitudes to each of the methods 
of healing presented in Chapter 1; secular medicine, temple medicine, and other healers. I 
will begin with Plato and show that his presentation of secular physicians and adaptation of 
popular medical theories indicate that he thought of the secular medical profession as worthy 
of consideration. I will then show, through his discussions of the creation of the universe in 
Timaeus, that the idea that the gods, like Asclepius, could perform direct, personal, medical 
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interventions would be unproblematic for Plato. Finally, it will become apparent that Plato 
thought seers could be legitimate, but the contempt shown towards magical healers, who 
claimed to have the ability to manipulate the gods, shows that he viewed their claims to be 
unsubstantiated and hubristic. I will then examine Aristotle’s views towards physicians, 
temple healing, and magical healers. Since we know that both his mother and father were 
physicians, we can confidently assume that Aristotle held the secular medical profession in 
high esteem. This assumption is supported within his treatises both in discussion of human 
biology and in his empirical approach within his texts. In regard to temple healing, Aristotle’s 
position is very unclear on whether or not he believed the gods were capable of the kind of 
individual, immediate, direct, requested incidents of medical healing claimed by the cult of 
Asclepius. As is usual with Aristotle, he refuses to entirely deny the possibility of something 
of this nature occurring, but I will show that he would very likely have not accepted this kind 
of healing. In terms of magical healers, in the same way, if Aristotle did not believe the gods 
were able to intervene in human affairs of their own free-will, it would be impossible for a 
mortal to force them to do so. Finally for this chapter, in order to show why Plato and 
Aristotle might have a particular interest in mood disorders, I will explore their theories of 
virtue. For both philosophers, the ultimate goal is to achieve eudaimonia and so any 
condition of the body or soul that might prevent the individual from achieving this virtue 
condition would reasonably have been of concern to them.  
I will then dedicate one chapter to each philosopher. Chapter 3: ‘Plato’ will first 
examine a passage from Timaeus, in which he discusses the symptoms of diseases of the soul, 
brought on by the bodily humors. These symptoms align closely with four of the nine DSM-
V symptoms of depression. They are presented in three pairs, suggesting that one pair is 
associated with each part of the tripartite soul. I argue that each symptom in a pair represents 
either the neglect or excessive satisfaction of the desire of a particular part, with the 
exception of the two symptoms associated with Reason, which both occur as a result of the 
neglect of its desire. This results in a hydraulic model of symptomatic presentation in which 
only one symptom in the pairs associated with Spirit and Appetites could manifest at any one 
time. However, it does also suggest that one symptom from each pair should present at the 
same time, leading to an individual with a disease in their soul experiencing four symptoms 
at any one time. I will go on to show that Plato’s characterisation of Apollodorus in both 
Symposium and Phaedo reflects this symptomatic model. In doing so, I will conclude that 
there is a positive correlation between DSM-V’s categorisation of depression and Plato’s 
depiction of psychic illness. 
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In Chapter 4: ‘Aristotle’, I will draw on references from across the corpus to show 
that Aristotle even more convincingly clusters together symptoms that DSM-V associates 
with depression. In relation to women, melancholics, and old men, Aristotle consistently 
groups together eight out of the nine symptoms of depression. Furthermore, he specifically 
attributes this passionate disposition to people with a cool physiology. This conclusion is 
consistent with the ideas presented in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata 30.1. By clustering 
eight out of the nine symptoms, and consistently attributing them to people with a cool 
physiology, Aristotle shows a surprisingly strong, positive correlation with DSM-V’s 
categorisation of depression, and associates them with one specific condition with its roots in 
physiology. 
Chapter 5: ‘Was philosophy of practical use in treating depression?’ will very briefly 
present the treatment recommendations made by Plato and Aristotle. The aim of this short 
chapter is to consider how these treatments may have provided alternative healing options to 
those presented in Chapter 1 for an Athenian resident suffering from depression. 
Through my explorations of fifth-century physicians, temple medicine, magical 
healing, and the works of Plato and Aristotle, I aim to show that the ancient understanding of 
affective disorders generally, and depression specifically, was in a state of evolution during 
this time period. Then, through my close analysis of the Platonic and Aristotelian corpora, I 
will show that the philosophers recognised depressive illness in a way that correlates 
positively with DSM-V’s current categorisation. This approach differs from the preceding 
scholarly enquiries in that depression is being examined as an illness that existed in ancient 
Athens, in its own right, rather than through its association with melancholia. My study will 
enrich existing understanding of the recognition of specific mental illnesses in the ancient 
Greek world.  
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Chapter 1: Historical context 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine depression in the context of Athenian society. Recognition of 
depression as an illness is dependent on a culture of self-awareness, compassion towards 
expressions of emotional vulnerability, and a belief that disease can affect the mind. 
Therefore, I will explore the likelihood of Athenian residents recognising their depression as 
an illness and their freedom to seek treatment should they desire. This recognition and the 
ability to try multiple treatment methods is likely to have varied depending on wealth, status 
and sex. It is probable that for men in particular, being wealthy would make recognition of 
the condition as an illness more likely because of increased leisure time and treatment 
opportunities would be broader with financial stability. On the other hand, for women, being 
part of a wealthy oikos may well have increased the likelihood of recognition but could have 
made treatment more difficult to obtain due to constraints on freedom of movement. Having 
examined how recognition and treatment might have varied dependent on wealth and sex, I 
will then begin to explore the lived experience of an Athenian who did recognise their 
condition as an illness and did have the freedom to try and treat their disorder. I will look at 
what options were available for treatment of illnesses and then explore if there is any 
evidence of practitioners in these methods attempting to treat or cure psychological disorders 
generally, and depressive disorders specifically. I will begin with secular physicians, then I 
will look at religious options and temple medicine in particular, and finally I will explore 
magic, pseudo-religious and pseudo-medical options. 
 
 
1. Recognition and disclosure 
When discussing illness in an ancient context, it is important to consider the likely personal 
thresholds for the individual to think of themselves as ill. Illness is a matter of personal 
recognition and may or may not involve the consultation of or input from another person. 
Helen King posits a list of factors that may influence the individual’s decision to regard 
themselves as ill. These include, ‘whether I am able to do all that I have to do, or want to do; 
my knowledge of the severity of my symptoms; and whether the monetary and social costs of 
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taking action outweigh any discomfort I may feel.’70 By these criteria, in ancient Athenian 
society the threshold for someone thinking of himself or herself as ill when experiencing a 
depressive disorder is likely to differ between people from different strata of society and 
between the sexes, due to differing responsibilities, constraints, and expectations.  
If any stratum of citizen in ClassicalAthens were to recognise depression, either in 
themselves or others, it would be the wealthy. The ordinary, poor, working citizen likely had 
more important things to concern themselves with than their emotional well-being, for 
example: continued financial security for their household; more immediately life-threatening 
diseases; access to fresh, non-contaminated drinking water; or the success of their annual 
harvest to provide their family with food against the threat of drought, flood, or disease. It 
seems unlikely that someone with these everyday responsibilities would have the time or the 
resources to be overly concerned with mild or even moderate depression. Unless the disorder 
was so bad that it began affecting their ability to work and thus provide for the family, I do 
not expect that a depressive illness would have been thought of as a priority, and certainly not 
worth spending their precious little disposable income on treatment through a qualified 
physician.  
The rich, on the other hand, would have fewer pressures with which to concern 
themselves, leaving more time for personal reflection. Therefore, they would probably have 
been more likely to identify moderate depression as a problem for which it was worth 
exploring treatment, and would have had the financial means to follow this through. The 
same trend can be seen in the modern world. As discussed previously, it has been reported 
that prevalence of depression is lower in less economically developed countries,71 but this is 
likely not reflective of actual rates of incidence. More accurately, if you are living in abject 
poverty, the chances are that you will not view your constant depressed mood as abnormal. 
And even if you did, you are not likely to have easy access to a mental health specialist. 
Whereas if you live in a developed country with relative personal stability and a good quality 
of life, you are probably more likely to see a depressed state as abnormal. 
So, wealthy Athenians might have been able to identify their own depressed state, but 
what about recognition of depressive disorders in others? This would require a society in 
which people had close, intimate relationships with friends, in which they felt comfortable 
discussing their emotional vulnerabilities. Any other relationship based on perceived status 
                                               
70 King 2005(b), p.6. 
71 DSM-V 2013, p.130. 
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and social advantage or a mutually beneficial business-like arrangement is unlikely to foster 
intimate discussions in which one party admits to concerns over self-worth or persistent 
sadness, for example. So, can we reasonably assume that such friendships did in fact exist in 
ancient Athens?  
Much of the existing literature that addresses the issue of friendship in this time 
period tends to focus on one of two things: understanding the scope of the term 
philos/philia,72 or exploring the extent to which the ancient Greeks employed a system of 
patronage similar to that which later existed in Rome.73 For my purposes, I am more 
interested in understanding if people in Athenian society had warm, intimate relationships 
that would correspond to what we think of as friendship. A friendship based on shared 
interests, compatible personalities, mutual compassion, and self-disclosure74 that exists 
despite any formal obligation or practical benefit. The existence of such relationships does 
not necessarily undermine the work of these scholars. It is, of course, still possible to have 
obligation within the oikos or to one’s patrons/clients while still maintaining the sort of 
intimate friendships that I will be exploring. They are by no means mutually exclusive. So, it 
remains to be explored if these relationships did exist, and if so, whether they were the kinds 
of relationships in which people might feel comfortable revealing any emotional 
abnormalities they may have been experiencing.  
I struggle to imagine a society in which the individual inhabitants did not experience 
meaningful, personal relationships outside of those dictated by social convention. You can 
choose to be courteous to those who affirm the status of your oikos, or those whom you are 
obliged to support politically, or perhaps those with whom you have agreeable business 
contracts, but this will not provide the same emotional satisfaction as a friendship based on 
mutual affection. You cannot choose nor predict to whom you take a liking. And, crucially, 
entirely suppressing the need for friendship (in the modern sense of the word) or indeed 
failing to secure such relationships, is damaging to the emotional well-being of the 
individual. As humans, we require social interaction and for this social interaction to be 
healthy and fulfilling, relationships cannot be orchestrated by social convention. They cannot 
abide by a set of rules as to with whom you may and may not form a friendly bond. 
Furthermore, it is clear that this was not a phenomenon alien to Athenian society. Making 
                                               
72 Belfiore 2000; Goldhill 1986; Heath 1987; Konstan 1997. 
73 Millett 1989; Strauss 1993; Zelnick-Abramovitz 2000. 
74 Defining parameters of modern friendship as identified by Duck 1983, p.67; Bell 1981, p.22 and 
Konstan 1997 p.14-5. 
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reference to Sophocles’ Philoctetes,75 who was marooned by Odysseus on the uninhabited 
island of Lemnos for ten years, Konstan notes that ‘to be deprived of human company was 
perceived as the extreme of suffering.’76 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics discusses the 
functioning of friendships in relative detail, highlighting that intimacy is crucial in strong and 
long-lasting friendships: 
 
τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον· εὖνοι µὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται 
ἀλλήλοις, φίλους δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα 
εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ µὴ λανθάνοντας δι᾿ ἕν τι τῶν εἰρηµένων… οἱ 
µὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιµον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ᾿ αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ᾗ 
γίγνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ᾿ ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι᾿ ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ 
ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὑτοῖς. οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ 
χρήσιµον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι᾿ ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς 
ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούµενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ ᾗ χρήσιµος ἢ ἡδύς…σπανίας δ᾿ εἰκὸς τὰς 
τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ 
τὴν παροιµίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγοµένους ἅλας 
συναναλῶσαι· οὐδ᾿ ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ᾿ εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν ἑκάτερος 
ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. 
 
To be friends therefore, men must (1) feel goodwill for each other, that is, wish each 
other’s good, and (2) be aware of each other’s goodwill, and (3) the cause of their 
goodwill must be one of the lovable qualities mentioned above…friends whose 
affection is based on utility do not love each other in themselves, but in so far as some 
benefit accrues to them from each other. And similarly with those whose friendship is 
based on pleasure: for instance, we enjoy the society of witty people not because of 
what they are in themselves, but because they are agreeable to us…Such 
friendships… require time and intimacy: as the saying goes, you cannot get to know a 
man till you have consumed the proverbial amount of salt in his company; and so you 
cannot admit him to friendship or really be friends, before each has shown the other 
that he is worthy of friendship and has won his confidence. 
(Aristotle EN 8.1156a1-5; 10-17; 25-9)  
 
                                               
75 Soph. Phil. 169-190, 234-39. 
76 Konstan 1997, p.16. 
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Aristotle here explicitly admits that two requirements for a long-lasting friendship are time 
and intimacy. The participating parties need to take the time to get to know one another and 
have the confidence of the other. This would suggest that it was indeed possible to have 
friends in fourth-century Athens in which one could confide, and so it is reasonable to 
assume that a friend might well notice a change in their friend’s demeanour or behaviour and 
express concern over this. Or vice-versa, if someone was experiencing extended periods of 
low-mood, for example, they might divulge this information to a close friend in whom they 
trust, especially since this kind of disclosure puts no expectation of help onto the friend, in 
the way a disclosure of financial ruin might, for example. There have been extensive debates 
regarding the degree to which Athenian citizens might be expected to help their friends (in 
the modern sense or otherwise), fellow citizens, the poor etc. when faced with financial 
hardship, sickness etc,77 but this does not really seem to apply in this situation. A disclosure 
of a depressed state would likely be seeking advice rather than a financial contribution.  
 
 
2. Opportunities for treatment 
In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. the Athenian population with the freedom (even if not 
the means) to seek medical attention themselves can be broadly broken down into the 
relatively few adult men of the upper and middle classes, and the vast majority of male 
citizens who made up the lower class.78 Athenian women will require separate examination, 
as the extent of their freedom is a matter of ongoing debate.  
As discussed previously, the likelihood of someone recognising their depressive state 
as an illness increases with wealth. So, wealthy citizens are probably the most likely to 
recognise their depression as an illness and want to seek assistance or treatment in some 
form.79 The poorest of citizens would have had far more pressing concerns in all but the most 
                                               
77 Blundell 1989, p.40-4; Christ 2010, p.255; Dover 1976, p.201; Hermann 2006, p.356-89; Konstan 
1997, p.6-15; Sternberg 2006, p.180. 
78 Rosivach 1991, p.193. I will only be considering Athenian citizens and their families in this study. 
The information available on slaves is too limited, although we can perhaps assume their freedom to 
pursue treatment would have been very restricted. I will also not be considering metics. It is unlikely 
that Athenian customs would have been imposed on them (although some may have adopted them) 
and since they could have immigrated from any number of places I cannot talk with any certainty 
about the freedom experienced by their wives, for example. 
79 I am being particularly careful in this discussion to differentiate between class and wealth. I do not 
use the term ‘wealthy’ interchangeably with ‘elite’, ‘upper-class’ or ‘aristocratic.’ After the 
Peloponnesian war, especially, many aristocratic families lost their wealth. They were still technically 
high-status, but were no longer wealthy, which is the defining feature in this discussion.  
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debilitating of cases. But even if a poor Athenian citizen did recognise their depression as 
something worth treating, from our limited surviving evidence it seems that even when this 
stratum of society were earning what they could expect to earn, it is unlikely that they would 
have had much in the way of disposable income at all.80 The commonly stated ball-park 
figure for a lower class skilled workers wage is 1 dr. per day worked, a figure taken from the 
wages paid to workers on the Erectheion, and Thucydides claims this was the daily wage paid 
to hoplites.81 Loomis thinks this is too simplistic and must have varied between professions,82 
but unfortunately we have very little information available. However, Aristophanes suggests 
that the half a dr. per day earned by a juror was just enough to feed a family of three on a 
very basic diet; a figure corroborated by Xenophon.83 So, even if a poor citizen had only one 
child and was earning 1 dr. daily, it is evident that this would leave very little in terms of 
disposable income.84 If this were the case, anything short of a psychological disorder that was 
completely debilitating does not seem likely to have warranted calling on assistance of any 
kind, if such assistance were to cost either money or a substantial amount of time.  
So, for the autonomous Athenian resident, the likelihood of self-recognition of a 
depressive disorder as an illness and then actively seeking treatment for this disorder is 
probably highly dependent on wealth.  But what of the non-autonomous residents; women in 
particular? Presumably the likelihood of recognising a depressive disorder in themselves 
would still increase with wealth. Despite the many domestic responsibilities of women from 
rich oikoi, they were still probably more likely to have more leisure time than poor women 
who would have had domestic chores with potentially no slaves to help them, as well as a job 
outside of the household to provide more of an income.  But in terms of seeking treatment, 
restrictions on the movement of aristocratic women around the city and visitors to the home, 
might have had more of an effect than financial constraints, allowing poor women more 
opportunity to seek out various methods of treatment.  
 
 
 
                                               
80 Xen. Ways and Means 1.1. comments on the ‘poverty of the masses’.  
81 IG I3 476; Thuc. 3.17.4; 8.45.11. 
82 Loomis 1998, p.233. 
83 Ar. Vesp. 300-2; Xen. Ways and Means 3.9. 
84 See also Aeschin. In Tim. 1.27. He uses an example of a lower-class citizen whom he describes as a 
craftsman who must work to earn his daily bread, the implication here being that if the worker did not 
work, he would not eat. 
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2.1. The freedom of women to seek treatment 
Based on the views expressed in ancient literature, it seems as though the segregation and 
seclusion of women certainly existed as an ideal in Athenian society. Xenophon states, ‘it is 
seemly for a woman to remain at home and not to be out of doors’,85 and Plato asserts that 
women are ‘accustomed to an underground and shadowy existence.’86 However, it is 
probable that these supposed societal ideals would have been quite difficult to implement in 
practice, especially for the poor.87 Women from poor families would certainly have had to 
leave the house and move around the city. Without a water supply to their house, or slaves to 
run errands for them, these women would have had to collect water, wash clothes, buy food 
etc. themselves. Aristotle comments on this in Politics, saying, ‘who could prevent the wives 
of the poor from going out when they want to?’88 There are also many examples of vase 
paintings depicting groups of women collecting water and carrying out other household 
chores. For example, in the three figures below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Attic Black- Figure Hydria. Antimenes Painter. 530-510 B.C. London, British 
Museum 1843,1103.66. Women waiting to fill their hydriai with water from the fountain on 
the left. The queue of women are split into 3 pairs, socialising and gossiping with each other 
as they wait. 
                                               
85 Xen. Oec. 7.30 
86 Pl. Laws. 781c. 
87 Blundell 1995, p.135-6. Pomeroy 1975 p.58-9 gives a succinct summary of the principal positions 
in the debate at the time of her writing including Ehrenberg 1943; Gomme 1925 and Lacey 1968, 
among others. 
88 Arist. Pol. 1300a. 
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Fig. 2: Attic Black-Figure Hydria. The AD Painter. 520-500 B.C. London, British Museum 
1843.11-3.49 (B329) Image on the body shows women collecting water from the fountain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Attic Black-Figure Epinetron. 500-480 B.C. London, British Museum. 
1814,0704.1205. Women working with wool.  
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Due to the addition of white paint on their skin in these images, I would suggest that the 
women depicted on these vases are specifically from poor, citizen families. There is nothing 
on any of these vases to suggest that the scenes are mythological or that the women depicted 
are slaves. Generally, it is very difficult to distinguish slave women from citizens on vase 
paintings. Slaves are usually identified by what they are doing rather than by what they are 
wearing or details in their appearance.89 However, in these instances, the addition of white 
paint on the exposed skin of the women could indicate that these women are citizens. The 
tradition of indicating a woman’s virtue by referring to her with the epithet white-armed 
(leukolenos) can be seen as far back as Homeric epic. Across the Iliad and the Odyssey, 
mortal women are referred to as white-armed 15 times, and Hera 24 times.90 The adjective is 
overwhelmingly used to depict the fair skin of a virtuous woman, fulfilling her proper role 
within the home, who lives most of her life inside, as she should. 91 The quintessential 
example of this image is Penelope. At Odyssey 2.95-110, Penelope, who is described as 
white-armed and ivory coloured,92 sits at her loom weaving a mourning shroud for her 
husband. She is a picture of virtue and domesticity, epitomised when her pale skin is 
described. So, with this strong association of the proper behaviour of citizen women and fair-
skin, we might interpret the white skin of the women on these vases as the painter showing 
that in these tasks, they are fulfilling their proper role and, in doing so, they are behaving 
virtuously. So, these women are probably citizens, but since they evidently do not have slaves 
to run these errands on their behalf, we should assume that they are citizens from poor 
families. 
Alongside these household duties that would likely have required poor women to 
leave the home, it seems that it was sometimes necessary for women from poor families to 
have jobs of their own and provide a supplementary income. 93 The surviving literature refers 
to such women working as grape-pickers and as having stalls in the market, selling goods 
such as ribbons, garlands, bread and vegetables.94 So, it would appear that despite a potential 
societal ideal that respectable women should remain within the home, this would just not 
                                               
89 McNiven 2012, p.516 
90 Thomas 2002, p.3. 
91 Thomas 2002, p.5. 
92 Hom. Od. 18.194; 23.241. 
93 Blundell 1995, p.137; Roberts 1998, p.20. 
94 Grape-pickers- Dem. 57.45; Ribbons- Dem. 57.31 and 34; Garlands- Ar. Thesm. 448; Bread- Ar. 
Vesp. 1390; Vegetables- Ar. Thesm. 387 and Vesp. 497; Blundell 1995, p. 137.  
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have been practical for the poor. Therefore, this relative freedom of movement could have 
provided the opportunity for poor women to seek out medical assistance. 
Scholarly debate tends to be more divided on the extent to which the movements of 
wealthy, upper-class women were restricted. In the first half of the twentieth century, there 
seems to have been a reluctance to admit that these women may have in fact had their 
movements restricted and lived their lives in virtual seclusion within the home.95 Gomme, to 
take one example, draws attention to the ease with which upper-class women seem to be able 
to leave the house in tragedy, suggesting that this representation may in fact show that 
women had a reasonable amount of freedom of movement.96 But Blundell points out that on a 
number of occasions we see these women, who have left the home of their own accord, 
engage in conversation with men causing the men to express their discomfort at the situation. 
This is seen in the conversation between Achilles and Clytaemnestra in Euripides’ Iphigeneia 
in Aulis 821-34. Achilles, having commented on Clytaemnestra’s evident high birth due to 
her beauty and expensive clothing, is explicit in his discomfort stating ‘it is shameful for me 
to stand talking to women.’97 In Euripides’ Electra, the title character is warned that ‘it is 
shameful for a woman to be standing with young men.’98 However, in these instances, it not 
just for leaving the house that the women are being reprimanded, but rather for engaging with 
unrelated men outside of the house. So perhaps this might suggest that in fact, so long as 
women avoided contact with men whilst going about their business outside of the house, they 
might have had relative freedom. On the other hand, in Women in the Assembly, Aristophanes 
comments that women who simply leave the house are thought to be meeting a lover.99 On 
this discrepancy, Blundell notes that the seemingly free movement of women in tragedy is 
often a thematic and staging necessity. The skene is usually the home, allowing for a clear 
visual boundary between private and public. The meeting and interactions of these two 
spheres of society is a theme that was popular among dramatists.100 Blundell’s conclusion on 
this issue, which I find the most reasonable assessment, is that the strongest possibility is that 
‘some people may have thought it acceptable for women to emerge from the house 
occasionally provided that they kept apart from male company.’101 This is consistent with my 
                                               
95 Blundell 1995, p.98. 
96 Gomme 1925 p.7-8. 
97 Eur. IA 831. 
98 Eur. El. 343-4. 
99 Ar. Eccl. 520. 
100 Blundell 1995, p.136. 
101 Blundell 1995, p.136. 
 40 
assessment of the white skin on vase paintings signifying virtuous behaviour, as shown on the 
images of groups of women collecting water on Fig. 1 and 2 with no men present, but 
Pomeroy notes that, in reality, the nature of the wealthy woman’s role within the household 
probably prevented her from leaving very often anyway.102  
Xenophon’s Oeconomicus gives an idealised description of a wealthy woman’s role in 
the household:  
 
ἔνδον τε µένειν καὶ οἷς µὲν ἂν ἔξω τὸ ἔργον ᾖ τῶν οἰκετῶν, τούτους συνεκπέµπειν, 
οἷς δ᾽ ἂν ἔνδον ἔργον ἐργαστέον, τούτων σοι ἐπιστατητέον, καὶ τά τε εἰσφερόµενα 
ἀποδεκτέον καὶ ἃ µὲν ἂν αὐτῶν δέῃ δαπανᾶν σοὶ διανεµητέον, ἃ δ᾽ ἂν περιττεύειν 
δέῃ, προνοητέον καὶ φυλακτέον ὅπως µὴ ἡ εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν κειµένη δαπάνη εἰς τὸν 
µῆνα δαπανᾶται. καὶ ὅταν ἔρια εἰσενεχθῇ σοι, ἐπιµελητέον ὅπως οἷς δεῖ ἱµάτια 
γίγνηται. καὶ ὅ γε ξηρὸς σῖτος ὅπως καλῶς ἐδώδιµος γίγνηται ἐπιµελητέον. ἓν µέντοι 
τῶν σοὶ προσηκόντων, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπιµεληµάτων ἴσως ἀχαριστότερονδόξει εἶναι, ὅτι, 
ὃς ἂν κάµνῃ τῶν οἰκετῶν, τούτων σοι ἐπιµελητέον πάντων ὅπωςθεραπεύηται. 
 
Your duty will be to stay indoors and dispatch those slaves whose work is outside, 
and superintend those who are to work indoors, and to receive what comes in and 
dispense as much of it as must be spent, and watch over as much as is to be kept in 
reserve, and take care that the amount stored up for a year is not spent in a month. 
And when wool is brought in to you, you must see that clothing is made for those who 
need it. You must also see to it that the dry grain is in good condition for making 
food. One of the duties that fall to you, however, will perhaps seem rather thankless: 
you will have to see that any servant who is ill is cared for. 
 (Xen. Oec. 7.35-6) 
 
From this description, it seems as though the mistress’ role was primarily to supervise the 
effective running of the household rather than being directly involved with the tasks herself, 
and this overseeing role is also attested by Erinna’s Distaff 23-4. So, it seems that wealthy 
women would have certainly had less reason to leave the house to run errands, as they would 
send slaves to do this instead. If this were the case, rich women may have had less 
opportunity to seek out treatment options than poor women; the reverse of that which we saw 
                                               
102 Pomeroy 1975, p.79. 
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for men. A kyria would not have been permitted to receive male guests into the house herself, 
so her lack of movement around the city would have denied her contact with male healers. 
 However, Xenophon does state that the role of organising medical treatment for any 
sick members of the household fell under the remit of the kyria. Since this was a role 
expected of her, it is probable that she would know who to approach for such treatment, and 
depending on the cost of treatment, she could possibly even have the finances in her 
possession to pay for these services without requiring the approval of her kyrios. But, the cost 
of treatment by a recognised physician was likely to be very expensive, as will be show in 
section 3.1.2, and kyriai were legally restricted in their possession of money to only a small 
amount to pay for household goods. Therefore, it is likely that the ability to pay for treatment 
may have to have been coupled with permission from their kyrios. This requires the woman 
with the disorder to recognise that she is ill, and also their kyrios to recognise the illness as 
such and be empathetic towards her desire for treatment.   
Therefore, a wealthy kyria may still have been unable to take advantage of all the 
treatment options on offer within the city. For the more expensive options, this depended on 
the approval of her kyrios, and if her movement around the city was restricted it is likely to 
have been more difficult for a kyria to receive treatment, especially from a male healer. 
On the other hand, while the members of a poor family might all be restricted to only 
the cheapest of treatment options, if a poor kyria had more freedom of movement around the 
city without acquiring specific permission, she might be comparatively more able to seek 
treatment for her disorder.103 
 
 
2.2. Who was most at risk of developing depression? 
Ironically, if women from wealthy oikoi were less able to seek treatment due to restrictions 
on their movements and interactions, this environment is probably more likely to breed 
depression in the first place. We now know that limited social interaction and a lack of 
sunlight (which leads to severe vitamin D deficiency) can be significant factors in the 
development of depression and these were both potential risk factors in the lives of these 
women.  
                                               
103 This comparative ease of spatial movement for the poor woman does not overcome the societal 
restrictions of who she would be able to mix with during her excursions out into the city, but these 
societal restrictions would probably apply to both poor and wealthy women, so spatial freedoms are 
still an important factor. 
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2.2.1. Social interactions 
Wealthy, upper-class women probably spent a majority of their lives within the home, 
sending slaves on errands outside the home instead, and because of this, friendships and 
social interactions with other women would have had to have been conducted within the 
home as well.104 As Pomeroy notes, there was probably very little time for women to leave 
the home due to the volume of domestic responsibilities, so the amount of time available for 
social visits to other upper-class women was probably also very limited. The scenes we have 
of lower-class women collecting water, washing clothes etc. together, tend to show the 
women socialising as they work.105 Pomeroy thinks that these women must have found great 
pleasure in gossiping as they ran their errands together106 so, in comparison, the relatively 
restricted social interactions of wealthy women could have made the feelings of isolation or 
seclusion more intense. It has been suggested that women may have developed close 
relationships across the slave/citizen boundary due to the amount of time spent together on 
household chores,107 but to spend every day of one's life with the same people, especially 
people who are probably always acutely aware of their inferior status, cannot have been a 
complete remedy for feelings of isolation. 
 
2.2.2. Vitamin D deficiency 
The other factor associated with being confined within the home that could increase the risk 
of developing a depressive disorder, is a lack of sunlight leading to vitamin D deficiency.108 
The most complete and representative remains we have of Hellenic houses are at Olynthus. 
The ruins show that in urban areas, the houses of the poor would have been very small, dark 
and squalid, but the houses of the wealthy would have had slightly more space to incorporate 
a small garden and open-air courtyard in the interior of the house.109 Therefore, there was 
outside space available within the house of which wealthy women might have taken 
advantage. However, there seems to me to be two reasons that the mistress of the house 
would have been unlikely to make use of this outside space: the nature of her work, and the 
engrained societal ideal that virtuous women should have pale skin.   
                                               
104 Blundell 1995, p.137. 
105 See Fig.1 in particular. 
106 Pomeroy 1975, p.80. 
107 Davies 1994, p.6-11; Lewis 2002, p.80. 
108 See Holick 2008; Menkes 2012; Pearce and Cheetham 2010. 
109 Wycherley 1962, p.176-188. 
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Archaeological finds make it apparent that these courtyards were not used for leisure. 
Saddle querns, mortars, olive presses and even loom-weights have been found scattered all 
over the courtyards of these wealthy residences.110 So, the mistress would need to be directly 
involved in this work to be spending extended periods of time in the courtyard. As already 
seen,111 the literary image we get from the likes of Xenophon and Erinna is that of a 
supervisory role over domestic chores, rather than manual work. But this could have been 
done outside. Some of the depictions on vases show the mistress sitting among her slaves and 
actively overseeing the work.112  
On the other hand, there are many examples of vase paintings that go so far as to 
suggest the mistress would in fact be involved in the manual labour. Vases show women, 
assumed to be mistresses of a household, sitting and performing a chore, often weaving at a 
small loom, spinning, or another aspect of wool work. They are shown either alone in this 
chore, or seated amongst their slaves.113 For example, Figure 4 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Attic Red-Figure Lekythos. Brygos Painter.  500-450 B.C. Boston (MA), Museum of 
Fine Arts, 13.189. Seated woman working with wool.114  
                                               
110 Whitley 2001, p.320, 24. 
111 See p.40. 
112 Lewis 2002, p.63. reproduced drawing of Attic Red-figure Pyxis, c.450 B.C. Paris, Musée de 
Louvre CA 587.  
113 A Black-Figure Lekythos attributed to the Amasis painter shows a group of women performing 
different parts of wool work with the seated mistress directly involved with the work. Von Bothmer 
1986, p.186. 
114 See also Keuls 1983, p.219 Fig 14.25 (woman with hand loom); p.217. Fig.14.16. (woman 
spinning); p.217 Fig. 14.17 (woman spinning); p.217 Fig. 14.18 (woman admiring a cloth, distaff 
overhead). 
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But, Lewis notes that we should be skeptical about the realism of these images. She points 
out that domestic scenes very rarely appear on pots that were ‘for distinctly ‘female’ use’115 
and more often appear on kraters and pelikai intended for export.116 So we should assume 
that these images were highly idealised creations of the lives of virtuous Athenian women. It 
is possible that these images of the lady of the house sitting by her loom symbolises her 
virtue, rather than suggesting that she actually undertook this work.117 So, we return to 
Xenophon’s depiction of the mistress, and if her primary role is in delegating the manual 
work and overseeing the household finances, she may well have spent most of her time truly 
indoors. 
Another societal expectation that may have exacerbated the situation is the association 
of pale skin with virtue. I have already drawn attention to the addition of white paint on the 
skin of women on vase paintings and commented that in literature this does seem to have 
been a way of implying that a woman was virtuous and spent her life within the home.118 If 
this association of fair-skin, virtue, and beauty119 had been engrained in Athenian thought 
since Homer, Thomas thinks that this ‘glorification of whiteness must have had a tremendous 
effect on actual women.’120 We know that women veiled themselves in public and made their 
skin paler by using lead based cosmetics to make themselves more attractive,121 and so it 
would not be surprising if they tried to keep out of the sun as much as possible to avoid their 
skin darkening. 122  
It would seem that high-class, wealthy women were likely to remain completely 
indoors for the majority of their lives due to the following aspects of their lives: their relative 
confinement to the home; veiling whilst outside; the nature of their domestic role as overseer 
of the chores; and an engrained societal expectation that the beautiful, virtuous woman 
should be ‘white-armed’, causing women to deliberately limit their exposure to the sun as 
much as possible. This very likely resulted in vitamin D deficiency, increasing their risk of 
                                               
115 Lewis 2002, p.59. 
116 Lewis 2002, p.59. 
117 Lewis 2002, p.65. 
118 See p.36-7. 
119 Athena makes Penelope paler (‘whiter than sawn ivory’ Od. 18.195-6) to enhance her appearance 
and the suitors are ‘beguiled with desire’ 18.212-3. 
120 Thomas 2002, p.10. 
121 Xen. Oec. 10.2. 
122 Ar. Thes. 191-2 refers to Agathon’s pale-skin, implying that he is both effeminate and an 
intellectual. Manly pursuits involve being outside, exposed to the elements, and such exposure was 
known to darken the skin. The connection between sun exposure and dark skin is also seen at Pl. Rep. 
556d; Ar. Eccl. 62-4. 
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developing depression. Alongside the limitations on social interaction, it seems that wealthy, 
upper-class women could have been more at risk of developing depression than poor, lower-
class women. Due to their increased leisure time, wealthy, upper-class women would also be 
more likely to recognise their symptoms as indicative of an illness, but they may have had 
more difficulty receiving treatment for the disorder due to reduced autonomy. 
 
 
2.3. Summary 
As discussed, the likelihood of any Athenian resident acknowledging that their depressive 
disorder was a problem which required treatment, and then being able to seek treatment, 
would be dependent on their wealth, status and gender. The chance of recognising the 
disorder is likely to increase as status increases for both men and women, but in terms of 
having the ability to seek treatment, it is probable that wealthy men of any status and poor, 
lower-class women were the most able of their genders. Men were probably most confined by 
their financial situation, and women by their freedom of movement.  
So, if a resident’s disorder were debilitating enough to prompt seeking outside 
assistance, and they had the freedom to do so, where could they go? Who could they 
approach? How was the origin of mental illnesses generally perceived by different factions of 
healers? How did these differences in perceived origin affect treatment recommendations? 
Were there options available to the rich that were not realistic for the poor? I will now go on 
to address a few of the potential options for ancient Greek healing and explore what each area 
could offer in terms of treatment for depression. 
I will begin with the most obvious area of treatment from a modern perspective; 
medical aid. Within this, I will consider the practicalities of hiring a qualified physician and 
explore the perceived origins of the disorder, their recommendations of drugs and herbal 
remedies, dietary regimen, and physical activity. The Hippocratic physicians will be the 
primary focus of the section on qualified physicians because the Hippocratic treatises are the 
only texts to survive in their entirety, suggesting a degree of medical dominance in the fifth 
and fourth centuries. Considering the theistic culture of the time, it is also likely that people 
would have turned to the gods for help with their medical ailments, so this will be my next 
area of study. I will look at Apollo in his role as healer and consider why the cult of 
Asclepius appears to have acquired a total monopoly over divine healing in place of the 
Olympian deity in a very short amount of time. I will then turn to the blurry realm of magical 
healers, unqualified physicians, quasi-religious healers, and charlatans. Finally, I will briefly 
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touch on whether there was room in the medical environment for input of philosophers and 
introduce the idea of moral deficiency as a cause for psychological illness that will lead into 
subsequent chapters.  
It is worth noting, once again, that I do not envisage a clear distinction between the 
four ‘sectors’ I will be examining. I view all areas of ancient healing as thoroughly co-
influential and, in truth, it is virtually impossible to neatly extract them from one another.  
 
 
3. Secular medical practices 
One option when seeking treatment for a perceived illness is, of course, to approach a 
physician. Respected physicians in Athens were expected to have trained with a renowned 
intellectual medical centre. Galen would have us believe that there were only two doctrinally 
opposed medical schools with which an aspiring physician could train: the School of Knidos 
(founded by Alcmaeon) and Kos (founded by Hippocrates).123 However, Smith and Langholf 
suspect that these centres were not as distinct as Galen suggests, and that there were likely 
other medical centres with which one could train.124 However, considering that it is the 
Hippocratic treatises that make up the vast majority of our surviving sources penned by 
practicing physicians, it might be reasonable to assume that by the fifth century B.C., the 
Hippocratic tradition dominated respected medical thought and physicians trained in this 
tradition were highly respected practitioners of secular medicine. From this point onwards, I 
will speak of the Hippocratic school, tradition, and practices as a means to refer to 
intellectual, highly trained and qualified physicians, but in the knowledge that there were 
likely other medical centres with which an aspiring physician could train.  
 
3.1. Barriers to medical treatment 
While qualified, secular physicians resided in the city, the opportunity for an individual to 
recieve treatment from them would depend on a number of factors. I will first explore 
whether there were sufficient physicians to treat the whole population. Then I will examine 
the cost of receiving treatment from a qualified physician and show how this may have been 
another barrier to medical treatment. We might assume that these doctors, who were usually 
themselves from aristocratic families, would have charged significant sums for their 
                                               
123 Gal. Method of Medicine 1.6K-7K. 
124 Langholf 1990, p.12-36; Smith 1973. 
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expertise, and so may have been available only to the richest members of society. However, I 
will show that it is very difficult to come to a decisive conclusion on these financial issues, 
since the limited surviving evidence is ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations. It has 
even been suggested that the city of Athens may have paid qualified physicians an annual 
salary in return for their agreement to treat all citizens equally, regardless of wealth. Finally, I 
will examine the perceived origin of psychological illnesses according to the Hippocratic 
authors before attempting to identify if there is any evidence of secular physicians treating 
depressive disorders specifically. 
 
3.1.1. Number of physicians 
If we consider probable numbers of qualified physicians in comparison to the estimated 
citizen population, there may not have been a sufficient number of physicians to treat the 
entire population of the city. Herodotus tells us that in the mid-fifth century, there were 
30,000 Athenian men of voting age.125 So we might estimate 60,000 residents to include 
women of the same age and perhaps 80,000 including the children of citizen families. This 
obviously does not include metics or slaves, for which it is very difficult to give even a 
conservative estimate,126 but who would still require medical assistance from time to time. 
Cohn-Haft estimates that a city would need one doctor per 1000 residents127 so based on an 
estimated population of 80,000 Athenians, the city would require 80 physicians in order to 
cope with everyday ailments. But Cohn-Haft’s calculations are based on 1950s Greece, with 
the benefits of good sanitation, antibiotics, vaccines, disinfectants and antiseptics, none of 
which would have been available to the 80,000 ancient Athenians. Disease and infection 
would have been far more prevalent, and epidemics far more common, so in order to treat the 
population sufficiently, Athens may have needed many more than the 80 doctors that might 
suffice in the modern day.  
The most likely men to have the means to train with the Hippocratic school are those 
from wealthy families. In order to be successful in this rigorous medical training, the student 
                                               
125 Herodotus Histories 5.97.2. Hansen 1985, p.26 points out that this number is ‘obviously a 
conventional figure’ (citing Ar. Eccl. 1131-33; Pl. Symp. 175e; Menander Epit. 1088; Arrian Anab. 
2.5; 2.6.1) and so is probably a just literary technique, instead of Herodotus actually knowing the 
estimated population of Athens. He then goes on to estimate the number in the fourth century based 
on the minimum number of citizens required to satisfy the terms of appointment to the Boule, and 
concludes that, actually, 30,000 is a reasonable suggestion. This figure is corroborated by Hansen 
again in 1988. 
126 Hansen 1988, p.10-11. 
127 Cohn-Haft 1956, p.24.  
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would have to be highly educated, literate and, if Plato is to be believed,128 wealthy enough to 
pay the tuition fees. Being the smallest stratum of society, and being a profession that 
required rigorous training, a compassionate disposition and a strong enough stomach to 
undertake all manner of invasive treatment, including surgery, it is possible that there were 
not enough qualified physicians to cope with the demand for secular medical healthcare 
within the city. Cohn-Haft draws attention to the Athenian pseudo-decree honouring 
Hippocrates for the publication of his medical treatises ‘in order that many may become 
physicians.’129 While it is unlikely that simply reading these texts would produce a 
sufficiently qualified Hippocratic physician, it does indicate that Athens had a shortage of 
doctors and welcomed the opportunity for more residents to educate themselves in medical 
practices. And if qualified physicians were relatively hard to come by, there would probably 
have been a significant demand for their time; time that would be best spent on ailments with 
which they were familiar and knew they could treat reasonably successfully. Across the 
Hippocratic corpus the advice to physicians seems to be that suffering should be alleviated as 
best as possible, but if the disease is known to be incurable, there is little point in trying.130 
So, the likelihood of a doctor making time to treat a depressive disorder might be dependent 
on how quick and effective he felt the treatment might be.  And it remains to be seen how 
aware the Hippocratic authors were of mood disorders. 
 
3.1.2. Cost of seeking treatment from a physician 
The second potential barrier to treatment is financial. With the rigorous training required and 
the apparent respect and esteem associated with the great techne of medicine,131 we might 
expect that being treated by these doctors would be out of the price range of all but the 
wealthiest of citizens. Unfortunately, we have very little evidence of how much a physician 
would have been paid for his services and the evidence to help estimate an average lower or 
middle class Athenian wage is just as sparse.132 In his efforts to meticulously collect and 
organise every surviving reference to the wages received by individuals in a variety of 
professions in ancient Athens, Loomis has uncovered just two references to the fees charged 
by physicians for individual ailments. The first is from fragment 12 of the comic writer 
                                               
128 Pl. Prt. 311b alludes to Hippocrates charging a fee to learn his craft. 
129 Cohn-Haft 1956, p.25; Littre 1861, p.400-2. 
130 Hipp. The Art 14; On Diseases 1.6.26.  
131 See Métraux 1995, p.ix. 
132 See discussion on p.2. 
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Alcaeus, in which Pollux 9.53 simply says ‘a talent’s worth of diseases.’133 Being such a 
short statement, and from a comic writer, this comment is ambiguous and should be treated 
with caution. Loomis notes that he is unsure if the author is referring to a talent in monetary 
terms, or weight.134 In other words, does the talent refer to the physician’s fee, or is it just 
highlighting the severity of the diseases? And even if it does refer to the physician’s fee, the 
number of diseases is not specified, and crucially, the comic author is most likely being 
deliberately hyperbolic. Consequently, we are no closer to learning the true cost of a doctor’s 
visit. But, even if Alcaeus is exaggerating, what we can take from this is perhaps that 
physicians were generally considered to be expensive, even if they were not actually charging 
a talent. The second fragment, this time from Nicophon, refers to a ‘3 obol fever.’ 135 This 
seems more promising as we have an exact, and seemingly reasonable amount, associated 
with just one fever, but once again Loomis is cautious. He again wonders if the 3 obols are 
referring to the severity of the fever, rather than the cost of treatment for it. To lend weight to 
this interpretation, Storey chooses to translate the comment ‘πυρετὸς…, οὐκ ἄξιος 
τριωβόλου’ as ‘good-for-nothing fever’ instead of the more literal 3 obols.136  So the only 
surviving references are suspicious, and even if we were to take them at their word and 
assume they mean literally what they say, they are in direct contradiction with one another. 
Alcaeus implies that doctors charged a fortune, Nicophon claims that they charged a rather 
reasonable fee.  
But, there does exist some further evidence regarding remuneration of physicians, 
which can potentially be interpreted as contradicting the earlier assumption that a lack of 
disposable income could be an obstacle to receiving medical treatment. It seems as though a 
system may have been in place in which city-states provided certain qualified physicians with 
an annual salary. Herodotus claims that Democedes was a recipient of this salary in various 
states once they realised he was extremely skilled as a physician. He says:  
 
In his second year the Aeginetans paid him a talent to be their public physician; in the 
third year the Athenians hired him for a hundred minae, and Polycrates in the fourth 
year for two talents. 
(Hdt. 3.131.2.) 
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Loomis thinks this must be hugely exaggerated. He thinks a hundred minae (or 10,000 
drachmas) is probably closer to what the King of Persia might make in a year, so not a 
reasonable sum for a single physician.137 I am not so sure though. If our very basic ball-park 
figure for a lower-class daily wage was 1 dr. it does not seem so incredulous that a highly 
skilled physician might be paid 10,000 per year (30 dr. per day). But despite the questionable 
amount of money, there could still be some truth in the practice of providing skilled 
physicians with a state salary. Diodorus states that by the time of Charondas, it had already 
been legislated that ‘private citizens, when ill should enjoy the services of physicians at state 
expense.’138 This information is corroborated by an Aristophanic Scholiast who claims that at 
this time ‘the physicians appointed by the state being public officers were accustomed to 
attend to the sick without fee.’139 Then in Aristophanes’ Acharnians, a peasant asks 
Dicaeopolis for a salve for his eyes and Dicaeopolis replies ‘I am not a public physician…go 
weep to Pittalos.’140 So it would seem that although the details of the practice such as the 
usual salary amount remain a mystery, the practice itself does seem to have existed. 
So, does this mean that Athens (and other cities) were running their own public health 
service, thus ensuring the best quality medical care was available to all citizens regardless of 
wealth? For many years scholarly opinion was in favour of this humanitarian interpretation, 
first presented by Vercoutre in 1880 and refined by Pohl in 1905. It was not until Cohn-Haft 
in 1956 that this interpretation was challenged and deemed unrealistically utopian.141 Cohn-
Haft sought to critically re-examine the evidence originally put forward by Vercoutre and 
Pohl with the intention of showing that the evidence originally used to draw their conclusions 
should not have been given the weight that it was. Cohn-Haft mainly takes issue with the 
passage from the Aristophanic scholia. The scholium probably dates to around A.D. 400, so 
although Cohn-Haft admits that the author most likely had access to sources now lost to us, 
being 800-900 years removed from the events, he does not think this passage should be 
considered among the evidence from which to draw conclusions.142 Cohn-Haft treats the 
scholium far more critically than his predecessors and makes some valid assertions about its 
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usefulness, but the same treatment is not extended to Diodorus. It seems as though Cohn-Haft 
does not seem to want to believe that the ancient Greeks could have possibly employed such 
a progressive and humanitarian system of healthcare. Diodorus’ evidence is disregarded 
simply because there is no evidence that Charondas’ laws survived down to the Hellenistic 
period even though Cohn-Haft himself says that ‘there is no reason to doubt the fact of 
Diodorus’ account’.143 Except for maintaining an awareness that Diodorus was writing in the 
first century B.C, up to 400 years after the events (depending on the chosen dating of 
Charondas), I am inclined to agree. Cohn-Haft then wonders, if this practice did exist, why is 
it that in some inscriptions the physician is commended for offering his services free of 
charge if he was just doing what he was paid to do.144 The conclusion he eventually reaches 
is that providing a state salary to these physicians achieved two things: 1) it went some way 
to combat the shortage of doctors by guaranteeing the physicians residence in the community; 
2) it provided an official public endorsement of a given physician’s qualification to practice 
in a particular community to protect citizens from charlatans.145  To this I would add that, 
quite simply, having some kind of public health provision in a densely populated city would 
have been logical, and Athens was a wealthy city that would likely have had the means to 
provide this practical measure. So, despite the unreliability of the Aristophanic scholia, the 
evidence provided by Herodotus, Diodorus and Aristophanes’ Acharnians does seem to 
suggest there was some kind of state funding for qualified physicians in Athens. But this may 
have been simply an incentive for them to stay in the city or possibly to ensure that the very 
poorest citizens could also receive medical care. Presumably, most patients, even those on a 
very restricted income, were expected to pay for their treatment. 
 
 
3.1.3. Summary 
The evidence regarding the availability of qualified physicians is limited and contradictory. 
Our only two sources discussing amounts of money paid for treating illness are in direct 
contradiction, one suggesting it was extremely expensive, the other that it was very cheap, 
and on the other hand both might actually be referring to severity rather than amounts of 
money. Then, the references we have which discuss publically remunerated physicians are 
contentious. The two least disputed references, from Herodotus and Aristophanes, make no 
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mention of what expectation of services the salary carried, and the only passages which do 
suggest that the physicians were expected to provide free healthcare are from 400 and 800 
years after the time period. So I cannot comment on the financial availability of Athenian 
physicians with any certainty. I suppose the safest option would be to assume that, since 
inscriptions do exist in praise of physicians who provided free healthcare to poor patients, 
wealthy patients might have paid qualified physicians handsomely to make their care a 
priority in a society in which doctors were under huge demand.  
 
 
3.2 Perceived origins of psychological disturbance   
By the time of Plato’s writings, and throughout Aristotle’s academic career, Hippocratic 
medicine dominated medical thought.146 As a result, they are the only medical works to have 
survived as complete texts. So, if one were to seek treatment from a qualified physician in 
late fifth- or fourth- century Athens, it is highly likely that the physician in question would 
have been trained in the Hippocratic tradition.147  
While the Hippocratic collection has survived remarkably well and should be able to 
provide a detailed understanding of the Hippocratic notion of the origins of both physical and 
mental illnesses, the Hippocratic treatises are problematic in their own way. The corpus is 
made up of treatises written by many different authors, all of whom were presumably 
practicing physicians trained in the Hippocratic method, but the variety of authors leads to 
issues of unity of interpretation of the Hippocratic teachings across the corpus. Furthermore, 
it is uncertain whether any of the surviving treatises were penned by Hippocrates himself. 
Edelstein notes that even in antiquity the authenticity of the texts was in dispute, so it is very 
unlikely that any of our surviving texts are genuine.148 However, Simon is more optimistic. 
He believes the focus should be on the ‘similarities of spirit that shine through the diversity 
of content’149 and that some trust should be placed in the ‘intuition of the ancient doctors and 
editors who saw a unity in these works.’150 I am inclined to agree with Simon, and so, where 
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possible, I will attempt to construct a coherent picture of the Hippocratic notion of the origin 
of psychological disorders and how these could be treated.  
It quickly becomes apparent that psychological illness was thought of in the same way 
as physical illnesses. The most famous example of this thinking is found in  
On the Sacred Disease. While the treatise is seemingly about epilepsy in particular, Simon 
argues that this does not render it irrelevant in the discussion of psychological disorders, 
because epilepsy is ‘typical of the way Greek physicians considered severe mental 
disturbances.’151 While a majority of the symptoms identified for this condition are physical, 
the author also refers to emotional and psychological disturbances such as night fears and 
terrors, and delirium152 and it is clear that the author believes that the origin of this disease 
lies with the humoral composition of the body. He explains that the disease is caused by an 
abundance of phlegm in the brain at birth. This excess phlegm then infiltrates other areas of 
the body, searching for somewhere to settle, and in doing so, causes the different symptoms 
experienced by epileptics depending on where the phlegm is located.153 This shows that 
Hippocratic physicians had made a connection between illnesses that present psychological 
symptoms and the notion of humors being responsible for illness. A similar conclusion is 
expressed in On Internal Affections 48. The disease in question is said to arise from bile that 
collects in the liver and settles in the head. It then causes certain psychological symptoms 
such as visual hallucinations, nightmares, delirium, alongside a few physical symptoms such 
as problems with eyesight and cold feet. This disease clearly exhibits mental disturbances, 
and the cause is again thought to be linked to an excess of a humor at this location within 
body. The aetiology is physical. Thus, in order to understand how the Hippocratic physicians 
would have attempted to treat illnesses with psychological symptoms, it is necessary to 
understand how they viewed the humors functioning within the body. 
The author of The Nature of Man provides the most comprehensive explanation of the 
composition of the healthy and diseased body, and explains the Hippocratic humoral theory 
in detail; a theory of which the other Hippocratic authors often assume audience 
knowledge.154 He suggests that health is achieved through the optimum co-mingling of the 
four humors of which the body is comprised; blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile. 155 It 
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is suggested that there is an ideal humoral balance that allows for the correct functioning of 
the entire body, resulting in health: 
 
ὑγιαίνει µὲν οὖν µάλιστα, ὅταν µετρίως ἔχῃ ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα κρήσιος καὶ6 
δυνάµιος καὶ τοῦ πλήθεος, καὶ µάλιστα µεµιγµένα ᾖ· 
 
He enjoys the most perfect health when these elements [the humors] are duly 
proportioned to one another…and when they are perfectly mingled. 
(Hipp. Nature of Man 4)  
 
It is clear that for the body to be in a state of health all four humors must be present in the 
correct quantities and thoroughly mixed together at all times.  
Conversely, disease was thought to arise when this balance was upset in any way. 
According to The Nature of Man, this imbalance would occur ‘when one of these elements 
[humors] is in deficit or excess, or is isolated in the body without being compounded with all 
the others.’156 Excess of a humor can seemingly occur in one of two ways; either a humor 
separates from the mixture and moves to another location, therefore causing an excess in the 
arrival location and a deficiency in the part it has left, or a region of the body could simply 
contain too much of a particular humor, which would require purging to reestablish the 
correct proportions. As detailed in The Sacred Disease, if an individual contains an excess 
from birth of one particular humor and the balance of humors is not redressed, the individual 
will experience recurrent diseases associated with that humor.157 
So, if diseases with psychological features were thought to originate with humoral 
imbalances within the body, the expectation would be that the treatment recommended would 
be the same as with other more obviously physical diseases. Usually, a drug or potion is 
recommended. However, the Hippocratic physicians were seemingly cautious about only 
prescribing drugs and herbal remedies, often offering alternative treatment methods should 
the patient choose.158 For example, Regimen 3.73 suggests that if the patient does not want to 
take the drugs recommended, they can instead take a hot bath, induce vomiting after eating 
certain foods and then take a short walk for six days, and then slowly increase the food and 
exercise over the course of a month. Diet and exercise are the most commonly recommended 
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treatments and it is the qualities of certain foods that render them appropriate for the 
treatment of particular diseases. For example, barley water is very commonly prescribed 
because of its cold and moist qualities.159 To a modern reader, these treatments seem very 
simplistic, and while increasing one’s daily amount of gentle exercise might have had some 
positive effect on a patient suffering with a depression, it is unlikely that small dietary 
changes or induced vomiting after meals would have dramatically improved their symptoms. 
In fact, the author of Regimen in Acute Diseases complains that because of the seemingly 
simple remedies often prescribed by physicians, some laymen think that all physicians just 
prescribe the same thing regardless of the disease.160 But perhaps these simple and readily 
available alternative treatments to drugs are further indicative of the financial position of 
many of the physician’s patients. Barley water would have been a very affordable option for 
the poorest citizen and it is of no use to prescribe treatments far out of the financial reach of 
the patient.161 Also, there does seem to have been a general belief in the ancient world that 
living simply was better for health than extravagance.162 But there may have been some truth 
in the thinking that eating very basic grains and simple foods could help the sick. When 
thinking about the nutritional value of crops, the increased food production brought about by 
huge population increases and industrialisation, coupled with our narrow selection of the 
most weather resistant crops and planting the same crops in the same areas year on year, 
significantly reduces their nutritional value. So, our crops are likely far poorer in nutrients 
than the similar crops consumed in ancient Greece.163 So perhaps, by prescribing a diet more 
abundant in different types of grain, the physician was, knowingly or unknowingly, 
improving the nutritional intake of the patient, hence potentially resulting in a faster recovery. 
The same treatments are indeed recommended for psychological diseases.164 Changes 
to diet and exercise are recommended, but there seems to be a particular drug associated with 
these psychological diseases that may help us in understanding a more specific assumed 
origin of these types of illnesses. 165 The author of On Diseases recommends that a disease 
with largely psychological symptoms should be treated with the hellebore flower: 
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δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖσι σπλάγχνοισιν εἶναι οἷον ἄκανθα καὶ κεντέειν, καὶ ἄση αὐτὸν λάζυται· 
καὶ τὸ φῶς φεύγει καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τὸ σκότος φιλέει, καὶ φόβος λάζεται. καὶ 
αἱ φρένες οἰδέουσιν ἐκτός, καὶ ἀλγέει ψαυόµενος. καὶ φοβεῖται, καὶ δείµατα ὁρᾷ καὶ 
ὀνείρατα φοβερὰ καὶ τοὺς τεθνηκότας ἐνίοτε. καὶ ἡ νοῦσος [ἐνίοτε] λαµβάνει τοὺς 
πλείστους τοῦ ἦρος. Τοῦτον πιπίσκειν ἑλλέβορον. 
 
Something like a thorn seems to be in the inward parts and to prick them; loathing 
attacks the patient, he flees light and people, he loves the dark, and he is seized by 
fear. His diaphragm swells outwards, and is painful when touched. The patient is 
afraid, and he sees terrible things, frightful dreams, and sometimes the dead. This 
disease attacks most people in spring. Give the patient hellebore to drink. 
(Hipp. On Diseases 2.72.) 
 
The author of On Internal Affections then makes the following explicit statement regarding 
the use of hellebore to purge excessive bile within the body: 
 
Ἢν δὲ ἀπὸ χολῆς ἡ νοῦσος γένηται, πῖσαι αὐτὸν ἐλλέβορον. 
 
If the disease has arisen from bile, have the patient drink hellebore.  
(Hipp. On Internal Affections 51) 
 
 
This association of hellebore and bile can be seen multiple times across the corpus,166 so, 
from these extracts, we can begin to construct a picture of certain ancient assumptions. 
Hellebore treats diseases caused by bile. Hellebore also treats diseases with psychological 
symptoms. So it follows that, of all the humors, it is bile that causes diseases with 
psychological symptoms. But can we even more precisely pinpoint the humoral origin? At 
some point, bile began to be thought of in two separate humoral categories. The author of The 
Nature of Man distinguishes between yellow bile and black bile and Nutton believes this may 
have been the first time such a distinction had been made from the way in which the author 
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refers to the humor as ‘the so-called black bile’.167  It is possible that this separation of the 
biles may have evolved from the tendency to associate primarily psychological illnesses, 
which were already thought to originate from bile, with blackness. For example, in On 
Internal Diseases 48, as seen previously, the author specifies that the patient whose largely 
psychological disorder was brought on by excess bile, must be treated with black 
hellebore.168  
 
 
3.3. Acknowledgment of depressive illness 
Having established that the Hippocratic corpus acknowledges diseases with psychological 
symptoms that seemingly originate from black bile, is there any evidence of a medical 
acknowledgment of depressive illness? It is worth noting that even in Western societies 
today, with our relatively wide-spread awareness of affective disorders, often it is still the 
case that medical treatment is initially sought for a physical symptom rather than for the 
accompanying emotional symptoms. For example, often an individual suffering from 
depression will cite unexplainable fatigue as the reason for their visit to their general 
practitioner.169 This is thought to be because of the disabling nature of fatigue in comparison 
to other symptoms.170 So, it is reasonable to assume that the same was true in ancient Greece. 
If this were the case, did physicians ever attempt to establish if their patient was experiencing 
any emotional difficulties or personal problems? Simon thinks that on a professional level, 
the Hippocratic physician had no interest in the subjects’ emotional state. However, he does 
concede that a sympathetic physician might have discussed such matters with his patient and 
that, when acting as a clinical detective, extracting such information may have aided him in 
his search for the root cause of the ailment. He points out that certainly later physicians allude 
to listening out for signs of lovesickness, which could have been easily mistaken for a 
physical ailment.171  
The closest we come to potential discussions of clinical depression is in the 
Hippocratic use of the term melancholia. This occurs many times across Greek literature 
including the Hippocratic corpus, and is very often translated in such a way as to reveal the 
translator’s assumption that this refers to some kind of depressive disorder. The obvious 
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example of this is melancholic, but this English word has a whole host of connotations that 
may or may not have been assumed in the Greek use of melancholia at this time. By using 
melancholic or melancholy, the modern reader imagines a specific disease, and then this 
disease is sometimes thought of interchangeably with depression. Furthermore, it is a 
common assumption that the term melancholia refers to a condition caused by black bile, 
since the etymological origin of the word does seem to lie with black bile (either an adjectival 
compound of melaina chole or from the adjective melancholos first used in Sophocles’ 
Trachiniae to describe the arrows of Herakles being dipped in black bile)172 So, it would 
seem that the person described as melancholia has some affiliation to or tendency to be in 
excess of the humor black bile. But is melancholia/melancholikos an illness in itself or is it 
just a way of describing the humoral disposition of a person?  
Within the Hippocratic corpus the term melancholikos is in such an early stage of 
development that its use is often ambiguous and is not necessarily always used to denote one 
particular illness. Thumiger points out that the frequent use of the noun form ‘implies a 
concept that has already reached some reasonable degree of definition’,173 but in 80% of the 
occasions this term is used, up to and including the Hippocratic treatises, it appears in its 
adjectival form melancholia.174 If melancholikos were used more frequently, a strong 
argument could be made that it referred to a definite disease in its own right, but as it stands 
the definition of the term appears to have been still in flux which results in its usage being 
somewhat ambiguous. Jouanna has argued that the synonymity between melancholia and 
depressive illness first occurs in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata,175 but van der Eijk 
disputes this. He thinks that, in order for the author to use the term so fluently, that stage must 
have already been reached by the time he was writing, so it is reasonable to suggest that this 
may have been under development during the time of the Hippocratic writings.176 
Furthermore, when examining the usage of the term melancholia throughout the Hippocratic 
treatises the intention does tend to fluctuate between ‘affect, behavioural traits and 
episode.’177 In order to illustrate this problem, I will present a number of Hippocratic 
references to melancholia and show how differently the term can be interpreted. The 
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following statements show the ambiguous nature of the term: 
 
 
Ἢν φόβος ἢ δυσθυµίη πολὺν χρόνον διατελῇ, µελαγχολικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον. 
 
Fear or despondency that is prolonged means melancholia. 
(Hipp. Aphorisms 6.23) 
 
Ἢν ἡ γλῶσσα ἐξαίφνης ἀκρατὴς γένηται, ἢ ἀπόπληκτόν τι τοῦ σώµατος, 
µελαγχολικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον. 
 
If the tongue is suddenly paralysed, or a part of the body becomes apoplectic, the 
affection is melancholic. 
(Hipp. Aphorisms 7.40) 
 
 
Τὰ ἐπ᾿ ὀλίγον θρασέως παρακρούοντα µελαγχολικά· 
 
Delirium characterized by over-boldness for short periods indicates melancholy. 
(Hipp. Prorrhetic 1.123) 
 
In each case, it may be tempting to read fear, despondency, mutism, apoplexy and over-
boldness as symptoms that the authors are identifying as part of the way in which they have 
seen the disease melancholia presenting. However, having established that the etymological 
origin of the term melancholia can be traced back to black bile, it is equally possible that 
these statements are simply stating that fear, despondency and over-boldness are typically 
seen in people who are naturally disposed to having too much black bile in their composition. 
They are not strictly symptoms of one disease in particular, but rather an indication of the 
presence of too much black bile generally.178 By translating melancholia as ‘melancholia’ 
and ‘melancholy’ in these examples, the reader assumes that melancholia is a specific 
disease. But perhaps the intention is closer if we read it as ‘fear or despondency that is 
prolonged means a presence of black bile’ or ‘delirium characterized by over-boldness for 
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short periods indicates the presence of black bile.’ Or perhaps not. These authors give us no 
further indications of their meaning here, so we must look elsewhere. 
These statements made by the same authors seem to indicate more definitively that it 
is indeed a specific disease they are referring to when discussing melancholia: 
 
Ἢν δὲ βόρειον ᾖ καὶ ἄνυδρον, τοῖσι µὲν ὑγροῖσι τὰς φύσιας καὶ τῇσι γυναιξὶ 
σύµφορον· τοῖσι δὲ λοιποῖσιν ὀφθαλµίαι ἔσονται ξηραί, καὶ πυρετοὶ ὀξέες, καὶ 
κόρυζαι, ἐνίοισι δὲ καὶ µελαγχολίαι. 
 
But if <the autumn> be northerly and rainless it is beneficial to those with moist 
constitutions and to women. To the others will come dry eye diseases, acute fevers, 
colds and, in some cases, melancholia. 
(Hipp. Aphorisms 3.14)  
 
Τοῦ µὲν γὰρ ἦρος, τὰ µελαγχολικά, καὶ τὰ µανικά,3 καὶ τὰ ἐπιληπτικά, καὶ αἵµατος 
ῥύσιες, καὶ κυνάγχαι, καὶ κορύζαι, καὶ βράγχοι, καὶ βῆχες, καὶ λέπραι, καὶ λειχῆνες, 
καὶ ἀλφοί, καὶ ἐξανθήσιες ἑλκώδεες πλεῖσται, καὶ φύµατα, καὶ ἀρθριτικά. 
 
In spring occur melancholia, madness, epilepsy, bloody flux, angina, colds, sore 
throats, coughs, skin eruptions and diseases, eruptions turning generally to ulcers, 
tumours and affections of the joints. 
(Hipp. Aphorisms 3.20)  
 
Τοῖσιν ἐξισταµένοισι µελαγχολικῶς, οἷσι τρόµοι ἐπιγίνονται, καὶ κακόηθες. 
 
For trembling to come on in patients that are out of their wits with melancholy is a 
malignant sign. 
(Hipp. Prorrhetic 1.14) 
 
Ἐν πυρετῷ καυσώδει ἤχων προγενοµένων µετὰ δ᾿ ἀµβλυωσµοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ῥῖνας 
βάρεος προελθόντος ἐξίστανται µελαγχολικῶς. 
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If, during an ardent fever, ringing occurs in the ears together with dullness of vision 
and a heaviness in the region of the nose, these patients lose their wits in melancholy. 
(Hipp. Prorrhetic 1.18) 
 
In the first two statements from Aphorisms there can be little doubt that the author intends 
melancholia to be viewed as a disease in its own right. On both occasions it is listed 
alongside other conditions that must certainly be considered illnesses; fever, colds, coughs, 
epilepsy, tumours etc. The two statements from Prorrhetic are slightly more ambiguous, but 
they do still seem to be referring to melancholia as a disease. At 1.14 the trembling that 
comes on seems to be a secondary symptom indicating a worsening of the original illness 
affecting the patient: melancholia. In 1.18 the reverse occurs. In this instance, the 
melancholia seems to be a secondary condition that comes about as a result of the seriousness 
of the fever and how unwell the patient feels. These examples seem to suggest that it is 
thought of as a specific disease by the authors, however, this is contradicted later in the same 
texts: 
 
Τοῖσι µελαγχολικοῖσι νοσήµασιν ἐς τάδε ἐπικίνδυνοι αἱ ἀποσκήψιες· ἀπόπληξιν τοῦ 
σώµατος, ἢ σπασµόν, ἢ µανίην, ἢ τύφλωσιν σηµαίνει. 
 
 In melancholic affections the melancholy humor is likely to be determined in the 
following ways: apoplexy of the whole body, convulsions, madness or blindness. 
(Hipp. Aphorisms 6.56) 
 
αἱ δὲ λέπραι καὶ οἱ λειχῆνες ἐκ τῶν µελαγχολικῶν. 
 
Lepra and lichen are from melancholy. 
(Hipp. Prorrhetic 2.43) 
 
The author of Aphorisms refers to melancholic illnesses in the plural, clearly indicating that 
in this instance he is not thinking of just one sickness called melancholia, but perhaps a 
collection of diseases brought on by a bodily composition of too much black bile. Prorrhetic 
makes the case even stronger. In this instance the author describes two diseases, Lepra and 
Lichen, as from melancholy. We know that Lepra and Lichen are specific diseases because 
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they are identified as such elsewhere in the corpus.179 Therefore, melancholia  must be the 
broader term encompassing a number of different diseases caused by a general excess of 
black bile.  
However, this does not necessarily undermine the previous statements in which it 
seemed apparent that melancholia was referring to one specific illness. We know from the 
high usage of the adjectival form of the term that the definition was likely to be in flux and 
still very adaptable, so it is entirely possible that the term was able to refer to both a specific 
illness with a strong association with excess black bile, and the general condition of having 
too much black bile which could give rise to a number of illnesses. Therefore, all we can do 
is ensure we are careful in how specific our understanding can be when reading these 
extracts, for it is equally likely that the author is referring to a particular disease called 
melancholikon or describing the humoral disposition of a person who tends to show the 
symptoms mentioned. 
However, what does emerge is an even stronger association of psychological and 
emotional disturbance with an imbalance of black bile in the body. Just as we saw with the 
explanation of the cause of physical diseases in The Nature of Man, the psychological 
symptoms identified in the statements above (such as fear, despondency, delirium and losing 
one’s wits) are all directly linked with the presence of an excess of black bile within the 
body.180 Furthermore, these symptoms are evidently not considered secondary symptoms to a 
primary physical disease. They are identified as the primary symptoms in a number of the 
references examined and so, it is reasonable to assume that someone experiencing these 
symptoms, might approach a physician to seek treatment and that the physician in question 
would be likely to consider the psychological symptoms as key factors in their diagnosis. 
 
 
4. Temple medicine  
Divine healing was probably the most wide spread method of treatment open to Athenian 
residents. There would have been no gender or status restrictions on asking for the assistance 
of the gods and we know from the many votive offerings recovered from sanctuaries that 
women were free to engage in ritual worship in the same way as men.181 Therefore, the main 
                                               
179 Hipp. On Diseases 1.3; Use of Liquids 4. 
180 Simon 1978, p.215-228 and van der Eijk 2005, p.26 make the same observation in varying degrees 
of detail.  
181 Lewis 2002, p.62 notes that many spindle-whorls, distaffs and loom-weights have been found that 
were used as votive offerings specifically from women.  
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questions to be answered for this method of treatment are who were the most popular deities 
involved in this practice? What treatments were offered? And is there any evidence that 
psychological disorders, and specifically depressive illnesses, were treated? 
 
4.1. Divine healers 
The earliest surviving references to religious healing, both epidemic and individual, occur in 
the Iliad. In Book 1, it is Apollo that brings plague upon the Greek camp, and Apollo who 
eventually lifts it. Later on, we see Glaucus wounded in battle calling on Apollo to take his 
pain away so that he can continue to fight, and indeed Apollo stems the flow of blood and 
removes his pain.182 Before the fifth century, Apollo the healer appears to have been the 
primary deity to whom people prayed for a cure for an existing sickness, or simply for 
protection from potential future sicknesses. He accumulated a number of epithets in this role 
such as Paean, Oulios, Iatros and Loimios183 and archaeological evidence survives, such as 
dedicative statues and votive offerings, across Greece and as far as Miletus, Ionia and around 
the Black Sea, indicating that people across the ancient world appealed to him for divine aid 
in times of sickness between the seventh and fifth centuries.184 This common conception that 
one must appease the gods in order for sickness to be cured was a result of the belief during 
this period that disease arose as a result of a cosmic disturbance that humans are incapable of 
rebalancing.185 Since cosmic disorder is the cause, only divine aid can restore the balance and 
alleviate the disease. Even during the fifth and fourth centuries the idea of psychological 
disorders in particular having a divine cause is likely to have been a widespread and accepted 
idea, despite the growing popularity of the Hippocratic theories, not least because this is 
precisely the way in which these illnesses had been presented to the public through the most 
wide-reaching of public entertainment throughout Greece: the dramatic arts. In popular 
tragedies, Herakles’ madness is inflicted on him by the goddess Lyssa under the instruction 
of Hera, Ajax’s hallucinations are caused by Athena, Aphrodite is responsible for Phaedra’s 
depressive lovesickness and Dionysus is to blame for the Bacchic frenzy that has a hold on 
the women of Thebes. For this reason, it would not be surprising if people sought out priests 
or went directly to the gods to cure them of their psychological disorders. However, it is clear 
                                               
182 Hom. Il. 16.509-528. 
183 Paean: Hom. Il. 5.401; 899; Oulios: Strabo 14.1.6; Iatros and Loimios identified from 
inscriptions on surviving dedications, Fritz 2009, p.68-9. 
184 Fritz 2009, p.69. 
185 Fritz 2009, p.80. 
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that people began to seek more direct methods of treating their sicknesses than simply 
sacrificing to appease a god and hoping for the best, and this resulted in the rapid expansion 
of the cult of Asclepius. 
Around the sixth century B.C., a shrine to Asclepius was founded close to the well-
established sanctuary of Apollo the healer at Epidaurus, but in just 100 years, Asclepius 
appears to have completely taken over the sanctuary from Apollo and the area became one of 
the most important sites in the Asclepian cult. 186 It would seem that alongside the developing 
medical views, the specialism and direct treatment offered by Asclepius was preferable to the 
previous method of praying to Apollo, offering a sacrifice and hoping that was enough to 
appease him.187 Around the same time as the emergence of the Hippocratic corpus, the cult of 
Asclepius arrived on the Athenian Acropolis along with its well-established and systematic 
process of healing.188  
The rapid acceptance and expansion of the cult across the Classical world is likely 
due in part to the benevolent reputation of the god, as well as the direct and immediate results 
said to be achieved. Unlike the usual reciprocal nature of mortal-divine negotiations, 
Asclepius asked for nothing in return, no votive offerings, not even belief in his power, as 
shown in the following evidence:189 
 
ἀνὴρ τοὺς τᾶς χηρὸς δακτύλους ἀκρατεῖς ἔχων πλὰν ἑνὸς ἀφ̣ίκετο ποὶ τὸν θεὸν 
ἱκέτας· θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῶι ἱαρῶι πίνακας ἀπίστει τοῖς ἰάµασιν καὶ ὑποδιέσυρε τὰ 
ἐπιγράµµα[τ]α. ἐγκαθ̣εύδων δὲ ὄψιν εἶδε· ἐδόκει ὑπὸ τῶι ναῶι ἀστραγαλίζον[τ]ος 
αὐτοῦ καὶ µέλλοντος βάλλειν τῶι ἀστραγάλωι, ἐπιφανέντα [τ]ὸν θεὸν̣ ἐφαλέσθαι ἐπὶ 
τὰν χῆρα καὶ ἐκτεῖναί οὑ τοὺς δακτύλλους· ὡς δ’ ἀποβαίη, δοκεῖν συγκάµψας τὰν 
χῆρα καθ’ ἕνα ἐκτείνειν τῶν δακτ̣ύλων· ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντας ἐξευθύναι, ἐπερωτῆν νιν τὸν 
θεόν, εἰ ἔτι ἀπ̣ιστησοῖ τοῖς ἐπιγράµµασι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶµ πινάκων τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἱε̣ρόν (!), 
αὐτὸς δ’ οὐ φάµεν. "ὅτι τοίνυν ἔµπροσθεν ἀπίστεις αὐτο[ῖ]ς οὐκ ἐοῦσιν ἀπίστοις, τὸ 
λοιπὸν ἔστω τοι," φάµεν, "Ἄπιστος ὄν̣[οµα]". ἁµέ̣ρας δὲ γενοµένας ὑγιὴς ἐξῆλθε. 
 
A man whose, fingers, with the exception of one, were paralyzed, came as a suppliant 
to the god. While looking at the tablets in the temple he expressed incredulity 
                                               
186 Fritz 2009, p.77-8. 
187 Fritz 2009, p.79. 
188 Edelstein 1945, p.65-6; Fritz 2009, p.79; Nutton 2004, p.103. The first evidence for the arrival of 
Asclepius in Athens is an inscription for which the events described are dated to 420 B.C.. 
189 Edelstein 1945, p.113. 
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regarding the curses and scoffed at the inscriptions. But in his sleep he saw a vision. It 
seemed to him that, as he was playing at dice below the Temple and was about to cast 
the dice, the god appeared, sprang upon his hand, and stretched out his [the patient’s] 
fingers. When the god had stepped aside it seemed to him [the patient] that he [the 
patient] bent his hand and stretched out his fingers one by one. When he had 
straightened them all, the god asked him if he would still be incredulous of the 
inscriptions on the tablets in the Temple. He answered that he would not. “Since then, 
formerly you were incredulous of the cures, though they were not incredible, for the 
future,” he said, “your name shall be ‘Incredulous.’” When the day dawned he walked 
out sound. 
(Epidauria IG IV2, 1, nos. 121-122. III. Tr. Edelstein) 
 
φιλοσοφεῖς, ὦ Ἀσκληπιέ, τὴν ἄρρητόν τε καὶ συγγενῆ σαυτῷ φιλοσοφίαν µὴ 
συγχωρῶν τοῖς φαύλοις δεῦρο ἥκειν, µηδ᾽ ἂν πάντα σοι τὰ ἀπὸ Ἰνδῶν καὶ Σαρδῴων 
ξυµφέρωσιν. 
 
O Asclepius, you teach a philosophy that is secret and congenial to yourself, in that 
you suffer not the wicked to come hither, not even if they bring to you all the wealth 
of India and Sardis.  
(Philostratus Vita Apollonii I.11) 
 
οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Ἀσκληπιὸς ἐπ᾿ ἀµοιβῆς ἐλπίδι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἰᾶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον 
αὐτῷ φιλανθρώπευµα πανταχοῦ πληροῖ. 
 
Asclepius, again, does not heal mankind in the hope of repayment, but everywhere 
fulfils his own function of benefice to mankind.  
(Julian, Epistulae, 78, 419B) 
 
 
The broad range of evidence that presents Asclepius as a benevolent god indicates that this 
was a widely accepted notion which continued for centuries after the birth of the cult. The 
first example is seen on the cure inscriptions at Epidaurus. These inscriptions on large stone 
tablets, found within the sanctuary, have been dated to the first half of the fourth century B.C. 
and tell the stories of hundreds of suppliants who came to the temple and were cured of 
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various ailments. In the instance quoted above, a man was cured of his paralysis even though 
he displayed disbelief in the curative power of the god.  Philostratus was writing in the early 
third century A.D and Julian in the fourth century A.D. showing that the association of 
Asclepius with benevolence persevered for almost a millennium.  It is worth noting that the 
Roman emperor Julian wanted the Empire to return to Paganism in the wake of Christianity, 
and so his aim was to highlight the benevolence of the gods, but for his argument to be 
convincing, Asclepius would need to be generally thought of as a good example of a 
benevolent god. 
When a prospective patient sought treatment at one of the sanctuaries or shrines of 
Asclepius, for example at the Asclepieia built on the Athenian acropolis, the ritual performed 
was very different from anything they were likely to have experienced from interactions with 
other deities. Drawing largely on Aristophanes’ Plutus 633-747 and the surviving cure 
inscriptions from Epidaurus, we can piece together quite a clear picture of the steps a 
suppliant took in order to gain an audience with the god. 190 First, they were expected to bathe 
and offer a sacrifice, as was usual when entering the sacred space of sanctuaries.191 However, 
there were no other elaborate purification rituals to perform, such as fasting, as was expected 
at the sanctuaries of other deities. For Asclepius, the purification of bathing was sufficient.192 
Then upon entry, there is no evidence that any admission fee or votive offerings were 
payable. When night fell, the suppliants were led through the temple district by priests. On 
their journey through the sanctuary, it seems that the priests may have led the suppliants past 
the cure tablets that adorned the walls of the district and read aloud some of the miraculous 
recoveries experienced by others.193 A cure inscription relays the story of a blind woman 
named Ambrosia who supposedly scoffed at the tales inscribed upon the walls of the temple, 
presumably read aloud by a priest since she would have been unable to read the inscription 
herself, but was cured of her blindness by the next morning.194 The suppliants were then led 
into the temple itself and instructed to lie down and go to sleep, as described in the following 
cure inscriptions found at Epidaurus:195  
 
                                               
190 Making use of Edelstein 1945 p.149-53 alongside the surviving cure tablets and Aristophanes. 
191 Ar. Plut. 656. 
192 Porph. Abst. 2.19. Tr. Edelstein 1945.  
193 Compton 1998, p.306. 
194 Edelstein 1945, T.423.4. 
195 Seen for example in Edelstein 1945 T.423.11, 12, 15 among others. Also Ar. Plut. 669-71. 
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Αἰσχίνας ἐγκεκοιµισµένων ἤδη τῶν ἱκετᾶν ἐπὶ δένδρεόν τι ἀµβὰς ὑπερέκυπτε εἰς τὸ 
ἄβατον. καταπετὼν οὖν ἀπὸ τοῦ δένδρεος περὶ σκόλοπάς τινας τοὺς ὀπτίλλους 
ἀµφέπαισε· κακῶς δὲ διακείµενος καὶ τυφλὸς γεγενηµένος καθικετεύσας τὸν θεὸν 
ἐνεκάθευδε καὶ ὑγιὴς ἐγένετο. 
 
Aeschines, when the suppliants were already asleep, climbed up a tree and tried to see 
over into the Abaton. But he fell from the tree onto some fencing and his eyes were 
injured. In a pitiable state of blindness, he came as a suppliant to the god and slept in 
the Temple and was healed.  
(Epidauria IG IV2, 1, nos. 121-122. XI. Tr. Edelstein) 
 
Εὔιππος λόγχαν ἔτη ἐφόρησε ἓξ ἐν τᾶι γνάθωι· ἐγκοιτασθέντος δ’ αὐτοῦ ἐξελὼν τὰν 
λόγχαν ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὰς χῆράς οἱ ἔδωκε· ἁµέρας δὲ γενοµένας ὑγιὴς ἐξῆρπε τὰν λόγχαν 
ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχων. 
 
Euhippus had had for six years the point of a spear in his jaw. As he was sleeping in 
the Temple the god extracted the spearhead and gave it to him in his hands. When day 
came Euhippus departed cured, and he held the spearhead in his hands. 
(Epidauria IG IV2, 1, nos. 121-122. XII Tr. Edelstein) 
 
Ἑ̣ρµόδικος Λαµψακηνὸς ἀκρατὴς τοῦ σώµατος. τοῦτον ἐγκαθεύδοντα ἰάσατο καὶ 
ἐκελήσατο ἐξελθόντα λίθον ἐνεγκεῖν εἰς τὸ ἱαρὸν ὁπόσσον δύναιτο µέγιστον· ὁ δὲ τὸµ 
πρὸ τοῦ ἀβάτου κείµενον ἤνικε. 
 
Hermodicus of Lampsacus was paralyzed in body. This one, when he slept in the 
Temple, the god healed and he ordered him upon coming out to bring to the Temple 
as large a stone as he could. The man brought the stone which now lies before the 
Abaton.  
(Epidauria IG IV2, 1, nos. 121-122. XV Tr. Edelstein) 
 
 
As mentioned in these inscriptions, the god would come to them while they slept to perform a 
cure for their medical complaint. From the surviving cure tablets, it seems that this occurred 
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in one of three ways. The suppliant may experience a strange dream unrelated to their 
condition and awake to find themselves cured, for example:196  
 
ἀνὴρ ἐν αἰδοίωι λίθον. οὗτος ἐνύπνιον εἶδε· ἐδόκει παιδὶ καλῶι συγγίνεσθαι, 
ἐξονειρώσσων δὲ τὸλ λίθον ἐγβάλλει καὶ ἀνελόµενος ἐξῆλθε ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχων. 
 
A man with a stone in his membrum. He saw a dream. It seemed to him that he was 
lying with a fair boy and when he had a seminal discharge he ejected the stone and 
picked it up and walked out holding it in his hands. 
(Epidauria IG IV2, 1, nos. 121-122. XIV Tr. Edelstein) 
 
 
Or, they dreamt of a surgery or treatment being performed on them and awoke cured:197  
 
ἀνὴρ Τορωναῖος δεµελέας. οὗτος ἐγκαθεύδων ἐνύπνιον εἶδε· ἔδοξέ οἱ τὸν θεὸν τὰ 
στέρνα µαχαίρ̣αι ἀνσχίσσαντα τὰς δεµελέας ἐξελεῖν καὶ δόµεν οἱ ἐς τὰς χεῖρας καὶ 
συνράψαι τὰ στήθη· ἁµέρας δὲ γενοµένας ἐξῆλθε τὰ θηρία ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχων καὶ 
ὑγιὴς ἐγένετο· κατέπιε δ’ αὐτὰ δολωθεὶς ὑπὸ µατρυιᾶς ἐγ κυκᾶνι ἐµβεβληµένας 
ἐκπιών.  
 
A man of Torone with leeches. In his sleep he saw a dream. It seemed to him that the 
god cut open his chest with a knife and took out the leeches, which he gave him into 
his hands, and then he stitched up his chest again. At daybreak he departed with the 
leeches in his hands and he had become well. He had swallowed them, having been 
tricked by his stepmother who had thrown them into a potion which he drank. 
(Epidauria IG IV2, 1, nos. 121-122. XIII Tr. Edelstein) 
 
ἀνὴρ ἐ[ντὸ]ς τᾶς κοιλίας ἕλκος ἔχων. οὗτος ἐγκαθεύδων ἐν[ύπνιο]ν εἶδε· ἐδ̣όκ[ε]ι 
αὐτῶι ὁ θεὸς ποιτάξαι τοῖς ἑποµένοις ὑπηρέτα[ις συλ]λαβόντας αὐτὸν ἴσχειν, ὅπως 
τάµηι οὑ τὰν κοιλίαν· αὐτὸς δὲ φεύ[γει]ν, τοὺς δὲ συλλαβόντας νιν ποιδῆσαι ποὶ 
ῥόπτον· µετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸν [Ἀσ]κλαπιὸν ἀνσχίσσαντα τὰγ κοιλίαν ἐκταµεῖν τὸ ἕλκος 
                                               
196 See also Edelstein 1945 T.423.1; 2; 3; 6; 8; 15; 17; 28; 29; 35; 37; 38; 39; 42; 43 for other cures 
involving dreams or visions. 
197 See also Edelstein 1945 T.423. 4; 9, 12; 25; 30; 32; 40; 41;  
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καὶ συρρά[ψαι] πάλιν, καὶ λυθῆµεν ἐκ τῶν δεσµῶν· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ὑγιὴς ἐξῆ[λθ]ε, τὸ 
δὲ δάπεδον ἐν τῶι ἀβάτωι αἵµατος κατάπλεον ἦς. 
 
A man with an abcess within his abdomen. When asleep in the Temple he saw a 
dream. It seemed to him that the god ordered the servants who accompanied him to 
grip him and hold him tightly so that he could cut open his abdomen. The man tried to 
get away, but they gripped him and bound him to a door knocker. Thereupon, 
Asclepius cut his belly open, removed the abcess, and, after having stitched him up 
again, released him from his bonds. Whereupon he walked out sound, but the floor of 
the Abaton was covered with blood. 
(Epidauria IG IV2, 1, nos. 121-122. XXVII Tr. Edelstein) 
 
 
 
In terms of effectiveness, it is very difficult to know how far the symptoms said to have been 
healed overnight were psychosomatic. We should not underestimate the profound effect the 
priests were likely to have on the suppliants’ expectations by relaying the stories inscribed on 
the cure tablets, creating a mystical atmosphere and telling them of the dreams they were 
likely to experience while sleeping in the temple.198 We know the effectiveness of placebos 
so it is entirely possible that people left the temple with their symptoms much improved 
simply because of the experience they underwent. Furthermore, the dreams and visions 
experienced by the suppliants could have been induced by the suggestions of the priests 
alongside burning hallucinogenic plants and herbs in the vicinity, although this is conjecture. 
If the perceived improvement of symptoms were solely placebo, it is worth noting that this 
could have been less dangerous than employing the help of a secular doctor. Physicians could 
be counterproductive in their methods so perhaps, in some cases, doing nothing was more 
effective treatment than seeking the help of a doctor. 
However, a cult reliant solely on psychosomatic illnesses and hallucinogenic tricks is 
unlikely to have lasted for the many centuries for which the Asclepian cult was successful. 
Nor would it have gained such high repute amongst the educated Athenian elite.199 So there 
must have been more to it. From the descriptions of the surviving cure tablets, in some 
instances it seems as though some kind of medical or even surgical procedure may have taken 
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199 Edelstein 1945 makes a similar point on p.110. 
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place while the suppliant was asleep.200 In other cases, drugs or medical regimen is 
prescribed that the patient must go away and perform in order for a cure to be successful.201 
So while divine intervention was credited for the successful recovery of patients, it was 
probably the application of cutting edge medical methods that was responsible for the cures. 
This reveals a significant degree of crossover between the most popular and credible secular 
and religious options available for the treatment of illness. 
It is clear that the cult of Asclepius spread rapidly across ancient Greece and was 
readily accepted in Athens. The sanctuaries became popular destinations for people suffering 
with all manner of complaints or disorders, and so it seems as though this would be a likely 
option for an individual experiencing depressive illness. 
 
4.2. Evidence of depressive disorder being treated 
The most direct surviving evidence of the types of conditions that were treated in the 
sanctuaries of Asclepius are the cure tablets which detail the ailments for which the suppliant 
sought help and often describe the dream experienced before the suppliant awoke cured. 
Clearly, these tablets provide only a sample of the types of sicknesses experienced by the 
people who came to the temple of Asclepius, but the tendency seems to be for people to have 
come with chronic conditions, which perhaps medical physicians had been unsuccessful at 
treating.202 Nutton notes that these conditions ‘must have placed an intolerable burden on 
patients and their families until they were cured’203 and so we might expect that people 
suffering with severe depression might indeed have sought help from the god. Unfortunately, 
the surviving tablets do not provide any evidence that specific recognisable symptoms that 
we might associate with a depression were treated at the sanctuary. But, if we widen the 
scope of the evidence to include all manner of psychological disorders, there is evidence of 
conditions such as epilepsy,204 mutism,205 headaches, and insomnia206 being treated, so the 
assumption that depressive symptoms may have been treated seems reasonable.  
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5. Other Healers 
There were many other healers within the city who were neither qualified secular physicians 
nor institutional religious healers. These individuals were unlikely to acquire panhellenic 
fame, unlike some Hippocratic physicians for example who may have travelled between 
poleis, but rather relied on a good reputation within the town in which they resided to earn a 
living.207 These healers can be broadly broken down into seers (manteis) and magicians 
(magoi) but even this basic division is probably not an accurate reflection of the practices of 
such people. It seems as though, quite often, their self-professed specialisms blurred the 
boundaries of divination, pharmacology and magic.208 However, I will try to address each 
profession separately. 
 
5.1. Manteis (Seers) 
Divination was a popular method of communication with the gods due to the impression of a 
more direct, two-way conversation. The answer acquired by a seer reading the entrails or 
interpreting dreams was immediate, rather than performing a sacrifice and then waiting days 
or even months to learn the outcome. The rites of diviners held tremendous authority in 
everyday life, since it was the only way that ordinary people could be privy to the 
information the gods were willing to share with them. In the same way as qualified 
physicians gained recognition through association with one of the respected medical schools, 
manteis claimed legitimacy by affiliation with one of the great guilds of diviners, such as the 
Melampids, the Telliadae or the Iamids, who often traced their lineage back to a famous 
mythical seer, Tiresias for example.209 Manteis could be called upon to assist with translating 
signs from the gods in many different areas of civic life. Seers travelled with the military,210 
were involved in politics (in Athens at least),211 and were called upon for domestic matters. 
Of particular interest to this study, is the role of manteis in cases of sickness.  
According to Johnston, who follows Parker, in their role as healers, manteis should be 
thought of as two types: the healer-seer who ‘used his special powers of discernment to 
diagnose an illness’ cause and then prescribed the appropriate cure’ and the “purifier” who 
‘focused more on using “magical techniques” to cure the victims of disease without too much 
                                               
207 Johnston 2008, p.28. 
208 Dickie 2001 p.60-3; Johnston 2008, p.113; Parker 1983.  
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210 Hdt 7.228.3; Xen. Hell. 2.4.18; Alexander had the military seer Aristander of Telmessus. 
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concern for what had caused their problems.’212 The techniques used by purifiers appear to 
have varied depending on client and could include medicinal or pharmaceutical options, some 
kind of ritual to restore cosmic order (and the options for these rituals are virtually endless) or 
reading the entrails of sacrificial animals until the gods were thought to have been 
appeased.213 But despite the position of authority held by seers in many aspects of ancient 
life, healer manteis are often treated in the sources with skepticism, ridicule, and even 
hostility. The following views are expressed by the Hippocratic author of On the Sacred 
Disease, Plato and Menander: 
 
ἐµοὶ δὲ δοκέουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι τοῦτο τὸ νόσηµα ἀφιερώσαντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι ἄνθρωποι 
οἷοι καὶ νῦν εἰσι µάγοι τε καὶ καθάρται καὶ ἀγύρται καὶ ἀλαζόνες, ὁκόσοι δὴ 
προσποιέονται σφόδρα θεοσεβέες εἶναι καὶ πλέον τι εἰδέναι. 
 
My own view is that those who first attributed a sacred character to this malady were 
like the magicians, purifiers, charlatans and quacks of our own day, men who claim 
great piety and superior knowledge. Being at a loss, and having no treatment which 
would help, they concealed and sheltered themselves behind superstition, and called 
this illness sacred, in order that their utter ignorance might not be manifest. 
(Hipp. On the Sacred Disease. 2) 
 
Ἐγὼ δὲ τοιαῦτα µὲν οὐ µαντεύσοµαι, 
 
I, however, will not indulge in this kind of prophecy. 
(Hipp. Prorrhetic 2.2) 
 
πρὸς τῷ θεοὺς µὴ νοµίζειν ἢ ἀµελεῖς ἢ παραιτητοὺς εἶναι. 
 
Holding that the gods are negligent or open to bribes. 
(Pl. Laws 10.909b) 
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ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ µάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι 
δύναµις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζοµένη θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς. 
 
Wandering priests and prophets approach the doors of the wealthy and persuade them 
that they have a power from the gods conveyed through sacrifices and incantations. 
 (Pl. Rep. 2.364b-c) 
 
εἰ µέν τι κακὸν ἀληθὲς εἶχες, Φειδία, ζητεῖν ἀληθὲς φάρµακον τούτου σ᾿ ἔδει. νῦν δ᾿ 
οὐκ ἔχεις. κενὸν εὑρὲ καὶ τὸ φάρµακον πρὸς τὸ κενόν, οἰήθητι δ᾿ ὠφελεῖν τί σε. 
περιµαξάτωσάν σ᾿ αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν κύκλῳ καὶ περιθεωσάτωσαν. ἀπὸ κρουνῶν τριῶν 
ὕδατι περίρραν᾿ ἐµβαλὼν ἅλας, φακούς. 
 
If your complaint had been a real one, Pheidias, You would have had to seek real 
medicine for it. You’re not now really ill, though! Find a quack treatment for your 
sham illness, and believe it’s helping. Let the women in a circle massage and 
fumigate you. Spray yourself with water from three springs. Add salt and lentils. 
(Menander Phasma 50-56) 
 
 
It is apparent from these sources that the authors do not look upon the practices of manteis 
favourably, especially the purifier manteis or those who employ magical techniques. But this 
is not necessarily representative of the fifth- and fourth- century popular Athenian views 
towards such healers. These authors each have particular reason to undermine the manteis. 
We might particularly expect hostile skepticism from the Hippocratic authors who would 
have been in direct competition with them, especially the purifiers. These diviners performed 
the healing rituals themselves and so threatened to undermine the method of rigorous training 
in the medical sciences undertaken by Hippocratic physicians.214 Perhaps we might expect 
less hostility towards the first type of mantis, the healer-seer, since they might be viewed as 
less problematic. If their role was simply to interpret the symptoms and suggest a course of 
action, they may well recommend calling upon a physician to treat the sickness, but this 
distinction is not made by the author. Plato is also a problematic source in relation to seers 
who seek remuneration for their techne. He continually attempts to undermine their authority 
                                               
214 Dickie 2001, p.20. 
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by accusing them of unscrupulous greed; a view that is present across Greek literature and is 
reinforced on many occasions by Homer and the tragedians.215 Evidently this is not an 
unusual accusation faced by seers, but Plato’s particular dislike of this practice renders his 
opinions unhelpful in the attempt to understand the public opinion of manteis. 
So, it is difficult for us to gauge non-intellectual, popular opinion of these healers. 
The comic dramatists might indicate that there was a general feeling of suspicion surrounding 
the practices of the purifier manteis. Of particular use are the comments made above in 
Menander’s Phasma, and references made by Aristophanes. In Menander’s play, a slave 
rebukes his master’s hypochondria and tells him to go and see a purifier to cure his fake 
illness. Aristophanes expresses the same sentiment of seers stereotyped as frauds.216 Of 
particular note is the following comment made in Peace 1045-6, ‘He looks like a charlatan. Is 
he a seer?’217 These casual assumptions from Menander and Aristophanes that seers tend to 
be charlatans could be indicative of a general popular assumption about these healers and 
would align popular opinion more closely with the views proffered by the intellectual writers. 
But on the other hand, these writers could just as easily be stereotyping for comedic effect. 
Regardless of the skepticism and ridicule expressed in some of the literature, it is clear that in 
general these seers were never wholly dismissed and divination remained a respected craft.218 
And even for those who were perhaps cautious of seers in general, in reality, it is 
probable that the average, uneducated person suffering with a chronic condition would have 
only really cared about the outcome. If they were struggling to cope with a depressive 
disorder and a friend recommended a seer they knew of, the sufferer might just try it. All they 
required was successful treatment, and whether that came from a qualified physician, a visit 
to Asclepius, or by a mantis performing a strange ritual was probably neither here nor 
there.219 
 
5.2. Magoi (Magicians) 
Similarly to manteis, magoi appear to have dabbled in many different professions and 
claimed affiliation with a great dynasty of magicians from which they inherited their 
                                               
215 Eur. Bacchae 255-7; Hom. Od. 2.186; Pl. Statesman 290c-d; Timaeus 71e-72b; Soph. Antigone 
1055; Oed. 380-403. 
216 Ar. Av 983; Pax 1045-6; 1120. 
217 Ar. Pax 1045-6. 
218 Flower 2008, p.139; 152. Soph. Oed. 298-99; Hom. Il. 1.106-120; Od.15.525-34; 20.351-62; Hdt. 
1.62.4-63.1. To name a select few examples. 
219 Johnston 2008, p.121; Parker 1983, p.208. 
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knowledge.220 However, rather than trying to appear well-versed in proper religious ritual and 
practices like the manteis likely did, the magoi seem to have cultivated a sense of mystery 
around their practices. It probably improved their earnings if people felt they were doing 
something out of the ordinary that could not be achieved by just anyone, but still not anything 
immoral or irreligious. The ordinary person very likely would have had a basic understanding 
of divination and even quotidian medicine, but the magician’s techniques would likely be out 
of their realm of understanding.221 The healing techniques of the magoi could again range 
from medicinal recommendations and potions to rituals or incantations aimed at re-
establishing the god’s favour. The latter of these options seem to have been the basis for their 
reputation as potentially powerful healers, and also as the target for source hostility. This 
claim of special powers that allowed them to influence the will of the gods or even bribe 
them into benevolence was not popular with our intellectual authors, who seemingly thought 
of this as blatant hubris:222  
 
ὅσοι δ᾽ ἂν θηριώδεις γένωνται πρὸς τῷ θεοὺς µὴ νοµίζειν ἢ ἀµελεῖς ἢ παραιτητοὺς 
εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαγωγῶσι µὲν πολλοὺς τῶν ζώντων, τοὺς 
δὲ τεθνεῶτας φάσκοντες ψυχαγωγεῖν καὶ θεοὺς ὑπισχνούµενοι πείθειν, ὡς θυσίαις τε 
καὶ εὐχαῖς καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς γοητεύοντες, ἰδιώτας τε καὶ ὅλας οἰκίας καὶ πόλεις χρηµάτων. 
 
But as to all those who have become like ravening beasts, and who, besides holding 
that the gods are negligent or open to bribes, despise men, charming the souls of many 
of the living, and claiming that they charm the souls of the dead, and promising to 
persuade the gods by bewitching them, as it were, with sacrifices, prayers and 
incantations, and who try thus to wreck utterly not only individuals, but whole 
families and States for the sake of money. 
(Pl. Laws 10.909b) 
 
 
δυσσεβεῖν ἔµοιγε δοκέουσι…εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος µαγεύων καὶ θύων σελήνην 
καθαιρήσει καὶ ἥλιον ἀφανιεῖ καὶ χειµῶνα καὶ εὐδίην ποιήσει, οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγέ τι θεῖον 
                                               
220 Collins 2008, p.49; 51; Johnston 2008, p.146. 
221 Johnston 2008, p.147-8. 
222 Dickie 2001, p.26. 
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νοµίσαιµι τούτων εἶναι οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀνθρώπινον, εἰ δὴ τοῦ θείου ἡ δύναµις ὑπὸ 
ἀνθρώπου γνώµης κρατεῖται καὶ δεδούλωται. 
 
 They do what I think is a very unholy and irreligious thing…For if a man by magic 
and sacrifice will bring the moon down, eclipse the sun, and cause storm and 
sunshine, I shall not believe that any of these things is divine, but human, seeing that 
the power of godhead is overcome and enslaved by the cunning of man. 
(Hipp. On the Sacred Disease 4) 
 
 
Plato’s treatment of these healers focuses on their illicit practices and hubris. He shows 
particular disdain for their bribery and coercion of the gods, their attempts to raise people 
from the dead, and their unscrupulous pursuit of wealth. The Hippocratic position here is that 
where the gods have inflicted a disease, a man could not provide a cure, and anyone claiming 
to be able to do so must be a charlatan, taking advantage of the desperation of their patient.  
 
 
5.3. Summary 
It is likely that while there may have been many unscrupulous individuals who would gladly 
offer their services to desperate Athenian residents who had not managed to find an effective 
cure from physicians or priests, there also existed trustworthy professionals in both of these 
areas of healing, which helped maintain the reputation of the techne as a useful means by 
which to attempt to understand the intentions of the gods. Some ‘religious entrepreneurs’,223 
as Collins entitles them, claimed to have knowledge of healing techniques across the 
boundaries of magical and religious practices in order to further their own business 
interests,224 and it is these individuals who seemingly threatened the medical professionals 
and earned the contempt of intellectuals such as Plato.  
Unfortunately, we cannot tell how effective an option it was thought to have been to 
approach a mantis or magos for assistance with depression, but it is probable that people with 
depression did seek them out. Purification was a typical ritual to perform in instances of 
madness, as seen with Bdelycleon cleansing his mad father in Aristophanes’ Wasps,225 but 
                                               
223 Collins 2008, p.49. 
224 Collins 2008, p.49; 51. 
225 Ar. Vesp. 118. 
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evidently this would have required the individual to categorise their depressive disorder in the 
same way as other mental illnesses, such as mania. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to reveal the types of healers that people may have 
approached when suffering from depression in Athens around the fifth century and to gauge 
the extent of the healers’ recognition of depression and ability to treat the condition. To do 
so, I began by exploring the likelihood of an Athenian resident recognising their depression 
as an illness and their freedom to seek treatment. This freedom was likely dependent on sex 
and wealth. Men were probably most confined by their financial situation, and women by 
their freedom of movement and I concluded that wealthy men of any status and poor, lower-
class women were probably the most able of their sex to seek treatment. 
I then explored the lived experience of an Athenian who did recognise their condition 
as an illness and did have the freedom to try and treat their depressive illness. I presented 
evidence relating to secular physicians, temple medicine, and magical healers to show that, to 
varying degrees, it is reasonable to assume that these people may have been approached to 
help treat depression. 
The Hippocratic corpus is the best source of information regarding secular physicians. 
It is clear from the surviving treatises that Hippocratic physicians acknowledged the 
existence of diseases that presented psychological symptoms or emotional disturbance (such 
as fear, despondency, delirium and losing one’s wits) and made a strong association between 
these diseases and an excess of black bile within the body. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that someone experiencing symptoms that we now associate with depression might 
approach a secular physician to seek treatment, and that the physician in question would be 
likely to consider the psychological symptoms as key factors in their diagnosis. 
The next sector of healing under examination was temple medicine, and specifically 
the cult of Asclepius. The most revealing evidence that survives from the sanctuaries of this 
healing cult are a number of stone tablets recovered from Epidaurus, on which are inscribed 
many stories of suppliants being cured of a huge variety of ailments. The tendency seems to 
have been for people to come in supplication to the god with chronic conditions, which 
perhaps medical physicians had been unsuccessful at treating. The surviving tablets do not 
provide any evidence of symptoms recognisably associated with depression, but if we widen 
the scope of the evidence to include all manner of psychological disorders, there is evidence 
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of conditions such as epilepsy, mutism, headaches, and insomnia being treated, so the 
assumption that depression may have been treated as well seems reasonable. 
Finally, I looked at magical healers, specifically manteis and magoi. These 
professions are considered with varying degrees of skepticism in our surviving literature, but 
it is probable that people with depression did seek them out, especially if other methods of 
treatment had proven unsuccessful in alleviating their symptoms.  
So, it is apparent that an Athenian resident suffering with depression had a number of 
options in their search for an effective treatment. In the next chapter I will go on to consider 
how Plato and Aristotle responded to the healing options already discussed, and how they 
could have been seen to offer another method of treatment through their encouragement of 
the pursuit of virtue.  
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Chapter 2: Plato and Aristotle’s cultural inheritance and philosophical 
responses to the ancient healing environment. 
 
 
Introduction 
With the popular and well-established practices of healing in secular and religious life, and 
the acknowledgement that depressive symptoms were a medical matter, it might seem that 
there was little place, or need, for philosophers in the search for useful healing techniques and 
treatments. But philosophical interest in medicine can be seen as far back as Parmenides, 
possibly even to Pythagoras.226 In fact, it is thought that the Hippocratic theories, especially 
humoral theory, likely developed from the work of Alcmaeon of Croton, the founder of the 
medical School of Knidos.227 Alcmaeon was supposedly primarily a philosopher,228 not a 
practicing physician. So, it appears that, historically, there was room for philosophers in the 
development of serious medical thought. However, the Hippocratic author of Ancient 
Medicine reveals a rather scathing attitude towards philosophers attempting to involve 
themselves in medical debate: 
 
ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτο µέν, ὅσα τινὶ εἴρηται ἢ σοφιστῇ ἢ ἰητρῷ ἢ γέγραπται 
περὶ φύσιος, ἧσσον νοµίζω τῇ ἰητρικῇ τέχνῃ προσήκειν ἢ τῇ γραφικῇ. 
 
But my view is, first, that all that philosophers or physicians have said or written on 
natural science no more pertains to medicine than to painting.  
(Hipp. Ancient Medicine 20, 9-11.) 
 
 
ὅστις δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβαλὼν καὶ ἀποδοκιµάσας πάντα, ἑτέρῃ ὁδῷ καὶ ἑτέρῳ σχήµατι 
ἐπιχειρεῖ ζητεῖν, καί φησί τι ἐξευρηκέναι, ἐξηπάτηται καὶ ἐξαπατᾶται. 
 
                                               
226 Nutton 2004, p.46. 
227 Aet. Plac. Philo. 5.30.1; Nutton 2004, p.47. 
228 Anonymus Londinensis p.162; Arist. Metaph. 1.986a25. 
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 Anyone who, casting aside and rejecting all these means, attempts to conduct 
research in any other way or after another fashion, and asserts that he has found out 
anything, is and has been the victim of deception. 
(Hipp. Ancient Medicine 2, 6-9) 
 
This disparagement of the philosophers’ talent for medical writing, might encourage us to 
think of their discussions concerning health and disease as a side-line hobby or merely ‘an 
eccentric curiosity’,229 but this is reductive of the importance of health for the philosophers. 
As we shall see from the exploration of Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of 
psychological disorders, their interest in mental health was likely born from a very real 
concern for the ability of their philosophical followers to correctly pursue the virtuous life. 
Their interest is genuine and their arguments should be considered amongst the most 
convincing options available for public consideration at the time. Aristotle himself comments 
on this overlap between philosophical and medical thought and notes that, although the two 
specialisms approach the issue from different angles, the conclusions drawn are equally valid: 
 
περὶ δὲ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου οὐ µόνον ἐστὶν ἰατροῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ µέχρι του τὰς 
αἰτίας εἰπεῖν. ᾗ δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ ᾗ διαφέροντα θεωροῦσιν, οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν, ἐπεὶ ὅτι 
γε σύνορος ἡ πραγµατεία µέχρι τινός ἐστι, µαρτυρεῖ τὸ γινόµενον· τῶν τε γὰρ ἰατρῶν 
ὅσοι κοµψοὶ ἢ περίεργοι, λέγουσί τι περὶ φύσεως καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκεῖθεν ἀξιοῦσι 
λαµβάνειν, καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως πραγµατευθέντων οἱ χαριέστατοι σχεδὸν τελευτῶσιν 
εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἰατρικάς. 
 
As for health and disease it is the business not only of the physician but also of the 
natural philosopher to discuss their causes up to a point. But the way in which these 
two classes of inquirers differ and consider different problems must not escape us, 
since the facts prove that up to a point their activities have the same scope; for those 
physicians who have subtle and inquiring minds have something to say about natural 
science, and claim to derive their principles therefrom, and the most accomplished of 
those who deal with natural science tend to conclude with medical principles. 
(Arist. On Resp. 21, 480b22-30) 
 
                                               
229 van der Eijk 2005, p.13. 
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 Furthermore, since the philosophers will be discussing symptoms in the context of 
their conception of what the good life is, they are likely to give a more holistic view of the 
disorder, rather than focusing on only the physical or religious causation of the individual 
symptoms. 
To begin the process of examining Plato and Aristotle’s recognition of depression, 
this chapter will first place the philosophers in the context of the healing environment 
presented in Chapter 1. I will explore the philosophers’ attitudes to each of the methods of 
healing presented in Chapter 1; secular medicine, temple medicine, and other healers. I will 
then show that, despite their divergent cosmological theories, the philosophers shared the 
same fundamental concerns in challenging the traditional conceptions of the universe and in 
discovering how to live well. In doing so, I will demonstrate that it is reasonable to assume 
that the philosophers may have concerned themselves with the kinds of behaviours exhibited 
by individuals with depression.  
 
 
 
1. Plato and ancient healing methods 
A child growing up in any sizeable ancient Greek polis would have very likely come into 
direct contact with physicians, temple medicine, and magical healers, or at least have been 
exposed to stories and gossip passed on by friends and family members concerning these 
methods of healing. Since both Plato and Aristotle would have shared in this cultural 
inheritance we might expect any philosophical discussion concerning healing to respond, or 
at least make reference, to these traditional practices. 
We know very little of Plato’s personal childhood experiences, primarily because of 
his choice to write in dialogue form, and to never include himself as a speaking character, 
rather than overtly imposing his authorial voice. So, we can never be certain whether Plato is 
drawing on real life events or constructing entirely fictional situations. However, he probably 
had the typical upbringing of a wealthy, Athenian, aristocratic child.230 This becomes 
apparent when considering Plato’s description of Athenian childhood in Protagoras, which 
                                               
230 Plutarch De. Am. Prolis. 496f. claims that Plato’s father Ariston died before witnessing Plato’s 
philosophical prowess, but there is no evidence that would suggest Ariston died while Plato was still a 
child. So, we can assume Plato was raised to adulthood by both of his parents, but that his father died 
before he began publishing the work that saw his rise to Panhellenic fame. 
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conforms to what we know from other sources about typical wealthy, aristocratic 
childhood.231 Plato discusses a child’s education at school such as grammar, music lessons, 
learning the works of the great poets by heart, and athletic training.232 He also draws attention 
to another aspect of Athenian childhood; he discusses the relationships between a child and 
their parents and attending slaves and it would seem that they all took an active role in raising 
the child: 
 
ἐκ παίδων σµικρῶν ἀρξάµενοι, µέχρι οὗπερ ἂν ζῶσι, καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ νουθετοῦσιν. 
ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόµενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ µήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ 
αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαµάχονται, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ᾽ 
ἕκαστον καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύµενοι ὅτι τὸ µὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ 
ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε µὲν καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε µὲν ὅσιον. 
 
Starting when they are little children and continuing as long as they live, they teach 
them and correct them. As soon as a child understands what is said to him, the nurse, 
mother, tutor, and the father himself fight for him to be as good as he possibly can, 
seizing on every action and word to teach him and show him that this is just, that is 
unjust, this is noble, that is ugly, this is pious, that is impious. 
(Pl. Prt. 325c6-d3) 
 
We know from other sources that children would have had very close relationships with their 
mothers, nurses and tutors,233 in particular, so it is not difficult to imagine a child, such as 
Plato, witnessing bouts of sickness and healing within the household and overhearing gossip 
between the adults that raised him. So, in the course of his rather typical wealthy, aristocratic 
upbringing, there is a good chance that Plato came into contact with the types of healers 
examined in Chapter 1. 
 
 
 
                                               
231 Arist. Pol. 8.1337b22; Xen. Lac. 2.1. and reiterated by Plato at Theag. 122e. Vase paintings also 
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233 Xen. Oec. 7.24; Mem. 1.4.7; Arist. G.A. 3.759b7; Arist. NE 8.1161b16; Lycurgus Leocr. 99-101. 
Golden 1990, p.97 notes that it was almost a cliché that children were very close to their mothers. 
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1.1 Plato and secular medicine 
Secular physicians appear very frequently throughout Plato’s dialogues, often escaping the 
scathing treatment of which Plato is so capable. In fact, in Republic, it is the patient whose 
illness is brought on by idleness that receives Plato’s contempt, rather than the obliging, 
‘sophisticated Asclepiad doctor’,234 who is forced to come up with ridiculous names for their 
ailments.235 Doctors are frequently used as examples of people who have specialist 
knowledge236 and it is probable that Plato looked favourably upon the intellectual rigour of 
their profession. So much so, that he adopts a modified version of the Hippocratic humoral 
theory in his own exposition of the construction of the human body in his Timaeus. There are 
two immediately apparent Platonic modifications, but the Hippocratic influence remains 
certain. According to the Hippocratic treatises, health relies on the optimum co-mingling of 
the four humors of which the body is comprised; blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile. 
237 There is a fixed amount of each humor within the human body238 and so disease occurs 
when a humor is in excess at one location, necessarily creating a humoral deficiency at 
another.239 In the Platonic construction of the body, the notion of a correct combination and 
quantity of compositional entities required to maintain an ideal balance within the body is 
maintained,240 but he envisages the healthy body being composed of the four elements (fire, 
water, air, and earth) rather than the four humors. For Plato, the humors are created as a result 
of the unbalancing of the elements and they move around the body wreaking havoc. Second, 
unlike the two diseased locations of the Hippocratic treatises, one from excess and one from 
the resulting opposing deficiency, the humors for Plato can be created in only one location 
due to an imbalance.241 But despite these deviations from the traditional humoral theory 
posited by the Hippocratic treatises, the influence on Plato’s medical theory is evident and 
undisputed, suggesting a degree of respect for the skill of the physician’s craft. 
This might be demonstrated further in his inclusion of specific physicians within his 
dialogues. The physician Eryximachus appears in Protagoras and, in most detail, in 
                                               
234 Pl. Rep. 405d2 
235 Pl. Rep. 405c6-d4. 
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237 Hipp. Nature of Man 4.  
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Symposium. In the first half of the twentieth-century, the presentation of Eryximachus in 
Symposium drew scholarly accusations of caricature and ridicule on Plato’s part. It was 
largely agreed upon that he represents all that Plato found ridiculous about the medical 
arts,242 but in a deft and convincing refutation of this assumption, in his 1945 article Edelstein 
disagreed. In particular, he challenged the view that Eryximachus is being presented as a 
caricature even when medical advice is requested, for example in the cases of Aristophanes’ 
hiccups and Agathon’s hangover.243 Edelstein concedes that Plato could be presenting a 
caricature of doctors when Eryximachus’ pedantry continues throughout his speech on Love, 
but he notes that perhaps these are just his individual character traits. After all, he is a doctor. 
Medical explanations come naturally to him.244 Edelstein adds that if we look at Socrates’ 
other companions, the same can be said. He observes that ‘in the speeches of Aristophanes 
and Agathon he uses motifs and stylistic devices that indicate the vocation of the two 
poets.’245 Furthermore, when passing comment on the quality of the preceding speeches, 
Socrates reserves his only compliment for Eryximachus’ attempt. Eryximachus is said to 
have done ‘beautifully in the contest’,246 or, at least, had ‘fought well’247 (Καλῶς γὰρ αὐτὸς 
ἠγώνισαι). Edelstein concludes that this must mean that, according to Socrates, Eryximachus’ 
speech was not the ‘least noteworthy’;248 high praise indeed from Plato. So, despite early 
twentieth century scholarly interpretations, it appears that in Plato’s characterisation of a 
physician, he credits the doctor with some degree of intellectual, and even philosophical, 
capability.  
These Platonic presentations of secular physicians and the adoption of popular 
medical theories, with minor amendments, indicate that Plato thought of the secular medical 
profession as worthy of consideration and with some convincing medical theories that were 
broadly compatible with his own philosophical theories. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
242 Gildersleeve 1909, p.109; See Edelstein 1945, p.85 for a summary of the standard interpretations at 
that point. 
243 Pl. Symp. 185 d-e and 176c-d. Edelstein 1945, p.86. 
244 Edelstein 1945, p.87. 
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1.2. Plato and temple medicine 
There can be no doubt that Plato was familiar with the cult of Asclepius and the medical 
interventions supposedly performed within the temple by the god himself. Regardless of the 
fact that this was the single largest healing cult in Athens during his lifetime,249 Plato himself 
refers to the cult, most famously in the closing lines of Phaedo. As Socrates dies, his final 
words to his companions are in reference to Asclepius, god of healing: 
 
Ὦ Κρίτων, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλοµεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ µὴ ἀµελήσητε. 
 
Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius, make this offering to him and do not forget. 
(Pl. Phd. 118a7-8) 
 
It is in this moment, perhaps above any other across the corpus, that we might expect Plato to 
be at his most sincere, and in this moment he chooses to acknowledge the role of the god 
Asclepius in whatever healing it may be that Socrates believes has been performed.250 The 
willingness of the philosophers to accept the claims of temple medicine, and any other divine 
medical intervention, must be linked to their beliefs about the functioning of the traditional 
Greek pantheon. For Plato, we might expect his thoughts on the position of the Olympian 
gods within the universe to be revealed in the cosmological account within his Timaeus.  
In this account, the Demiurge (maker, creator, ‘God’) is the highest of all beings and 
is the cause of cosmic order. Plato claims that He created the intelligible universe by bringing 
order to matter, forming time, and making the celestial divinities (the Sun, planets, moons, 
and stars).251 The anthropomorphic gods of Greek tradition are accounted for in the following 
way: 
 
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιµόνων εἰπεῖν καὶ γνῶναι τὴν γένεσιν µεῖζον ἢ καθ᾽ ἡµᾶς, 
πειστέον δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἔµπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις µὲν θεῶν οὖσιν, ὡς ἔφασαν, σαφῶς 
δέ που τούς γε αὑτῶν προγόνους εἰδόσιν: ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ 
                                               
249 Plato was born around 427 B.C. and the cult of Asclepius arrived in Athens around 420 after 
enjoying huge success in other areas of Greece, especially at Epidaurus. See Nutton 2004, p.103. 
250 See Wells 2008, p.139-40 for a concise summary of the many major scholarly views on the debate 
surrounding Plato’s meaning here.  
251 De Vogel p.231-2 helpfully discusses the issue of whether the Demiurge was truly thought of as a 
‘creator’ by forming the matter out of nothing (or space) by giving it qualities of the elements or if he 
simply arranged pre-existing matter, but this discussion is not pertinent here. 
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ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς οἰκεῖα φασκόντων 
ἀπαγγέλλειν ἑποµένους τῷ νόµῳ πιστευτέον. οὕτως οὖν κατ᾽ ἐκείνους ἡµῖν ἡ γένεσις 
περὶ τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἐχέτω καὶ λεγέσθω. Γῆς τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ παῖδες Ὠκεανός τε καὶ 
Τηθὺς ἐγενέσθην, τούτων δὲ Φόρκυς Κρόνος τε καὶ Ῥέα καὶ ὅσοι µετὰ τούτων, ἐκ δὲ 
Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας Ζεὺς Ἥρα τε καὶ πάντες ὅσους ἴσµεν ἀδελφοὺς λεγοµένους αὐτῶν, 
ἔτι τε τούτων ἄλλους ἐκγόνους. 
 
As concerning the other divinities, to know and to declare their generation is too high 
a task for us; we must trust those who have declared it in former times: being, as they 
said, descendants of gods, they must, no doubt, have had certain knowledge of their 
own ancestors. We cannot, then, mistrust the children of gods, though they speak 
without probable or necessary proofs; when they profess to report their family history, 
we must follow established usage and accept what they say. Let us, then, take on their 
word this account of the generation of these gods. As children of Earth and Heaven 
were born Oceanus and Tethys; and of these Phorkys and Cronos and Rhea and all 
their company; and of Cronos and Rhea, Zeus and Hera and all their brothers and 
sisters whose names we know; and of these yet other offspring. 
(Pl. Tim. 40d4-41a3 Tr. Cornford) 
 
Cornford believes that there is no reason to assume that this passage is insincere or pandering 
to those who might look to accuse him of impiety. He suggests instead that ‘the irony in our 
passage is aimed, not at the pious beliefs of the common man, but at the pretentions of 
‘theologians’ to know the family history of anthropomorphic deities.’252 The Demiurge then 
addresses all of the gods, both celestial and anthropomorphic, and orders them to create the 
bodily forms of mortal beings. Everything directly created by the Demiurge is immortal, 
since he is incapable of producing anything less than perfect. Therefore, when it comes to 
creating the mortal beings that inhabit the Earth, the Demiurge must assign this role to the 
divinities. The Demiurge himself creates our souls and places them on the celestial bodies 
(planets etc.) to await embodiment. 253 At this stage the Demiurge retires and is involved in 
                                               
252 Cornford 1937 p.139; Guthrie 1935, p.240-1 arrives at a similar conclusion.  
253 Pl. Tim. 41c-d. Herein lies a difficulty. In different dialogues the soul is conflictingly considered 
all immortal or only partially immortal. In Phaedo, it is suggested that the mortal part of the soul is 
left behind when the immortal part ascends upon death. This is not the case in Phaedrus. In the image 
of the chariot, all parts of the soul ascend together to the immortal realm. Taylor 1928, p. 253 thinks 
this is an issue but not worth dwelling on at this point and to just think of the Demiurge constructing 
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the day-to-day affairs of mortals no further. He charges the gods with offering us guidance 
and assistance, as they see fit, to keep us on the path of justice. However, while this passage 
is initially directed at all of the gods, both celestial and anthropomorphic, Plato does not 
make it clear whether or not the traditional gods of Greek thought are involved in the process 
of generation of mortal bodies and the subsequent governance. The passage reads as follows: 
 
(41a1-4) Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ οὖν πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερῶς καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ᾿ 
ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοὶ γένεσιν ἔσχον, λέγει πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας 
τάδε·… (41c2-d4) ἵν᾿ οὖν θνητά τε ᾖ τό τε πᾶν τόδε ὄντως ἅπαν ᾖ, τρέπεσθε κατὰ 
φύσιν ὑµεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ζώων δηµιουργίαν, µιµούµενοι τὴν ἐµὴν δύναµιν περὶ τὴν 
ὑµετέραν γένεσιν. καὶ καθ᾿ ὅσον µὲν αὐτῶν ἀθανάτοις ὁµώνυµον εἶναι προσήκει, 
θεῖον λεγόµενον ἡγεµονοῦν τ᾿ ἐν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀεὶ δίκῃ καὶ ὑµῖν ἐθελόντων ἕπεσθαι, 
σπείρας καὶ ὑπαρξάµενος ἐγὼ παραδώσω· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑµεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν 
προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῶα καὶ γεννᾶτε τροφήν τε διδόντες αὐξάνετε καὶ 
φθίνοντα πάλιν δέχεσθε…(42d3-e3) Διαθεσµοθετήσας δὲ πάντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, ἵνα τῆς 
ἔπειτα εἴη κακίας ἑκάστων ἀναίτιος, ἔσπειρε τοὺς µὲν εἰς γῆν, τοὺς δ᾿ εἰς σελήνην, 
τοὺς δ᾿ εἰς τἆλλα ὅσα ὄργανα χρόνου. τὸ δὲ µετὰ τὸν σπόρον τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκε 
θεοῖς σώµατα πλάττειν θνητά, τό τε ἐπίλοιπον ὅσον ἔτι ἦν ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης δέον 
προσγενέσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ πάνθ᾿ ὅσα ἀκόλουθα ἐκείνοις ἀπεργασαµένους ἄρχειν, καὶ 
κατὰ δύναµιν ὅ τι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβερνᾷν ζῶον, ὅ τι µὴ κακῶν 
αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ γίγνοιτο αἴτιον.’ 
 
 
(41a1-4) Be that as it may, when all the gods had come to birth- both all that revolve 
before our eyes and all that reveal themselves in so far as they will- the author of the 
universe addressed them in these words-…(41c2-d4) In order then that mortal things 
may exist and this All may be truly all, turn according to your own nature to the 
making of living creatures, imitating my power in generating you. In so far as it is 
fitting that something in them should share the name of the immortals, being called 
divine and ruling over those among them who at any time are willing to follow after 
righteousness and after you- that part, having sown it as a seed and made a beginning, 
                                               
the entire soul, whereas Cornford 1937, p.141 & 146 interprets the job of the gods to include adding 
the mortal parts of the soul at this point. 
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I will hand over to you. For the rest, do you, weaving mortal to immortal, make living 
beings; bring them to birth, feed them, and cause them to grow; and when they fail, 
receive them back again…(42d3-e3) When he had delivered to them all these 
ordinances, to the end that he might be guiltless of the future wickedness of any one 
of them, he sowed them, some in the Earth, some in the Moon, some in all the other 
instruments of time. After this sowing he left it to the newly made gods to mould 
mortal bodies to fashion all that part of a human soul that there was still need to add 
and all that these things entail, and to govern and guide the mortal creature to the best 
of their powers, save in so far as it should be a cause of evil to itself. 
(Pl. Tim. 41a-42e Tr. Cornford) 
 
Plato makes it entirely clear at 41a1-4 that this address is to all the gods, both celestial and 
anthropomorphic. It becomes less clear at 41c2-5 which of these gods are responsible for 
actually creating the mortal beings, and thus are charged ‘to govern and guide’ their creations 
at 42e2. At 41c3, the gods are told by the Demiurge to ‘turn according to your own nature to 
the making of living creatures, imitating my power in generating you,’ but it is never made 
explicit what the different natures are to which the gods should turn. We know from other 
Platonic dialogues that the nature of the celestial bodies, especially the Sun, is birth, growth, 
and nourishment. In Republic 509b, the Sun is identified as ‘the offspring of the Good, which 
most resembles his parent.’ This description of the Sun resembling his parent complements 
the Timaean order from the Demiurge at 41c4 that the creators of mortal beings should be 
‘imitating my power in generating you.’254 So, if this were the intention, the celestial deities 
must be involved in the creation, and ultimate governance, of mortals. But are they alone in 
their task?  
There is no specific mention of what the traditional, anthropomorphic deities are 
doing during this process of the creation. We know they are definitely being addressed by the 
Demiurge, since Plato takes the time to ensure his readers cannot mistake the speech as being 
directed only at the celestial deities; (41a2-4) ‘both all that revolve before our eyes and all 
that reveal themselves in so far as they will- the author of the universe addressed them in 
these words.’ So, they are deliberately addressed, told to turn to their nature in creating 
mortal beings, and then, if Cornford is correct and it is only the celestial beings that create 
                                               
254 Cornford 1937, p.141. 
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mortals,255 they just do nothing. This seems strange, so I would venture that it is probable that 
Plato did view them as having a role to play in the generation of mortals. Perhaps in turning 
to their nature and imitating the way in which they were created at 40d-e, we are supposed to 
imagine the traditional deities involving themselves in the kind of sexual liaisons with 
humans that account for the birth of the figures of mythology (Achilles, Perseus, Helen, 
Heracles etc.) and, ultimately, the theologians who claim ancestry from the gods. This would 
be a neat second attempt by Plato to ridicule the theologians. First the suggestion at 40e was 
that they do not know their own family history, and now their very existence is being put 
down to the often illicit, sometimes violent, sexual encounters of gods and humans, rather 
than the pure generation of mortals from matter by the celestial deities.  
Aside from our speculations on their role in the generation of mortals, from my 
reading of the passage cited, I can see nothing to suggest that Plato did not envisage both the 
celestial and anthropomorphic deities as having a role to play in the governance and guidance 
of the mortal beings created. If this is an accurate interpretation, this ability of the gods to 
intervene in human affairs, in order to keep us on the path of justice, suggests a 
complementary relationship between Plato’s views on divine powers and the temple healing 
claimed by cults such as that of Asclepius. Clearly, the cultic belief that Asclepius himself 
performed direct medical interventions within his temple would be unproblematic for Plato 
as, in his view, the gods would be able to intervene in human affairs as they see fit. 
Furthermore, if the disease in question were to prevent the individual from pursing the just 
life, this kind of divine intervention may have even been expected of the gods.  
 
1.3. Plato and magical healers 
As seen previously, in Chapter 1, Plato says the following about magoi and manteis 
respectively: 
 
ὅσοι δ᾽ ἂνθηριώδεις γένωνται πρὸς τῷ θεοὺς µὴ νοµίζειν ἢ ἀµελεῖς ἢ παραιτητοὺς 
εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες δὲ τῶνἀνθρώπων ψυχαγωγῶσι µὲν πολλοὺς τῶν ζώντων, τοὺς 
δὲ τεθνεῶτας φάσκοντες ψυχαγωγεῖνκαὶ θεοὺς ὑπισχνούµενοι πείθειν, ὡς θυσίαις τε 
καὶ εὐχαῖς καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς γοητεύοντες, ἰδιώτας τεκαὶ ὅλας οἰκίας καὶ πόλεις χρηµάτων 
χάριν ἐπιχειρῶσιν κατ᾽ ἄκρας ἐξαιρεῖν, 
 
                                               
255 Cornford 1937, p.141. 
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But as to all those who have become like ravening beasts, and who, besides holding 
that the gods are negligent or open to bribes, despise men, charming the souls of many 
of the living, and claiming that they charm the souls of the dead, and promising to 
persuade the gods by bewitching them, as it were, with sacrifices, prayers and 
incantations, and who try thus to wreck utterly not only individuals, but whole 
families and States for the sake of money.  
(Pl. Laws. 10.909b) 
 
ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ µάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες πείθουσιν ὡς ἔστι παρὰ σφίσι 
δύναµις ἐκ θεῶν ποριζοµένη θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς. 
 
Wandering priests and prophets (manteis) approach the doors of the wealthy and 
persuade them that they have a power from the gods conveyed through sacrifices and 
incantations. 
 (Pl. Rep. 2.364b-c) 
 
 
Plato’s position on seers (manteis) generally is difficult, since in this instance from Republic 
he speaks of them in an unfavorable tone, but he does usually seem to accept that humans can 
interpret divine signs. The most compelling evidence for the legitimacy of this practice 
occurs in Timaeus 71e2-72a3: 
 
ἱκανὸν δὲ σηµεῖον ὡς µαντικὴν ἀφροσύνῃ θεὸς ἀνθρωπίνῃ δέδωκεν: οὐδεὶς γὰρ 
ἔννους ἐφάπτεται µαντικῆς ἐνθέου καὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ καθ᾽ ὕπνον τὴν τῆς 
φρονήσεως πεδηθεὶς δύναµιν ἢ διὰ νόσον, ἢ διά τινα ἐνθουσιασµὸν παραλλάξας. 
ἀλλὰ συννοῆσαι µὲν ἔµφρονος τά τε ῥηθέντα ἀναµνησθέντα ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ ὑπὸ τῆς 
µαντικῆς τε καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅσα ἂν φαντάσµατα ὀφθῇ, πάντα 
λογισµῷ διελέσθαι ὅπῃ τι σηµαίνει καὶ ὅτῳ µέλλοντος ἢ παρελθόντος ἢ παρόντος 
κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ. 
 
The claim that god gave divination as a gift to human folly had good support: while 
he is in his right mind no one engages in divination, however divinely inspired and 
true it may be, but only when his power of understanding is bound in sleep or by 
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sickness, or when some sort of possession works a change in him. On the other hand, 
it takes a man who has his wits about him to recall and ponder the pronouncements 
produced by this state of divination or possession, whether in sleep or while awake. It 
takes such a man to thoroughly analyze any and all visions that are seen, to determine 
how and for whom they signify some future, past, or present good or evil. 
(Pl. Tim. 71e2-72a3) 
 
 
This passage suggests that the gods may well send signs and dreams capable of interpretation 
by mortals, but that it is only the rational man that is capable of interpreting their true 
meaning.  
So evidently Plato thought seers could be legitimate, but the contempt shown towards 
magical healers (magoi) in Laws is consistent with the ideas expressed in Timaeus. As mortal 
beings we are naturally inferior to the divine gods, and so in Plato’s view we would not be 
capable of affecting, manipulating, or controlling their power for our own benefit. The gods 
can choose to intervene and use their power in mortal matters, but it is apparent that Plato 
viewed the claims of these magical healers to be hubristic.256  
 
 
1.4. Summary 
In summary, the combination of some favorable presentations of secular physicians within 
Plato’s dialogues and his adaptation of prominent medical theories within his own 
philosophical framework indicates that Plato held the secular medical profession in some 
esteem. Likewise, based on the cosmological account given in his Timaeus, in which the 
traditional gods of Greek religion appear to be instructed by the Demiurge to offer mortal 
beings guidance and assistance to keep them on the path to justice, the Asclepiad claims of 
the god personally intervening in individual medical matters would be unproblematic for 
Plato. However, the philosopher’s position on magical healing practices remains unclear. He 
is certainly very skeptical and accuses some practitioners of hubris in their claims of an 
ability to influence the decisions of the gods, but in his discussion of the rational man 
successfully interpreting signs from the gods, it is apparent that he did not completely 
disregard all forms of divination and magical healing. 
                                               
256 Pl. Laws. 10 828b7-c2; Flower 2008, p.87. 
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Plato’s cosmology as presented in Timaeus broadly allows for the traditional Greek 
conceptions of the gods. They appear to retain their ability to intervene in the affairs of 
humans as they choose and this could even encompass the practices of seers and magicians in 
certain circumstances. However, Aristotle’s response to Plato’s account of the cosmos is 
much less explicit about the potential role of the gods in human affairs, and as a result, more 
hypothetical conclusions must be drawn from his texts. 
 
 
2. Aristotle and ancient healing methods 
 
2.1. Aristotle and secular medicine 
Aristotle’s experiences with secular medicine were far more direct and sentimental than 
Plato’s. Aristotle was born in the relatively small city-state of Stageira, where he stayed until 
the age of seventeen.257 Coming from a wealthy family, it is likely that his education would 
have been similar to the typical aristocratic, Athenian education, including grammar, music 
and athletics, but in terms of contact with city healers, there is one crucial aspect of 
Aristotle’s upbringing that must have influenced his thinking throughout his life. Aristotle’s 
father was the personal royal physician to King Amyntas of Macedonia and his mother is said 
to have also claimed descent from Asclepius.258 It is likely that as a young child, Aristotle 
spent time in the royal court, and it is possible that it was his father’s intention to train 
Aristotle in the family trade. However, both of his parents died while he was still a child, and 
Aristotle was taken in and raised by a relative named Proxenos. It is apparent that despite this 
uprooting as a young child, Aristotle had a happy childhood and maintained a great affection 
for his adoptive family and hometown throughout his life. He eventually adopted Proxenos’ 
own son Nicanor and expressed affection for the family in his will.259 So it is clear, from both 
this continued affection and his intellectual capability even as a 17- year-old entering The 
Academy, that his adoptive father ensured that Aristotle received a thorough education. So, 
although his childhood changed direction, even if Aristotle did not have his own memories of 
his father’s success in his profession, which he may well have had since we cannot be sure 
exactly what age he was when his father died, it seems likely that his adoptive father would 
have ensured Aristotle was aware of his father’s esteemed professional reputation. Therefore, 
                                               
257 Diog, Laert. 5.1; Anagnostopoulos 2009, p.3; Guthrie 1975, p.20. 
258 Anagnostopoulos 2009, p.4; Guthrie 1975, p.20. 
259 Guthrie 1975, p.20. 
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it would not be surprising if Aristotle read the medical texts his father would have studied, 
like the Hippocratic treatises, and took on this empirical thinking in his own intellectual 
pursuits. And, indeed, this is the case. History of Animals 512b12ff. shows Aristotle’s 
familiarity with On the Nature of Man, and the empirical method is adopted, most obviously, 
in his works on the natural world, such as History and Generation of Animals. Therefore, we 
can confidently assume that Aristotle held the secular medical profession in high esteem.  
 However, this evident familiarity with On the Nature of Man, and possibly other 
Hippocratic treatises, should not lead to an assumption that Aristotle accepted the Hippocratic 
humoral theory.260 Aristotle does accept the potential existence of the four humors within the 
body,261 but unlike the Hippocratic humors that are always present within the body in the 
appropriate quantities and combinations, Aristotle claims that the humors are not always 
present in the body,262 and that rather than causing disease themselves, they are residues; by-
products that can be either detrimental or beneficial to the body, but are not the primary cause 
of disease.263 Furthermore, he makes no mention of mixtures of humors. Instead, Aristotle 
talks of imbalances in the qualitative physiology of the body, such as hot or cold, being 
responsible for disease.264 This thinking is closer to the theories of Alcmaeon than the 
Hippocratics. 
 
 
2.2. Aristotle on temple medicine 
Across his entire corpus, Aristotle never mentions the cult of Asclepius. However, through an 
examination of his cosmological and theological philosophy, I will present my interpretation 
of his probable opinion concerning temple medicine and the kind of medical intervention 
                                               
260 As it did with Lucas 1968, p.284: ‘Aristotle, who had been trained as a physician, accepted the 
Hippocratic theory of the human constitution, namely that health depends on the proper balance on 
the four humors present in the body.’ van der Eijk 2005, p.140 refutes this. 
261 For example, he mentions all four humors in HA 3.2. 511b10.  
262 Arist. Part. An. 4.2. 676b31-2, ‘In some individuals there is a distinct gall-bladder attached to the 
liver, while in others there is no gall-bladder at all.’ The gall-bladder was thought to produce black 
bile so this suggests that some people have no black bile. See van der Eijk 2005, p.152.  
263 Arist. Part. An. 4.2. 677a12-15 and 677b7-9, ‘It would be absurd to think that phlegm and the 
sediment from the stomach are not residues wherever they are found; and clearly the same applies to 
bile too.’ On the benefit of bile, he says at Part. An. 4.2. 677a30-1, ‘it is evident that the bile is not for 
the sake of anything but is a purifying excretion.’At HA 3.2. 511b10 all of the humors are described 
as excretions, alongside faeces. 
264 This concept will be examined in detail in Chapter 4. For some preliminary evidence, see Arist. 
Ph. 246b4-5 ‘Bodily excellences such as health and fitness, we regard as consisting in a blending of 
hot and cold elements in due proportion’ and Pr. 954a15; Francis 2011, p.159; van der Eijk 2005, 
p.154. 
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claimed by the cult, i.e. divine, direct, immediate, and individual healing of both chronic and 
emergency illnesses, and explore where the traditional Greek deities could be accounted for 
in Aristotle’s cosmological theory.  
In the past, scholars have attempted to simplify Aristotle’s theological opinions by 
excluding any possibility of the traditional Greek gods being considered a part of his 
cosmos.265 It is true that neither On the Heavens nor any other surviving Aristotelian text 
explains how the anthropomorphic gods would fit into his conception of the universe, but I 
find myself in agreement with Bodéüs that there is space for the gods within his cosmology, 
and that Aristotle’s statements regarding the traditional gods seem to be sincere.266 For 
example, in Topics Book I Aristotle makes his views regarding the necessity to honour the 
gods clear:  
 
Οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβληµα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλ᾿ ἣν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις τῶν 
λόγου δεοµένων καὶ µὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως· οἱ µὲν γὰρ ἀποροῦντες πότερον δεῖ 
τοὺς θεοὺς τιµᾶν καὶ τοὺς γονέας ἀγαπᾶν ἢ οὒ κολάσεως δέονται, οἱ δὲ πότερον ἡ 
χιὼν λευκὴ ἢ οὒ αἰσθήσεως. 
 
 Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might 
puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For people 
who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods and love one's parents 
or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white 
or not need perception.  
(Arist. T. 1.105a2-7) 
 
 
Here, and elsewhere,267 Aristotle displays a rather typical ancient attitude that, similarly to 
honouring one's parents, honouring the gods is so fundamental that anyone who does not 
accept this fact cannot be educated, they can only be coerced into behaving appropriately. 
But Bodéüs rightly notes that this apparent sincerity towards honouring the gods ‘does not 
imply that the philosopher endorsed in a literal sense all the beliefs of his ancestors.’268 The 
                                               
265 Defourny 1932, p.351 thinks Aristotle thought popular religion was a lie. 
266 Bodéüs 2000, p.9. 
267 E.g. Arist. EN. 4.3.1123b18; EN. 8.12.1162a4-7.  
268 Bodéüs 2000, p,10. 
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anthropomorphic notions of the gods and their conduct ‘flatly contradict Aristotle’s most 
fundamental convictions.’269 So in order to understand Aristotle’s conception of the 
traditional gods in the context of his cosmology, the qualities of the gods that will be under 
discussion are: their immortality; their ability to manifest at will; their ability to respond to 
the needs or desires of humans; their ability either to physically move to the space a human 
occupies to perform curative surgery; and their ability to bestow divine favour upon 
individuals. Aristotle’s cosmology and theological thoughts are expressed most directly in 
Metaphysics Book 12 and On the Heavens. We can also piece together some partial 
cosmological discussions from the fragmentary work De Philosophia, but Metaphysics 12 
and On the Heavens will be the primary focus of this section. 
Aristotle constructs a theory of a singular force, known as the Prime Mover or 
immovable mover, that inspires order in the universe at Metaphysics Book 12. The Prime 
Mover is always perfectly good and therefore unchangeable, since change would be either for 
the better or worse, suggesting that at some point either before or after the change, the Prime 
Mover was not perfect, which is impossible, as seen below at Metaphysics 12.9, 1074b26. 
Aristotle then reveals that since the Prime Mover is perfectly good its only action must be 
pure, self-contemplative thought: 
 
Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· δοκεῖ µὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινοµένων 
θειότατον, πῶς δ᾿ ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας. εἴτε γὰρ µηδὲν νοεῖ, τί 
ἂν εἴη τὸ σεµνόν; ἀλλ᾿ ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἴη ὁ καθεύδων· εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ᾿ ἄλλο 
κύριον, οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία νόησις ἀλλὰ δύναµις, οὐκ ἂν ἡ 
ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίµιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. ἔτι δὲ εἴτε νοῦς ἡ οὐσία 
αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησίς ἐστι, τί νοεῖ; ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι. καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν τι, ἢ τὸ 
αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἢ ἄλλο. πότερον οὖν διαφέρει τι ἢ οὐδὲν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν; ἢ καὶ 
ἄτοπον τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἐνίων; δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιµιώτατον νοεῖ, 
καὶ οὐ µεταβάλλει· εἰς χεῖρον γὰρ ἡ µεταβολή, καὶ κίνησίς τις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον. 
πρῶτον µὲν οὖν εἰ µὴ νόησίς ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δύναµις, εὔλογον ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς 
αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως· ἔπειτα δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιµιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ 
νοούµενον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χείριστον νοοῦντι. ὥστ᾿ εἰ 
φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ µὴ ὁρᾶν ἔνια κρεῖττον ἢ ὁρᾶν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἄριστον ἡ 
νόησις. αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. 
                                               
269 Elders 1966, p.38. Following Verdenius 1960, p.60. 
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Its activity must be self-thinking. For while thought is held to be the most divine of 
phenomena, the question what it must be in order to have that character involved 
difficulties. For if it thinks nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one 
who sleeps. If it thinks, but this depends on something else, then (as that which is its 
substance is not the act of thinking but a capacity), it cannot be the best substance; for 
it is through thinking that its value belongs to it. Further, whether its substance is the 
faculty of thought or the act of thinking, what does it think? Either itself or something 
else; and if something else, either the same thing always of something different? Does 
it matter then, or not, whether it thinks the good or any chance thing? Are there not 
some things about which it is incredible that it should think? Evidently, then, it thinks 
that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be a 
change for the worse, and this would be already a movement. First, then, if it is not 
the act of thinking but a capacity, it would be reasonable to suppose that the 
continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it. Secondly, there would evidently be 
something else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought. For both 
thinking and the act of thought will belong even to one who has the worst of thoughts. 
Therefore if this ought to be avoided (and it ought, for there are even some things 
which it is better not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of 
things. Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of 
things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking. 
 (Arist. Metaph. 12.9, 1074b15-35) 
 
 
From this we understand that the Prime Mover cannot have sensory experiences or nutritive 
requirements. These capacities would feel uncomfortably constrained and unsatisfied by the 
perpetual and eternal cycle of thinking on thought, which would distract from the activity of 
intellect.270 The Prime Mover cannot be distracted from self-contemplation, because it is 
unchangeable and perfect, so it follows that it cannot have sensory experiences or nutritive 
requirements. Since nutrition and perception are capacities of soul, and soul is the actuality of 
a body,271 and the Prime Mover has neither of these fundamental capacities of soul, we must 
                                               
270 Arist. DC. 2.1. 284a26-33; Elders 1966, p.181. 
271 Arist. DA. 2.1. 412b4. 
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assume that the Prime Mover is disembodied and thus does not have a soul.  Therefore, the 
Prime Mover is disembodied, eternal, self-contemplative thought. 
In terms of the Prime Mover inspiring cosmic order, the universe is likened to a 
household to illustrate that all entities in the universe share in the same goal-directed activity, 
to differing degrees based on a natural hierarchy.272 This activity is love for the Prime Mover. 
So, the Prime Mover inspires order in the universe but has no other involvement with the 
affairs of lower level entities. Therefore, in order to account for the traditional Greek gods, 
we must move further down the cosmological hierarchy. 
One level below the Prime Mover in the natural hierarchy we find the celestial bodies 
(stars, planets, moons etc.). These bodies exist eternally and are observed by Aristotle to 
move in a highly ordered, circular fashion.273 I will first address their divinity, and then 
discuss movement.  
Aristotle accepted the traditional theory that all matter is constructed from the four 
elements (fire, water, air and earth). Matter, made from combinations of these elements, is in 
a continuous cycle of generation and disintegration back into its original elemental 
components.274 This cycle is incompatible with the nature of the celestial bodies. Aristotle 
viewed the celestial bodies (and everything else in the heavens) as divine entities and eternal 
existence is a requisite quality for divinity:275 
 
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον καὶ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ τέλος καὶ τὸ τὸν πάντα χρόνον 
καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν περιέχον τέλος αἰών ἐστιν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι εἰληφὼς τὴν 
ἐπωνυµίαν, ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος… καὶ γάρ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήµασι 
περὶ τὰ θεῖα πολλάκις προφαίνεται τοῖς λόγοις ὅτι τὸ θεῖον ἀµετάβλητον ἀναγκαῖον 
εἶναι πᾶν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀκρότατον· ὃ1 οὕτως ἔχον µαρτυρεῖ τοῖς εἰρηµένοις. οὔτε 
γὰρ ἄλλο κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ὅ τι κινήσει (ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἂν εἴη θειότερον) οὔτ᾿ ἔχει φαῦλον 
οὐθέν, οὔτ᾿ ἐνδεὲς τῶν αὑτοῦ καλῶν οὐδενός ἐστιν. 
 
The fulfillment of the whole heaven, the fulfillment which includes all time and 
infinity, is duration (eternal)- a name based on the fact that it is always276- being 
immortal and divine…So, too, in its discussions concerning the divine, popular 
                                               
272 Arist. Metaph. 12.10, 1075a11-25; Sedley 2000, p.333. 
273 Arist. DC. 2.8. 289b8-30. 
274 Arist. DC. 1.3. 270a30-32; GC. 2.4. 331b2-26. 
275 Arist. DC. 1.3. 270a13-270b25.1.9. 277b27-29, 279a25-34; 2.3, 286a9-11.  
276 ‘Duration’, aion, is derived from ‘always existing’, aiei on. 
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philosophy often propounds the view that whatever is divine, whatever is primary and 
supreme, is necessarily unchangeable. This fact confirms what we have said. For there 
is nothing else stronger than it to move it, since that would be more divine- and it has 
no defect and lacks none of the proper excellences. 
(Arist. DC. 1.9. 279a25-34) 
 
Although the celestial bodies are corporeal, they cannot be constructed from the four 
traditional elements. Therefore, Aristotle introduces a fifth element, which he names 
Aether,277 divine in nature and therefore incapable of being deconstructed into any smaller 
parts, to ensure the divinity and eternal nature of his celestial bodies.278 So in terms of 
immortality alone, the traditional gods could be thought to occupy the celestial realm. 
 However, the movement of the celestial bodies does not fit into the traditional image 
of the Greek gods. On movement of the celestial bodies, Aristotle concludes the following:  
 
λείπεται τοὺς µὲν κύκλους κινεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἄστρα ἠρεµεῖν καὶ ἐνδεδεµένα τοῖς 
κύκλοις φέρεσθαι· 
 
We are left with the conclusion that the circles move and that the stars stay still and 
are carried along because fixed in the circles. 
(Arist. DC. 2.8 289b32-5) 
 
 
ὥστ᾿ εἴπερ ἓν τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τἆλλα ἂν εἴη σφαιροειδῆ. 
 
One then of the heavenly bodies being spherical, clearly the rest will be spherical 
also. 
(Arist. DC. 2.11 291b24) 
 
Being spherical refers to the eternal movement of all celestial bodies in a circle. Aristotle’s 
claim is that the bodies themselves do not move, but that they are stationary on an invisible 
sphere that does move by nature.279 He then justifies this hypothesis by concluding that the 
                                               
277 Arist. DC. 1.3. 270a30-270b23. 
278 Arist. DC. 1.3. 270a13-270b25. 
279 Arist. DC. 2.8 289b32-5; 2.11. 291b11-23. 
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celestial bodies, being closer to achieving the perfect good of the Prime Mover due to their 
superior position in the cosmological hierarchy, require less movement. The Prime Mover 
has no need for movement since it is perfectly good and thus any change would have to be 
change for the worse, which is impossible. The celestial bodies, therefore, require some, but 
little movement in order to achieve their full potential in self-contemplative thought.280 
Aristotle explains this in the following way: 
 
 
διὸ δεῖ νοµίζειν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄστρων πρᾶξιν εἶναι τοιαύτην οἵα περ ἡ τῶν ζῴων καὶ 
φυτῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα αἱ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πλεῖσται πράξεις· πολλῶν γὰρ τῶν εὖ 
δύναται τυχεῖν, ὥστε πολλὰ πράττει, καὶ ἄλλων ἕνεκα. τῷ δ᾿ ὡς ἄριστα ἔχοντι οὐθὲν 
δεῖ πράξεως· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις ἀεί ἐστιν ἐν δυσίν, ὅταν καὶ οὗ 
ἕνεκα ᾖ καὶ τὸ τούτου ἕνεκα. τῶν δ᾿ ἄλλων ζῴων ἐλάττους, τῶν δὲ φυτῶν µικρά τις 
καὶ µία ἴσως·… καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ µὲν γῆ ὅλως οὐ κινεῖται, τὰ δ᾿ ἐγγὺς ὀλίγας 
κινήσεις·… Καὶ ἔτι διὰ τόδε ἓν ἔχουσι σῶµα αἱ ἄλλαι φοραί, ὅτι πολλὰ σώµατα 
κινοῦσιν αἱ πρὸ τῆς τελευταίας καὶ τῆς ἓν ἄστρον ἐχούσης· ἐν πολλαῖς γὰρ σφαίραις ἡ 
τελευταία σφαῖρα ἐνδεδεµένη φέρεται, ἑκάστη δὲ σφαῖρα σῶµα τυγχάνει ὄν. 
 
It is plausible that the best-conditioned of all things should have its good without 
action, that which is nearest to it should achieve it [good] by little and simple action, 
and that which is farther removed by a complexity of actions, just as with men’s 
bodies one is in a good condition without exercise at all, another after a short walk, 
while another requires running and wrestling and hard training…We must then think 
of the actions of the stars as similar to that of animals and plants. For on our earth it is 
man that had the greatest variety of actions- for there are many goods that a man can 
secure; hence his actions are various and directed to ends beyond them- while the 
perfectly conditioned has no need of action, since it is itself the end…the lower 
animals have less variety of action than man; and plants perhaps have little action and 
of one kind only… It is for this reason that the earth moves not at all and the bodies 
near to it with few movements…For this last sphere moves with many others, to 
which it is fixed, each sphere being actually a body. 
(Arist. DC. 2.12.292b1-293a6-8) 
                                               
280 As discussed previously with reference to Arist. Metaph. 12.9, 1074b15-35. 
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So, if the Greek gods were thought by Aristotle to be able to physically move to, and around 
in, the human realm, as they were in traditional thought and mythology, they could not 
belong to his celestial realm. However, the celestial bodies could partake in another form of 
non-locomotive activity that was traditionally associated with the Greek gods; willful 
manifestation. Aristotle believed there was no void in nature, so the heaven that the celestial 
bodies move in must be an invisible entity. Therefore, heaven is an invisible entity made up 
of an invisible, everlasting element (Aether) between the visible celestial bodies. As 
discussed, the visible celestial bodies were thought to be fixed on an invisible moving sphere, 
which must be made of the same substance as them, Aether. It would seem, then, that entities 
made of Aether can be, and perhaps even choose to be, visible or invisible.281 So, it follows 
that the gods, whether or not they have a bodily form, must be made of Aether, since they 
exist and are divine. In which case, we can presume that the divine gods, made of Aether, 
could choose to be non-manifest or manifest at will. It is here that we might find the 
appearing and disappearing gods of tradition, even if Aristotle rejected the idea that the gods 
could move around in the mortal realm, as suggested in traditional mythology.282 
The next point for consideration is the concept of divine favour and the claims of the 
Asclepian cult (among other sects of temple medicine) that the gods can directly cure 
individual humans who seek their assistance. This is the point at which the celestial realm no 
longer seems possible if Aristotle did accept the Asclepiad notion of individual divine 
healing. The celestial bodies certainly influence earthly affairs, for example he attributes the 
seasons to the solar ellipse,283 but Aristotle is clear that the celestial bodies cannot be 
distracted from their thinking on goodness. They are the closest emulators of the Prime 
Mover, and so the affairs of individual humans would simply not warrant their attention.  
Evidently the self-moving, interfering, traditional Greek gods do not neatly fit into 
Aristotle’s celestial realm, but neither can they be part of the mortal realm.  Perhaps, then, 
they were thought to exist in a kind of sub-celestial, sur-mortal realm that affords them more 
freedom of movement and less of an absolute focus on the Prime Mover. Such a stratum in 
the cosmological hierarchy is alluded to in Meteorology:  
 
                                               
281 Bodéüs 2000, p.46-7. 
282 Bodéüs 2000, p.47. 
283 Arist. Mete. 1.9. 347a1-2 ‘This cycle of changes reflects the sun’s annual movement: for the 
moisture rises and falls as the sun moves in the ecliptic.’ 
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Περὶ δὲ τοῦ τῇ θέσει µὲν δευτέρου τόπου µετὰ τοῦτον, πρώτου δὲ περὶ τὴν γῆν, 
λέγωµεν· οὗτος γὰρ κοινὸς ὕδατός τε τόπος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ τῶν συµβαινόντων περὶ τὴν 
ἄνω γένεσιν αὐτοῦ. 
 
Let us next deal with the region which lies second beneath the celestial and first above 
the earth. This region is the joint province of water and air, and of the various 
phenomena which accompany the formation of water above the earth. 
(Arist. Mete. 1.9. 346b16-19) 
 
 
But while we might imagine the gods finding their place in this sub-celestial stratum, when it 
comes to discussions about the gods’ ability, or inclination, to directly influence human 
affairs on a personal level, Aristotle is uncharacteristically direct and relatively firm in his 
conclusions. He expresses his disbelief that the gods could be involved in the kind of good 
fortune, prophetic dreams, or divine signs claimed by men, because this apparent divine 
favour affects the worst of men just as often as the best. He is clear in his assessment that 
divine favour must be related to closeness in affinity with the Prime Mover. Mortal beings, 
who aspire to emulate the Prime Mover through maximum philosophic contemplation, should 
be, in Aristotle’s thinking, the only receivers of divine favour. This is expressed in the 
following passages: 
 
ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείµενος ἄριστα καὶ 
θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιµέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, 
ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ 
(τοῦτο δ᾿ ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας µάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιµῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν 
ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιµελουµένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ 
πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ µάλισθ᾿ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν 
δ᾿ εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιµονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς µάλιστ᾿ εὐδαίµων. 
 
Now he who exercises his intellect and cultivates it seems to be both in the best state 
and most dear to the gods. For if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are 
thought to have, it would be reasonable both that they should delight in that which 
was best and most akin to them (i.e. intellect) and that they should reward those who 
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love and honour this most, as caring for the things that are dear to them and acting 
both rightly and nobly. And that all these attributes belong most of all to the wise man 
is manifest. He, therefore, is dearest to the gods. And he who is that will presumably 
be also the happiest; so that in this way too the wise man will more than any other be 
happy. 
 
(Arist. NE. 10.8. 1179a24-32) 
 
 
εἰ µὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ θεῶν δώρηµα ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιµονίαν 
θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ µάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο µὲν ἴσως 
ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δέ, κἂν εἰ µὴ θεόπεµπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι᾿ 
ἀρετὴν καί τινα µάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς 
ἀρετῆς ἆθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ µακάριον. 
 
 Now, if there is any gift of the god to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be 
god-given, and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. 
But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; happiness 
seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of excellence and 
some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike things; for that 
which is the prize and end of excellence seems to be the best thing and something 
godlike and blessed. 
(Arist. NE. 1.9. 1099b11-16) 
 
 
Having established that any divine favour bestowed on mortals should, logically, be received 
by the most virtuous, Aristotle concludes that, because this is not his experience of how good 
fortune is allocated among men, that the gods can be responsible for neither good fortune nor 
seemingly prophetic dreams:  
 
ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ φασίν, ὑπὸ θεοῦ, καὶ ἔξωθέν τι εἶναι τὸ κατορθοῦν, οἷον 
πλοῖον κακῶς νεναυπηγηµένον ἄµεινον πολλάκις διαπλεῖ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ δι᾿ αὑτὸ ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι 
ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν; ἀλλ᾿ οὕτως ὁ εὐτυχῶν τὸν δαίµον᾿ ἔχει κυβερνήτην. ἀλλ᾿ 
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ἄτοπον θεὸν ἢ δαίµονα φιλεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ µὴ τὸν βέλτιστον καὶ τὸν 
φρονιµώτατον.  
 
Or is it because he is loved, as the phrase is, by a god, success being something 
coming from without, as the worse-built vessel often sails better, not owing to itself 
but because it has a good pilot? So, the fortunate man has a good pilot, namely, the 
divinity. But it is absurd that a god or divinity should love such a man and not the best 
and most wise of men. 
(Arist. EE 8.2. 1247a24-29) 
 
 
τό τε γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν πέµποντα, πρὸς τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀλογίᾳ, καὶ τὸ µὴ τοῖς βελτίστοις καὶ 
φρονιµωτάτοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τυχοῦσι πέµπειν ἄτοπον. 
 
It is absurd to combine the idea that the sender of such dreams should be God with the 
fact that those to whom he sends them are not the best and wisest, but merely people 
at random. 
(Arist. Div. Som. 462b19-21) 
 
 
Ὅλως δ᾿ ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὀνειρώττει τινά, θεόπεµπτα µὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ 
ἐνύπνια, οὐδὲ γέγονε τούτου χάριν, δαιµόνια µέντοι· ἡ γὰρ φύσις δαιµονία, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ 
θεία. σηµεῖον δέ· πάνυ γὰρ εὐτελεῖς ἄνθρωποι προορατικοί εἰσι καὶ εὐθυόνειροι, ὡς 
οὐ θεοῦ πέµποντος, ἀλλ᾿ ὅσων ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ λάλος ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ καὶ µελαγχολική, 
παντοδαπὰς ὄψεις ὁρῶσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ κινεῖσθαι ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν 
ὁµοίοις θεωρήµασιν, ἐπιτυχεῖς ὄντες ἐν τούτοις ὥσπερ ἔνιοι ἀρτιάζοντες 
 
On the whole, forasmuch as certain other animals also dream, it may be concluded 
that dreams are not sent by God, nor are the designed for this purpose. They have a 
mysterious aspect, however, for nature is mysterious, though not divine. A sign is 
this: the power of foreseeing the future and of having vivid dreams is found in persons 
of inferior type, which implies that God does not send their dreams; but merely that 
all those whose physical temperament is, as it were, garrulous and melancholic, see 
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sights of all descriptions; for inasmuch as they experience many movements of every 
kind, they just chance to have visions resembling objective facts, their luck in these 
matters being merely like that of persons who play at dice. 
(Arist. Div. Som. 463b12-20) 
 
ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδ᾿ ἡ ἐπιµέλεια καὶ ἡ εὔνοια παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι εὐτυχία διὰ 
τὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐγγίγνεσθαι· τὸν δὲ θεὸν τῶν φαύλων οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐπιµελεῖσθαι. 
 
Surely, neither the concern nor the benevolence of God would seem to be in good 
fortune, because it also occurs among the wicked; and it is unlikely that God would 
care for the wicked. 
(Arist. Mag. Mor. 2.8. 1207a15)284 
 
 
But in true Aristotelian style, although he finds repeated good fortune, or seemingly 
supernatural prophetic abilities, inexplicable within his cosmology, he does not entirely close 
off the conversation. In one final concluding comment on the matter within Eudemian Ethics, 
Aristotle says: 
 
Φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι δύο εἴδη εὐτυχίας, ἡ µὲν θεία· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ εὐτυχὴς διὰ θεὸν 
κατορθοῦν, ἣ δὲ φύσει. 
 
It is clear then, that there are two kinds of good luck, the one divine- and so the lucky 
seem to succeed owing to god- the other natural. 
 
(Arist. EE 8.2.1248b3-4) 
 
There has been much scholarly discussion about why Aristotle chooses, at this moment, to go 
back on the rigid standpoint he takes so often elsewhere,285 but as I stated in the opening of 
                                               
284 It is necessary to acknowledge the disputed authorship of Magna Moralia, but I am in agreement 
with van der Eijk 2005, p.241 n.12 in his assessment that the strength of philosophical agreement 
between this passage and the others quoted here justifies its inclusion. 
285 For some enlightening explorations of this issue and other instances where Aristotle might be 
partially accepting the possibility of divine favour please see Bodéüs 2000, p.158-68 
Broadie 2003; Gabbe 2012; Mayhew 2008; van der Eijk 2005, p.238-58. 
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this section, my aim is to reveal the most likely position Aristotle would take on the kind of 
divine, direct, immediate, individual healing of both chronic and emergency illnesses claimed 
by the cult of Asclepius. Despite this final refusal of Aristotle to completely denounce all 
possibility of divine favour, the consistency of the theophilestatos argument286 suggests that, 
largely, ‘Asclepiadic’ interventions (i.e. individual, immediate, direct, requested incidents of 
medical healing) would very likely not have been accepted by Aristotle. 
 
 
2.3. Aristotle on magical healers 
Once again, across his entire corpus, Aristotle never discusses magoi and rarely mentions 
manteis, and when he does, it is either in a neutral tone or not particularly favourable. For 
example, in Rhetoric he says there is less chance of making a mistake if you generalise, 
which is ‘why soothsayers do not further define the exact time.’287 Little can be deduced from 
discussions so lacking in detail, but as a continuation of my conclusions drawn for Aristotle’s 
probable opinions on temple medicine, I would suggest that the same arguments would apply. 
If Aristotle did not believe the gods were able to intervene in human affairs of their own free-
will, it would be impossible for a mortal to force them to do so.  
 
 
2.4. Summary 
From our knowledge of Aristotle’s background and his parents’ medical renown, we can 
quite safely assume that Aristotle held the secular medical profession in high esteem, despite 
his lack of direct discussion of secular physicians and their efficacy. However, the claims of 
direct divine intervention in temple healing is not compatible with my suggestion of 
Aristotle’s conception of the traditional gods and their position within his cosmology. To me, 
it seems that the gods were probably thought to fit into the celestial, or perhaps sub-celestial, 
realm, resulting in their focus on intellect and inability to directly intervene in the mortal 
realm. This suggestion would also account for any disbelief harboured towards magoi, who 
Aristotle never even mentions. It is also unlikely that manteis would have been considered 
                                               
286 The term of reference used by Broadie 2003, p.61ff. (among many others both prior and since) to 
the argument quoted above from NE 10.8. 1179a24-32 in which Aristotle claims that, if the gods are 
to favour anyone, it must be those who cultivate their intellect. 
287 Arist. Rhet. 1407b2. 
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legitimate unless they were rational, intellectual individuals who only foretold good fortune 
to other virtuous people. 
It appears that both Plato and Aristotle had a degree of respect for secular medicine, 
but their (potentially) conflicting viewpoints on religious healing are the product of their 
diverging cosmological theories.  
 
 
  
 
3. Shared philosophical visions 
Despite their often converging philosophical theories, as philosophers, Plato and Aristotle 
shared the same fundamental concerns. Their goals were to challenge existing preconceptions 
about the gods and the universe, and in doing so, to discover how one could live the best 
possible life in accordance with the cosmos. One point of apparent agreement in their 
cosmologies is the inability for the randomness or injustice of mortal beings to have an effect 
on the order of higher realms of the cosmos. In Timaeus, it is asserted that the existence of 
mortal beings is required for the completion of the cosmos288 but further than this, it does not 
seem that mortals, or even the condition of the human soul, can affect the balance or order of 
the universe. So much so that while the gods are tasked with guiding us towards justice, they 
are not obliged to do so, and are not held responsible for the condition of a human soul in any 
way. Plato is clear that each individual mortal being is responsible for the condition of their 
own soul.289 Therefore, while humans are required to exist within the complete universe, the 
level of mortal contribution to cosmic interdependence ends with this existence. The gods can 
choose to assist us, their inferiors, but we are incapable of affecting the higher levels of 
cosmic order. The same appears to be true of Aristotle’s universe. It is unclear whether or not 
the gods are capable of mortal intervention, but it does seem apparent that unvirtuous mortal 
beings have no effect on the strict order and intellectual focus of the celestial realm and the 
prime mover. Therefore, for both philosophers, we are wholly responsible for ensuring we 
live virtuously and maintain our soul in a good condition. For both Plato and Aristotle, their 
primary shared point of concern was how to live well; and by this, they meant live virtuously. 
                                               
288 Pl. Tim. 41c. ‘As long as they [living beings] have not come to be, the heaven will be incomplete, 
for it will still lack within it all the kinds of living things it must have if it is to be sufficiently 
complete.’ 
289 Pl. Tim. 42b. 
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If virtue and virtuous behaviour is the primary concern, they might be particularly interested 
in people displaying the kinds of symptoms and behaviours that manifest with depression, 
since, as I shall go on to demonstrate, these symptoms directly go against both the Platonic 
and Aristotelian advice for how to live well. So, the philosophers may well have attempted to 
offer advice for how to avoid or prevent oneself from acting in this way, and how to gain 
control over the turbulent behaviours and changeable moods exhibited by depressed people. 
In order to explore this further, I must first examine Plato and Aristotle’s personal 
conceptions of what it is to be virtuous, so that we might consider in what ways an individual 
displaying depressive symptoms, might fall short of the expectation for virtue. 
 
 
3.1. Virtue for Plato 
According to Plato, happiness (eudaimonia) is the soul’s ultimate goal and every deliberate 
action is taken in the belief that it will lead to happiness.290 Eudaimonia can only be achieved 
through acquiring true knowledge, knowledge of the Forms, and the only way to achieve this 
knowledge, is with a soul in a virtuous condition.291 But this condition is very difficult to 
achieve.  
Plato viewed the soul as comprised of three distinct parts, Reason, Spirit and 
Appetite, each with its own desires and ideal position within a natural hierarchy. Reason 
desires wisdom, the only rational desire to pursue, and is the natural leader of the soul,292 
Spirit craves honour and respect,293 and the Appetitive part is responsible for our desires for 
food, drink and sex.294 In the stable, harmonious co-existence295 of the virtuous soul, Spirit 
and Appetite are subservient to Reason. However, this psychic balance is very difficult to 
achieve since Spirit and Appetite constantly struggle against the rule of Reason and have the 
potential to overwhelm it if allowed to grow strong. 296 The desires of all three parts gain 
strength through indulgence and so the irrational desires of Appetite and Spirit must not be 
                                               
290 Penner 2011, p.260; Reshotko 2013, p.156. 
291 Pl. Rep 514a-518b, 521a. – Happiness = Knowledge. The allegory of the cave shows that only 
those who have achieved recollection of the Forms are truly happy. Phdr. 248e-249d. shows that 
Knowledge = Virtue. Rep. 580b reaches the conclusion that Happiness = Virtue. So, Happiness = 
Knowledge = Virtue. 
292 Pl. Rep. 441e.  
293 Pl. Rep. 440c-d. 
294 Pl. Rep. 439d. 
295 Vlastos 1969, p.520; Reshotko 2013, p.157. 
296 Penner 2011, p.261.  
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indulged to excess or they will rapidly overpower Reason.297 Therefore, virtue is a stable 
balance within the soul in which Reason dominates, and Spirit and Appetite are subservient 
to the will of Reason.298  
With a soul in this virtuous condition, the natural instinct will be towards the desire of 
Reason, which is the pursuit of knowledge; specifically, knowledge of the Forms. This 
process is most effectively depicted in Phaedrus with the metaphor of the soul as a winged 
chariot. Reason is the charioteer, Spirit is a benevolent white horse and Appetite the bad-
tempered black horse.299 At the beginning of time, every soul is said to have resided up in the 
heavens with the wholly good souls of the gods,300 since it was in a perfectly harmonious 
state and could fly to the highest boundary of the heavens. The Forms exist in a space beyond 
that, but by flying right up to the top, our charioteer could glimpse some of the Forms. But 
because our souls have conflicting parts, unlike the gods, the harmony of the chariot began to 
break down. The black horse weighs down the chariot in the first place, hindering the 
charioteer from seeing all of Reality and then causes the charioteer to lose control, crashing 
into other souls. Our wings became damaged and broken and our souls fell to earth and 
entered human bodies.301 Being distracted by the senses of the body and the irrational desires 
of Appetite and Spirit, the souls forget the Forms and struggled to regain the harmony and 
control it had at the beginning.302 But if an individual were to regain this psychic balance 
through a life dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge, their soul would once again begin its 
ascent as the desire of Reason is to recollect its previous knowledge of the Forms.303 Once 
this recollection is achieved, the soul will truly understand happiness, and always pursue this 
in all actions. 
 
 
3.2. Virtue for Aristotle 
The guide to virtue for Aristotle is more prescriptive than that provided by Plato, which is 
essentially a very rough outline that we should not indulge our irrational desires to excess and 
rather focus on philosophic enquiry. But Aristotle gives us much more of a step-by-step guide 
                                               
297 Pl. Rep. 421b3-5, 410b; Phdr. 256b-d. Each part of the soul should have its appropriate share of 
indulgence. 
298 Pl. Phdr. 256a-c harmony of the soul = virtue.  
299 Pl. Phdr. 246a-c. 
300 Pl. Phdr. 246a. 
301 Pl. Phdr. 246a-247b5. 
302 Pl. Phdr. 249a-c. 
303 Pl. Phdr. 249c-e. 
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of how to act virtuously. Similarly to Plato, the focus is still on eudaimonia, achievable only 
by living one’s life in such a way that the activities of the soul are always ‘in conformity with 
virtue (arete)’.304 Aristotle describes this virtue as the disposition or habit of always choosing 
‘a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency’305 in the activities 
of the soul, which are the passions felt and the actions taken,306 where the mean is ‘that 
amount which is neither too much nor too little, and this is not one, nor the same for all.’307 
For an agent to be considered virtuous they must achieve both a disposition towards 
appropriate feelings and actions, and practical wisdom. Once this is accomplished, the agent 
will have the ability to consistently hit the mean in all activities of the soul, but, once again, 
this is very difficult to do so.308 An agent must develop their habitual responses since the 
passions happen to us rather than being consciously chosen309 and virtuous actions must be 
chosen once in possession of practical wisdom and in the knowledge that the action is the 
appropriate choice.  
A human agent is not simply born with the disposition for virtue. Children are born in 
possession of intellect (which is inoperative at birth so they are incapable of reasoned 
deliberation, but naturally matures and becomes operative with time) and they do not yet 
possess practical wisdom (phronesis) which is integral to becoming a virtuous agent.310 
Practical wisdom can only be developed once reason is operative and good habits and ethical 
principles have been instilled throughout childhood and continue to be exercised in early 
adulthood. Once this has been achieved, phronesis can be developed by putting the general 
ethical principles learnt in childhood into practice, so that the knowledge can be refined from 
the universal to particular, situationally appropriate knowledge.311 Only once these are 
achieved can an agent be considered truly virtuous.  
Virtuous character is developed during childhood by establishing good habits, which 
are taught to the child through an education focused on ethical principles.312  
                                               
304 Arist. EN. 1.7.1098a16. 
305 Arist. EN. 2.9.1109a21-22. 
306 Arist. EN. 2.6.1106b17. 
307 Arist. EN. 2.6.1106a31-2. 
308 Arist. EN. 1.7.1098a18-19. 
309 Arist. EN. 2.5.1106a3. 
310Arist. EE 2.8, 1224b29-35; EN 6.13.1144b14-20; 10.8.1178a15-16; Heath forthcoming, Ch.3, p.23. 
311 Arist. EN 6.8.1142a11-17. 
312 Later I will examine to what extent an adult could hope to change their character, but in an ideal 
situation, an adult would have developed their virtuous character throughout their childhood and early 
adulthood by following the teachings of an ethical education. 
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Phronesis, on the other hand, which is related to determining virtuous action, can only be 
developed during adulthood, once the virtuous character is in place. In order to develop their 
phronesis an agent must either have, or witness others having, a number of experiences 
related to the virtue. When a person is presented with a situation, deliberates and chooses to 
act in a certain way, a latent image of each of the perceptual aspects of the circumstances is 
retained within the soul.313 These images (or memories as we would think of them in this 
context, since it is not only visual perceptions that are stored but those related to all the 
senses314) are called phantasmata. When later recalling the event, it is possible to access and 
integrate multiple phantasmata within the soul at the same time315 and in doing so we are 
able to assess the circumstances and consequences of prior situations. This is what Aristotle 
perceives as experience (empeiria). It is by accessing the soul’s ever-growing bank of 
phantasmata that an agent striving for virtue can assess the outcome of previous deliberations 
and thus adjust their present and future actions appropriately in order to try and come closer 
to achieving the mean. In this way, hitting the mean becomes a trial and error process, which 
requires a large bank of experiences and so it becomes clear why children cannot be virtuous; 
they simply do not have the life experience yet to develop their phronesis and thus achieve 
the mean. Evidently, this is a lengthy process, but Aristotle is clear that it is not only personal 
experiences that contribute to the bank of phantasmata. Much can be learnt from witnessing 
the experiences and choices made by others. He encourages his audience to take guidance 
from people who have already achieved a virtuous state316 and presumably we can also learn 
from the mistakes we witness others making, so that we ourselves do not make the same 
errors in our own future attempts to hit the mean. When this mean is eventually achieved, the 
individual will finally have the phantasmata associated with how to respond to such a 
situation virtuously. By acquiring this practical wisdom, in the future, when presented with 
the same situation, the individual will again be able to act in accordance with the goals set by 
their virtuous character. But it is not only identical situations that the agent will be equipped 
to respond to by acquiring this particular set of phantasmata. As humans, our intellect allows 
us to apply this practical wisdom to similar, but not identical, situations. We are capable of 
identifying the similarities between situations, but also the differences and then using our 
reason to adjust our behavior accordingly, so that we may still hit the mean, despite not 
                                               
313 Arist. Mem. 1. 450a31-32. Speaks of perception stamping ‘a sort of impression of the percept’ on 
the soul.  
314 Arist. DA 3.3. 429a3-5. 
315 Arist. APo. 2.19, 100a3-6; Arist. Metaph. 1.1, 980b25-981a1. 
316 Arist. EN. 2.6.1106b36-7a2. 
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having experienced the exact set of circumstances previously. Once the agent has 
experienced many situations and collected phantasmata related to all virtues, they should 
have sufficient practical wisdom to allow them to respond appropriately to any situation they 
may encounter. At this point the agent would, hypothetically, finally be able to devote their 
life as far as possible to contemplation, with the understanding that as mortal, social animals 
we require time away from contemplation to eat, drink and socialise for our physical and 
mental health.317 This is the ideal Aristotelian virtuous agent whose character and phronesis 
are in the best state for them to be able to achieve eudaimonia.  
So, what exactly is the mean that the virtuous agent must aim at? Aristotle asserts that 
there is no formulaic method that can be used in determining the mean in relation to moral 
virtue,318 stating: 
 
ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡµᾶς δὲ ὃ µήτε πλεονάζει µήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο 
δ᾿ οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν. 
 
By the mean relative to us [I mean] that which is neither too much nor too little- and 
this is not one, nor the same for everyone. 
(Arist. EN. 2.6. 1106a31-2) 
 
I interpret this statement to mean that we should view the mean as situationally dependent.319 
Aristotle claims that the only way to achieve a virtuous mean is to ensure the passion or 
action is felt or performed ‘at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the 
right people, for the right aim and in the right way’320 and failure in any one of these criteria 
results in failing to achieve the virtue. These criteria primarily refer to the situation in which a 
passion or action would occur and so would support the notion of relativism on the basis of 
situation.  
                                               
317 Ar. EN 10.7. 1177b26-35.  
318 Arist. EN. 2.6. 1106a35-1106b6. 
319 There are other interpretations of this statement that have been expressed by eminent scholars over 
the years, especially that of individual relativism expressed by Hardie 1968, p.135; Kraut 2014; 
Leighton 1995, p.67-78; Lloyd 1968, p.76,82 and Sherman 1989, p.37. This is not the place to address 
this debate, but see Appendix 2 for my reasoning for this interpretation. My main points of contention 
are that the mean loses its normative force if it is individualised (which goes against Aristotle’s 
recommendation that we learn from the experiences of others) and there is no indication that the mean 
gets harder to hit the more virtuous we become. There is one mean, regardless of how close we are to 
being truly virtuous agents.  
320 Arist. EN. 2.6. 1106b21-22. 
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Aristotelian virtue specifies that it is not only actions that must hit the mean, but also 
one’s passions. By passions, Aristotle clarifies that he is referring to ‘appetite, anger, fear, 
confidence, envy, joy, love, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general feelings that are 
accompanied by pleasure or pain.’321 So it would seem that “passion” is a term relating to 
relatively uncontrollable bodily requirements (the need to eat for example) and a range of 
emotional states. 
In order to achieve the passionate mean, the agent is required to feel the passion in 
accordance with the following criteria: 
 
τὸ δ᾽ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, µέσον τε 
 
(1) at the right time, (2) on the right occasion, (3) towards the right people, (4) for the 
right purpose and (5) in the right manner. 
(Arist. EN. 2.6. 1106b21-22. Tr. Rackham 1934) 
 
Moral assessment begins with the passionate experience occurring within the right context; 
(1) and (2). For example, to feel anger towards injustice would hit the mean, but feeling the 
same anger towards justice would, of course, not be the correct response. This idea is 
reinforced later on in the text where Aristotle states that fear can be felt appropriately towards 
evils such as disgrace or death.322 The passion must also be felt towards the appropriate 
person (3). Rhetoric talks of the effect of emotions on judgement.323 For example, if someone 
you love is being accused of a terrible crime, despite the strength of the evidence, your anger 
might be directed at the accusing party rather than your loved one, since you would not want 
to accept the truth. The anger is misdirected as a result of your love for them and so the 
emotion is distorting your judgement.324 In such a case, your anger is not being felt towards 
the correct person and would, consequently, miss the mean. 
Feeling the passion with the right aim or for the right purpose refers to setting the goal 
for the eventual action. (4). If the goal envisaged or desired would be either excessive or an 
under-reaction to the particular situation then the passion misses the mean in this criterion.  
                                               
321 Arist. EN. 2.5.1105b21-4. 
322 Arist. EN. 3.6.1115a6-14. 
323 Arist. Rhet. 2.1. 1378a1-3. 
324 Arist. EN. 7.6. 1149a25-6; Arist. Insomn. 460b4-6; Leighton 1982, p.149. 
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It seems logical that ‘in the right way’325 (5) refers to the strength of the feeling or 
emotion, i.e that the passion achieves the mean by being felt neither too keenly nor too 
faintly.326 This is supported by Aristotle’s claim that ‘we stand badly if we feel it [anger] 
violently or too weakly.’327  
Aristotle provides a comprehensive guide regarding how to achieve virtue, especially 
in relation to one’s moods and emotions. Therefore, it is unsurprising to find discussions 
within the corpus concerning typical behaviours exhibited by depressed individuals.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Both Plato and Aristotle would have been exposed to all the healers examined in Chapter 1 
during their early life. Both present an attitude of respect towards secular healers, but their 
views appear to diverge in relation to religious healing. Plato seems to empower the gods to 
access and intervene in the mortal realm. As a result, the kind of intervention claimed by the 
cult of Asclepius would have been unproblematic for him. However, he is skeptical of 
magical healers and seers. He does not appear to entirely discredit all diviners, but the claims 
of the magoi having the ability to manipulate the gods and harness their power earns Plato’s 
contempt.  
On the other hand, Aristotle is shown to have virtually excluded the traditional gods 
in his cosmology. I presented one possible interpretation of how the gods might fit into his 
theory by way of a sub-celestial, sur-mortal realm, but this is by no means definitive. 
However, I remain unconvinced that Aristotle saw the gods as having the ability to intervene 
in mortal affairs, so I do not believe Aristotle would have been convinced by the claims of 
direct divine intervention in temple medicine or by the magoi. On the other hand, his few 
references to manteis are unrevealingly neutral, but if the gods were able to look favourably 
upon mortals who try to imitate the goodness of the divine, Aristotle might have thought 
diviners capable of interpreting these signs from the gods.  
Having examined virtue for both Plato and Aristotle, while there are evident 
differences in their approaches and theories, it is apparent that for both philosophers the 
                                               
325 Arist. EN. 2.6. 1106b22. 
326 Arist. EE. 2.3. 1221b19. 
327 Arist. EN. 2.5.1105b28. 
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crucial aspect of achieving virtue is balance. For Plato, virtue is the parts of the soul co-
existing in a balanced internal harmony; for Aristotle, virtue is acting and feeling in a 
proportionate way, neither excessively nor deficiently, thus hitting the mean.  
The depressed person would certainly struggle to achieve the internal harmony 
required by both philosophers to achieve virtue and due to the psychological nature of many 
of the symptoms of depression that were already being acknowledged by other healers in 
Athens, and Plato and Aristotle’s engagement with the established healing environment, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the philosophers may have felt that they could make 
valuable contributions to this field of thought. Therefore, I will now go on to explore Plato 
and Aristotle’s recognition of the symptoms we now associate with depression.  
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Chapter 3- Plato 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will explore Plato’s understanding of psychic illness and argue that there are 
positive correlations with DSM-V’s categorisation of depression. I begin by presenting a key 
passage from Timaeus (86b1-87a9) in which Plato discusses psychic illnesses and provides a 
list of associated symptoms. I will then compare each of these symptoms to those included in 
DSM-V’s categorisation of depression and show that they align surprisingly well. However, 
as a result of the deliberate pairings of the symptoms listed, I will argue that Plato viewed 
each symptom within a pair as manifesting independently. I note that each pair should be 
thought of as arising from a disease in each part of the tripartite soul. This disease is excess 
and so the two symptoms represent the two poles of excess when it affects a particular part of 
the soul. When the desires of Appetite are indulged to excess this gives rise to despondency, 
when they are neglected, irritability ensues; excessive Spirit brings on recklessness and 
neglect brings on cowardice; and the exception is Reason, which cannot be excessively 
satisfied, so both forgetfulness and stupidity are a result of the neglect of this part of the soul. 
This results in a possible symptomatic model in which the symptoms in a pair cannot be 
experienced at the same time. 
I will then use the characterisation of Apollodorus in support of the symptomatic 
model implied by Timaeus. Drawing on his representations in Symposium and Phaedo, I will 
show that Apollodorus’ character is consistent with the Timaean man with a disease in his 
soul. Apollodorus is consistently presented as forgetful and stupid, and in Phaedo he is 
particularly despondent, whereas in Symposium, which is set on a different day, he is shown 
to be very irritable. Whilst confirming the Timaean model of symptoms in a pair only being 
able to manifest individually, the characterisation of Apollodorus also shows that the same 
individual is able to experience both of the symptoms in a pair at different times.  
In order to convincingly conclude that there are positive correlations between Plato’s 
understanding of psychic illness and DSM-V’s categorisation of depression, there needs to be 
some recognition of the tendency of the symptoms to occur together. I argue that, although 
the Timaeus presents a model in which individual symptoms in each pair must present alone, 
Plato must have envisaged symptoms from different pairs manifesting together. His theory of 
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tripartition promotes the idea that, when in a healthy state, the three parts of the soul exist in a 
delicate, harmonious balance. If one of these parts is disrupted, the other two parts are also 
affected. Therefore, if one part is suffering with a disease of excess that causes the 
manifestation of one of its assigned symptoms, the other two parts will also experience one of 
their symptoms. For example, if Appetite is in excess, Reason must experience neglect, and 
Spirit will likely be affected by the disharmony within the soul as well. Therefore, the 
clustering of symptoms is necessary in Plato’s psychology. Once again, this is confirmed 
through the characterisation of Apollodorus. Alongside the forgetfulness and stupidity, and 
despondency or irritability already examined, he also exhibits low self-esteem, which could 
be thought of as a deficiency in Spirit, and anhedonia, another possible manifestation of the 
neglect of Appetite. 
Having shown that Plato recognised the clustering of symptoms that align closely 
with four of DSM-V’s symptoms of depression, I will explore the perceived origin of psychic 
diseases according to Timaeus 86b1-87a9. It is hugely significant that Plato appears to 
suggest that the soul could be affected by physical, bodily diseases. Therefore, I will provide 
my own translation of the passage in order to ensure my analysis of Plato’s precise meaning 
is accurate. I will highlight translational variations by comparing my translation to those of 
previous scholars and justify my choice of interpretation. I will then explore Plato’s account 
of the origin of these psychic diseases, since the suggestion that the humors could directly 
infect the soul goes against one of the most fundamental and consistent Platonic notions of 
soul-body distinctness. I ultimately argue that the humors may have been thought to invade 
the space that the soul occupied, thus disrupting the revolutions of the soul, which would then 
lead to psychic disease. 
Finally, I will conclude that there are strong positive correlations between Plato’s 
understanding of psychic illness and DSM-V’s categorisation of depression. Plato identifies 
four of the nine DSM-V symptoms of depression, recognised their tendency to occur 
together, and attributed the psychic disease from which they arise as ultimately a disease 
originating with the poor condition of the body. 
  
 
 
1.  Timaeus 86b1-87a9 
The most striking and detailed Platonic discussion of mental illness occurs in his Timaeus 
86b1-87a9. This passage provides a crucial insight into Plato’s potential recognition of a 
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clustering of symptoms. The end of this passage is of particular interest to this study. At 87a, 
Plato identifies a collection of behaviours, intellectual abilities, and moods that he calls 
diseases of the soul and that have a surprising common origin; the bodily humors. Upon an 
initial reading, at least, Plato appears to be suggesting that the physical, bodily humors, are 
capable of directly infecting the soul and causing diseases within the psyche. This 
interpretation of the passage would be in direct contradiction with one of the most consistent 
cross-corpus Platonic notions of soul and body distinctness, and so requires detailed analysis. 
Timaeus 86b1-87a9 reads as follows:328 
 
 
(86b) Καὶ τὰ µὲν περὶ τὸ σῶµα νοσήµατα ταύτῃ ξυµβαίνει γιγνόµενα, τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν διὰ 
σώµατος ἕξιν τῇδε. νόσον µὲν δὴ ψυχῆς ἄνοιαν ξυγχωρητέον, δύο δ᾿ ἀνοίας γένη, τὸ 
µὲν µανίαν, τὸ δὲ ἀµαθίαν. πᾶν οὖν ὅ τι πάσχων τις πάθος ὁπότερον αὐτῶν ἴσχει, 
νόσον προσρητέον· ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας ὑπερβαλλούσας τῶν νόσων µεγίστας θετέον 
τῇ ψυχῇ· περιχαρὴς γὰρ 
(86c)    ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἢ καὶ τἀναντία ὑπὸ λύπης πάσχων, σπεύδων τὸ µὲν ἑλεῖν ἀκαίρως, τὸ 
δὲ φυγεῖν, οὔτε ὁρᾷν οὔτε ἀκούειν ὀρθὸν οὐδὲν δύναται, λυττᾷ δὲ καὶ λογισµοῦ 
µετασχεῖν ἥκιστα τότε δὴ δυνατός ἐστι. τὸ δὲ σπέρµα ὅτῳ πολὺ καὶ ῥυῶδες περὶ τὸν 
µυελὸν γίγνεται, καὶ καθαπερεὶ δένδρον πολυκαρπότερον τοῦ ξυµµέτρου πεφυκὸς ᾖ, 
πολλὰς µὲν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ὠδῖνας, πολλὰς δ᾿ ἡδονὰς κτώµενος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυµίαις καὶ 
τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τόκοις, ἐµµανὴς 
(86d) τὸ πλεῖστον γιγνόµενος τοῦ βίου διὰ τὰς µεγίστας ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, νοσοῦσαν καὶ 
ἄφρονα ἴσχων ὑπὸ τοῦ σώµατος τὴν ψυχήν, οὐχ ὡς νοσῶν ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἑκὼν κακὸς 
[κακῶς] δοξάζεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία κατὰ τὸ πολὺ µέρος 
διὰ τὴν ἑνὸς γένους ἕξιν ὑπὸ µανότητος ὀστῶν ἐν σώµατι ῥυώδη καὶ ὑγραίνουσαν 
νόσος ψυχῆς γέγονε. καὶ σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα ὁπόσα ἡδονῶν ἀκράτεια κατ᾿ ὄνειδος ὡς 
ἑκόντων λέγεται τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ 
(86e) ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζεται· κακὸς µὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδείς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἕξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώµατος 
καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφὴν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός, παντὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἐχθρὰ καὶ ἄκοντι 
προσγίγνεται. καὶ πάλιν δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς λύπας ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ διὰ σῶµα πολλὴν 
ἴσχει κακίαν. Ὅπου γὰρ ἂν οἱ τῶν ὀξέων καὶ τῶν ἁλυκῶν φλεγµάτων καὶ ὅσοι πικροὶ 
καὶ χολώδεις χυµοὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶµα 
                                               
328 As presented in the 1929 Loeb edition.  
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(87a) πλανηθέντες ἔξω µὲν µὴ λάβωσιν ἀναπνοήν, ἐντὸς δὲ εἱλλόµενοι τὴν ἀφ᾿ αὑτῶν 
ἀτµίδα τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς φορᾷ ξυµµίξαντες ἀνακερασθῶσι, παντοδαπὰ νοσήµατα ψυχῆς 
ἐµποιοῦσι, µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ πλείω· πρός τε τοὺς τρεῖς τόπους 
ἐνεχθέντα τῆς ψυχῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἂν ἕκαστ᾿ αὐτῶν προσπίπτῃ, ποικίλλει µὲν εἴδη 
δυσκολίας καὶ δυσθυµίας παντοδαπά, ποικίλλει δὲ θρασύτητός τε καὶ δειλίας, ἔτι δὲ 
λήθης ἅµα καὶ δυσµαθίας. 
 
 
 
 
 
(86b) The diseases of the body come about in this way. Those of the soul arise because of 
the bodily condition in the following way. We must accept that mindlessness is a 
disease of the soul, and there are two kinds of mindlessness: madness and ignorance. 
Everything that someone suffers must be called a disease if it has one or the other (i.e 
madness or ignorance); and we must assume that excessive pleasures and pains are 
the greatest diseases of the soul. For when a man is joyful or, on the contrary, 
suffering with pain, 
(86c) scrambling to seize one of them in untimely ways, and avoid the other, he is not able 
to see or hear anything correctly, he is raving and, at that time, he is least able to 
partake in reason. If that seed becomes abundant and overflows around the marrow, 
and like a tree produces an inordinate quantity of fruit, he brings upon himself again 
and again many pangs and pleasures from his desires and their fruition, and because 
of these greatest pleasures and 
(86d) pains, he becomes mad for most of his life, and although his soul is in a diseased and 
frantic state because of his body, he will appear not as sick, but as willfully bad; but in 
reality, sexual licentiousness (e.g.) becomes a disease of the soul, for the most part, 
due to the condition of a single type, which flows in the body due to the porousness of 
the bones, and makes it moist. Indeed, almost all affections of the soul are unruly 
pleasures, but the man who is reproached is called willfully bad, but this reproach is 
not correct, for no one is bad willfully. The bad man becomes bad on account of the 
bad 
(86e) condition of his body and a lack of education, and in every case the things he does are 
hateful to everyone and happen to them unwillingly. And again, with respect to pains, 
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in the same way the soul acquires a lot of badness because of the body. For whenever 
both acidic and salty phlegms and other bitter and bilious humors wander throughout 
the body without finding a vent, but are 
(87a) trapped inside and mixing together the vapour that they give off with the motion of 
the soul, they are in a blended state, and they induce all kinds of diseases of the soul, 
some greater and lesser, and some fewer and more. As the diseases are carried to the 
three places of the soul, according to whichever place they attack, they proliferate all 
kinds of irritability and despondency, and they proliferate rashness and cowardice, as 
well as forgetfulness and, at the same time, stupidity. 
 
(Pl. Tim. 86b1-87a9 Tr. Enright) 
 
 
 
2. Symptoms of psychic diseases 
In the final three lines of the given passage, Plato identifies a group of moods and behaviours 
that he claims arise as a result of the presence of diseases within the psyche: 
 
πρός τε τοὺς τρεῖς τόπους ἐνεχθέντα τῆς ψυχῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἂν ἕκαστ᾿ αὐτῶν προσπίπτῃ, 
ποικίλλει µὲν εἴδη δυσκολίας καὶ δυσθυµίας παντοδαπά, ποικίλλει δὲ θρασύτητός τε 
καὶ δειλίας, ἔτι δὲ λήθης ἅµα καὶ δυσµαθίας. 
 
As the diseases move to the three parts of the soul, according to which part they 
attack, they proliferate all kinds of irritability and despondency, and they proliferate 
rashness and cowardice, as well as forgetfulness and, at the same time, stupidity. 
 
 (Pl. Tim. 87a4-87a9) 
 
 
At this moment in the passage, the diseases themselves are not identified by Plato. He only 
provides information on the subsequent conditions that the diseases cause. We might think of 
these conditions as symptoms of the disease, although Plato does not make this distinction 
himself. These conditions (or symptoms) are irritability, despondency, recklessness, 
cowardice, forgetfulness and stupidity. When compared to DSM’s symptomatic 
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categorisation of Major Depressive Disorder, Plato’s list of possible symptoms is strikingly 
similar to a number of symptoms we now associate with depression:  
 
- Duskolia, which conveys irritability or bad temperedness, could be equated to the 
irritability experienced by some sufferers of MDD. DSM-V specifies that many 
individuals experiencing the symptom depressed mood exhibit increased irritability in 
the form of unwarranted angry outbursts for a period of at least 2 weeks.329 
- Dusthumia translates as despondent or despairing, and some translators even opt for 
melancholic.330 This is probably the term that most closely reflects the sadness 
experienced by some sufferers of depression.  
- While thrasytes (recklessness) is usually a sign of a manic, rather than depressive, 
episode,331 deilia (cowardice) could describe the often irrational phobias and anxiety 
experienced by sufferers of MDD.332  
- Both lethe (forgetfulness) and dusmathia (stupidity) correspond to another symptom 
of MDD. An impaired ability to think or concentrate is a common symptom of MDD 
and DSM-V suggests that this can manifest as memory difficulties (or forgetfulness) 
or a decreased ability to learn due to the inability to concentrate, which could be 
interpreted as stupidity.333  
 
So, at 87a Plato groups together a number of the symptoms and associated behaviours that we 
now associate with depression: despondency, irritability, anxiety, impaired memory, and 
decreased ability to learn new things. However, it is interesting that Plato groups the 
symptoms caused by the psychic diseases into three pairs, rather than presenting them as a 
simple list. He specifically separates them into pairs using the following language: 
 
ποικίλλει µὲν εἴδη δυσκολίας καὶ δυσθυµίας παντοδαπά, ποικίλλει δὲ θρασύτητός τε 
καὶ δειλίας, ἔτι δὲ λήθης ἅµα καὶ δυσµαθίας. 
 
                                               
329 DSM-V 2013, p.164. 
330 Pl. Laws 666b7; Phd 85b7; Zeyl 2000. 
331 DSM-V 2013, p.124; 129. p.124 states, as a symptom of a manic episode, ‘excessive involvement 
in activities that have a high potential for painful consequences.’ p.129 specifies recklessness. 
332 DSM-V 2013, p.164. 
333 DSM-V 2013, p.164. 
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They proliferate all kinds of irritability and despondency, and they proliferate 
rashness and cowardice, as well as forgetfulness and, at the same time, stupidity. 
(Pl. Tim. 87a4-87a9 Tr. Enright) 
 
 
I would argue that these pairings suggest that Plato did not envisage quite the same clustering 
of symptoms that we now associate with depression. Rather than recognising the tendency for 
all of these symptoms to occur together, the suggestion appears to be that only one or the 
other of each pair of symptoms is able to present at any one time. This conclusion is based on 
Plato’s indentification of the diseases of the soul as the excessive pleasures and pains. He 
states: 
 
ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας ὑπερβαλλούσας τῶν νόσων µεγίστας θετέον τῇ ψυχῇ· 
 
We must assume that excessive pleasures and pains are the greatest diseases of the 
soul. 
(Pl. Tim. 86b4-5 Tr. Enright) 
 
This reveals that psychic disease is excess, and excess can be either of pleasure or pain, 
where moderation is the healthy centre point. If we think of the pairs of symptoms as 
products of the two poles of excess, the pairing seems logical. It seems that each pair of 
symptoms should be thought of as specific to one part of the tripartite soul, when that part is 
affected by the disease of excess.334 Irritability and despondency occur when Appetite is 
affected, recklessness and cowardice will occur in Spirit, and forgetfulness and stupidity in 
Reason. I will address each of these pairings in the order they appear in the text. 
Despondency and irritability are fitting for the symptoms of excessive pleasure and 
pain (respectively) for the appetitive part. These are consistent with the descriptions of the 
moods associated with the excessive satisfaction or neglect of the desires of Appetite in 
Republic and Phaedrus. In Republic, Plato describes the appetitive part of the soul clinging to 
grief and gaining satisfaction from being allowed to revel in despondency. When the 
interlocutors discuss the emotions of a man whose son has died, Socrates says: 
 
                                               
334 Ahonen 2014, p.45; Tracy 1969, p.132.  
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Οὐκοῦν τὸ µὲν ἀντιτείνειν διακελευόµενον λόγος καὶ νόµος ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ ἕλκον ἐπὶ τὰς 
λύπας αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος; 
 
Reason and principle demand restraint, while his very feeling of sorrow prompts him 
to give way to grief?  
(Pl. Rep. 604a9-604b1) 
 
If Reason and principle (nomos- custom) demand that the man restrain himself in his 
expressions of grief, we can assume that it is the appetitive part of his soul that encourages 
him to indulge in his grief. His Spirit’s desire for respect/honour would encourage adherence 
with custom. Plato then goes on to describe the satisfaction the appetitive part of the soul 
gains from indulging in grief or despondency, even when the experience inciting 
despondency is not experienced first-hand. The work of tragedians can reproduce the same 
feelings of despondency in their audience, which equally satisfies the viewers’ Appetite and 
strengthens its desire: 
 
Εἰ ἐνθυµοῖο ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόµενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συµφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς 
τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὂν τοιοῦτον οἷον 
τούτων ἐπιθυµεῖν, τότ’ ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιµπλάµενον καὶ χαῖρον· 
 
If you consider that the poet gratifies and indulges the instinctive desires of a part of 
us, which we forcibly restrain in our private misfortunes, with its hunger for tears and 
for an uninhibited indulgence in grief. 
 
(Pl. Rep. 606a3-6) 
 
So, despondency is an emotional response to the appetitive part of the soul experiencing 
excessive pleasure. 
On the other hand, when the desires of the appetitive part are neglected Plato shows 
that the part becomes irritable. This is shown through the description of the mood of the black 
horse in Phaedrus. When the desires are neglected the appetitive horse ‘leaps violently 
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forward’335 and ‘bursts into a torrent of insults’336 at the charioteer and white horse for 
stopping their advance. This description is certainly compatible with irritability. 
Recklessness and cowardice align well with the excessive satisfaction or neglect of 
the desires of Spirit. When the desire for honour/respect is overly strong, recklessness occurs, 
and when this is too weak, the person becomes cowardly. In other words, recklessness is the 
symptom of excessive pleasure for the spirited part, and cowardice that of a severely deficient 
Spirit.  
The desire of Reason must be affected by forgetfulness and stupidity, but the wording 
Plato uses in relation to these two symptoms is slightly different to the other two pairs. He 
says: 
 
ποικίλλει µὲν εἴδη δυσκολίας καὶ δυσθυµίας παντοδαπά, ποικίλλει δὲ θρασύτητός τε 
καὶ δειλίας, ἔτι δὲ λήθης ἅµα καὶ δυσµαθίας. 
 
They proliferate all kinds of irritability and despondency, and they proliferate 
rashness and cowardice, as well as forgetfulness and, at the same time, stupidity. 
(Pl. Tim. 87a4-87a9) 
 
This wording suggests that forgetfulness and stupidity occur under the same circumstances, 
rather than being symptoms of the opposing extremes of excess. But this supports the 
argument further, since the desire for wisdom cannot be excessively strong or excessively 
satisfied. Both forgetfulness and stupidity would be caused by neglecting the desire to learn 
and thus ignoring Reason’s need for wisdom.337 
From this evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that, unless the soul were in perfect 
harmony, Reason would experience neglect and so forgetfulness and stupidity would ensue. 
But for the other two parts of the soul, Spirit and Appetites, if one symptom in each pair were 
associated with an excessive satisfaction of the desires of that part of the soul, and the other 
were the neglect, presumably these symptoms could not appear at the same time. This creates 
a model of symptomatic manifestation in which irritability and despondency, or rashness and 
cowardice could not manifest at the same time. In terms of the aim of this study to identify if 
                                               
335 Pl. Phdr. 254a4. 
336 Pl. Phdr. 254c6. 
337 Tracy 1969, p.132 argues that forgetfulness= quick thinking, which he takes to mean the excessive 
satisfaction of the desire for wisdom. However, this ignores the difference in expression between the 
three pairings and forgetfulness to quick-thinking seems like a bit of a stretch to me.  
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Plato displays positive correlations in his understanding of psychic disease with DSM’s 
categorisation of depression, this is not a particularly problematic finding for rashness and 
cowardice, but we know that depressed mood and irritability are both commonly seen in 
individuals with depression. However, this Timaean model does not exclude the possibility 
that the same person could experience each symptom in a pair at different times. It only 
restricts despondency and irritability from being exhibited at exactly the same time. Plato 
demonstrates this possibility through his characterisation of Apollodorus. 
 
 
 
3. Apollodorus: A characteristic demonstration of psychic disease 
Apollodorus appears in Plato’s Symposium and Phaedo. He is presented as a devoted 
follower of Socrates, but with little talent for philosophy and rather emotionally volatile.338 
However, when considered alongside Timaeus, Apollodorus’ behaviour aligns well with the 
description of a man with a disease in his soul. It is worth noting that while Apollodorus’ 
moods appear to align with the symptoms of a diseased soul, as presented in Timaeus, 
Apollodorus’ companions in the dialogues never explicitly state that they consider him to be 
ill. It is revealed that people call him ‘the maniac’ in response to his bad temperedness and 
claims of worthlessness,339 but never that these traits are considered symptomatic of an 
underlying illness. However, Plato does address this societal attitude, which he considers to 
be a general misunderstanding. He says in Timaeus: 
 
 
And because of these excessive pleasures and pains, he becomes mad for most of his 
life, and although his soul is kept diseased and frantic by his body, he will appear not 
as sick, but as willfully bad… Indeed, almost all affections of the soul are unruly 
pleasures, but the man who is reproached is called willfully bad, but this reproach is 
not correct, for no one is bad willfully. 
(Pl. Tim. 86c8-e1 Tr. Enright) 
 
                                               
338 Edelstein 1945; Moore, 1969; Nails 2002, p.39; Neumann 1965. 
339 Pl. Sym. 173e. 
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So, despite Apollodorus’ companions’ assumption that he chooses to be difficult, bad 
tempered and overly emotional, and their lack of suggestion that he may be experiencing an 
illness within his psyche, I believe Plato is presenting a characterised manifestation of the 
Timaean man with a diseased soul that everyone thinks of as willfully bad rather than sick.  
Apollodorus is depicted on two different occasions and his emotional expressions are 
very different. As a result, he conforms to the Timaean model of symptom manifestation, in 
which only one in the pair of symptoms associated with Spirit and Appetites can occur at any 
one time, but both symptoms in a pair can manifest in the same person at different times. 
 
 
3.1. Comparison of Apollodorus’ behaviour to Timaean symptoms 
Across the two dialogues in which he appears, Apollodorus never displays cowardice or 
rashness, but he is presented as forgetful/stupid, irritable and despondent. I will address each 
pair of symptoms in turn.  
 
Forgetfulness/ stupidity 
I concluded previously that forgetfulness and stupidity must both be symptoms of the disease 
caused by the neglect of Reason, because it is not possible to overly satisfy this rational 
desire. Therefore, we would expect both of these symptoms to occur simultaneously. A lack 
of philosophic ability is one of the widely accepted scholarly assumptions about 
Apollodorus.340 He is usually considered to be of lower intelligence than his peers and 
Apollodorus himself says in Symposium, ‘my greatest pleasure comes from philosophical 
conversation, even if I’m only a listener’341, clearly suggesting that he does not even think of 
himself as philosophically capable. 
 
 
Despondency/irritability 
One conclusion drawn from Timaeus was that despondency and irritability should be viewed 
as polar opposite symptoms of a disease in the appetitive part of the soul. When the desires of 
Appetite are overindulged, the individual can feel despondent, when they are neglected, the 
symptom is irritability. Therefore, we would not expect these symptoms to manifest at the 
                                               
340 de Vries 1969, p.232; Edelstein 1945, p.103; Kruger 1948, p.79; Moore, 1969; Neumann 1965. 
341 Pl. Sym. 173c3-5. 
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same time, although they could manifest within the same person at different times. This 
conclusion is supported by Plato’s presentation of Apollodorus. 
The first dialogue under examination is Phaedo. We are told that Apollodorus was 
present at the death of Socrates, but he does not speak in this dialogue. However, we can 
make some inferences regarding his character from the comments made by his peers 
regarding his general demeanour during the last moments of Socrates’ life. We are told that 
Apollodorus is absolutely grief-stricken and continually weeps for the whole dialogue, while 
his companions are able to remain more composed. Their comments about him read as 
follows: 
 
καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδόν τι οὕτω διεκείµεθα, τοτὲ µὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ 
δακρύοντες, εἷς δὲ ἡµῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος— οἶσθα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα 
καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ. 
 
All of us present were affected in much the same way, sometimes laughing, then 
weeping; especially one of us, Apollodorus- you know the man and his ways.  
(Pl. Phd. 59a9) 
 
 
καὶ ἡµῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως µὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἷοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ µὴ 
δακρύειν,…Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔµπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, 
καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάµενος κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὅντινα οὐ κατέκλασε 
τῶν παρόντων…ἐκεῖνος δέ, ‘οἷα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυµάσιοι. ἐγὼ µέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα 
τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεµψα, ἵνα µὴ ’ τοιαῦτα πληµµελοῖεν: καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα 
ὅτι ἐν εὐφηµίᾳ χρὴ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε.’ 
 
Most of us had been able to hold back our tears reasonably well up till 
then…Apollodorus had not ceased from weeping before and at this moment his noisy 
tears and anger made everybody present break down… ‘What is this?’ Socrates said, 
‘It’s mainly for this reason that I sent the women away, to avoid such unseemliness, 
for I am told one should die in good omened silence. So keep quiet and control 
yourselves.’ 
(Pl. Phd. 117d2-e2) 
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It is abundantly clear from these statements that Apollodorus is unusually overcome by grief. 
All those present are saddened by the events, but particular attention is drawn to Apollodorus 
being unable to control his sadness. Furthermore, it is suggested that this behaviour is not 
unusual for Apollodorus. His peers are rather dismissive of his emotional reaction and 
explain away his despair with ‘you know the man and his ways’.342 It is also interesting that 
Socrates only tells everyone to control themselves and let him die in peace at the moment all 
the rest of the companions begin to cry, even though the narrator tells us that Apollodorus has 
been noisily weeping for the whole time.343 It seems that no one present is surprised by 
Apollodorus’ emotional outburst and so everyone, even Socrates, just choose to ignore his 
weeping. This suggests, at least, that Apollodorus is prone to being particularly despondent.  
So, it is apparent that Apollodorus’ despair is not unusual to his personality, but it is 
evident that this kind of emotional outburst was not appropriate for the situation. Socrates 
rebukes his other followers for a similar display of grief, which is consistent with the cultural 
(and Platonic) views on appropriate emotional displays presented elsewhere in the corpus. In 
Republic Socrates’ interlocutor gives a very clear idea of what he saw as an appropriate 
public response to the immense grief experienced by a decent man suffering a personal 
tragedy; a loss comparable to that experienced by Apollodorus upon the death of Socrates:  
 
Ἀνήρ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐπιεικὴς τοιᾶσδε τύχης µετασχών, ὑὸν ἀπολέσας | ἤ τι ἄλλο ὧν περὶ 
πλείστου ποιεῖται, ἐλέγοµέν που καὶ τότε ὅτι ῥᾷστα οἴσει τῶν ἄλλων. 
Πάνυ γε. 
Νῦν δέ γε τόδ’ ἐπισκεψώµεθα, πότερον οὐδὲν ἀχθέσεται, ἢ τοῦτο µὲν ἀδύνατον, 
µετριάσει δέ πως πρὸς λύπην. 
Οὕτω µᾶλλον, ἔφη, τό γε ἀληθές.  
Τόδε νῦν µοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέ· πότερον µᾶλλον αὐτὸν οἴει τῇ λύπῃ µαχεῖσθαί τε καὶ 
ἀντιτείνειν, ὅταν ὁρᾶται ὑπὸ τῶν ὁµοίων, ἢ ὅταν ἐν ἐρηµίᾳ µόνος αὐτὸς καθ’ αὑτὸν 
γίγνηται; 
Πολύ που, ἔφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὁρᾶται.  
Μονωθεὶς δέ γε οἶµαι πολλὰ µὲν τολµήσει φθέγξασθαι, ἃ εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἀκούοι 
αἰσχύνοιτ’ ἄν, πολλὰ δὲ ποιήσει, ἃ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτό τινα ἰδεῖν δρῶντα. 
Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. 
                                               
342 Pl. Phd. 59a9. 
343 Pl. Phd. 117d. 
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‘Didn’t we then say that a good man who loses his son, or anything else dear to him, 
will bear the misfortune more equably than other people?’ 
‘Yes.’ 
‘Now consider: is it because he feels no grief? Or is that impossible, and is it because 
he will moderate his sorrow?’ 
‘The second alternative is nearer the truth.’ 
‘Then tell me, will he be more inclined to resist and fight against his grief when his 
fellows can see him, or when he is alone by himself?’ 
‘Much more inclined when others can see him.’ 
 ‘On the other hand, when he is alone he will not mind saying and doing things which 
he would be ashamed to let other people hear or see.’ 
‘That is true.’ 
(Pl. Rep.10. 603e7-604a3) 
 
It appears that the cultural expectation for behaviour in the face of significant loss was that 
when in public, or surrounded by one’s peers, one should control oneself. This is reiterated in 
Laws: 
 
Δακρύειν µὲν τὸν τετελευτηκότα ἐπιτάττειν ἢ µὴ ἄµορφον, θρηνεῖν δὲ καὶ ἔξω τῆς 
οἰκίας φωνὴν ἐξαγγέλλειν ἀπαγορεύειν. 
 
Tasteless though it is to forbid or instruct people to weep over the dead, dirges should 
be forbidden; and cries of mourning should be allowed only inside the house. 
(Pl. Laws 960a1-2) 
 
It is clear that Apollodorus is not conforming to these expectations of appropriate public 
grief. In fact, in Plato’s view he is not even displaying the appropriate private grief of a 
philosopher. In Republic, Socrates goes on to explain to his interlocutors that even in private, 
excessive expressions of grief are to be avoided: 
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ὅ τε δεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅτι τάχιστα παραγίγνεσθαι ἡµῖν, τούτῳ ἐµποδὼν γιγνόµενον τὸ 
λυπεῖσθαι. 
Τίνι, ἦ δ’ ὅς, λέγεις;  
Τῷ βουλεύεσθαι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ 
πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὑτοῦ πράγµατα, ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ βέλτιστ’ ἂν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ 
µὴ προσπταίσαντας καθάπερ παῖδας ἐχοµένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοᾶν διατρίβειν, 
ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἐθίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ὅτι τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ 
ἰᾶσθαί τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ νοσῆσαν, ἰατρικῇ θρηνῳδίαν ἀφανίζοντα. 
 
‘Grief prevents us getting just the help we need.’ 
‘And what is that?’ 
‘That of deliberation,’ I said, ‘which reflects on what has happened and then makes 
what reason picks as the best move that the fall of the dice allows. We mustn’t hug 
the hurt part and spend our time weeping and wailing like children when they trip. 
Instead, we should always accustom our souls to turn as quickly as possible to healing 
the disease and putting the disaster right, replacing lamentation with cure.’ 
(Pl. Rep. 604c3-d2)  
 
As discussed previously, the reason that grief should not be dwelled upon is that indulging 
one’s sorrow excessively satisfies the desires of the irrational, appetitive part of the soul. In 
this passage from Republic, we see a repetition of the notion expressed in Timaeus that 
excessive satisfaction of the desires of a part of the soul is a disease.  
So Apollodorus is presented as having the tendency to respond to personal losses in a 
particularly despondent manner. From the evidence shown from Republic, Plato attributes 
despondency to an excessive satisfaction of the desires of Appetite, which he then refers to as 
a disease. Likewise, in Timaeus excessive satisfaction is presented as a disease of the soul 
that causes despondency when the appetitive part is affected. This cross-textual consistency 
of thinking of despondency as a symptom of the psychic disease that is excessive satisfaction 
of Appetite does suggest that we should think of Apollodorus’ despondency in the same way. 
I would venture that we can reasonably think of Apollodorus in Phaedo as experiencing the 
despondency (δυσθυµία) associated with diseases of the soul as expressed in Timaeus. 
But what of irritability? Our only other presentation of Apollodorus, and the only one 
in which he is a speaking character, occurs in the opening of Symposium. The opening of this 
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dialogue is set years before Phaedo, at a time when Apollodorus is still a follower of 
Socrates, and in this instance, Apollodorus is presented as irritable instead of despondent. 
We learn from the ensuing discussion that Plato has constructed quite a complex 
timeline within this introduction, which will lend support to one of my postulations later. 
Apollodorus is currently speaking to an unnamed friend. This friend asks Apollodorus to tell 
him what happened at a symposium that Socrates attended many years ago. Apollodorus was 
not present but he was told what happened by someone who was. Incidentally, Apollodorus 
was asked to relate the same story by another friend [Glaucon] a few days previously. He 
tells the friend in relative detail about the conversation he had with Glaucon the other day 
before getting to the point and telling his companion about the speeches at the symposium. 
The introductory exchange reads as follows:344  
 
ΑΠ. καὶ ὅς, Ἀπολλόδωρε, ἔφη, καὶ µὴν καὶ ἔναγχός σε ἐζήτουν βουλόµενος 
διαπυθέσθαι τὴν Ἀγάθωνος συνουσίαν καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων τῶν τότε ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ παραγενοµένων, περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων τίνες 
ἦσαν… πρότερον δέ µοι, ἦ δ᾿ ὅς, εἰπέ, σὺ αὐτὸς παρεγένου τῇ συνουσίᾳ ταύτῃ ἢ οὔ; 
κἀγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Παντάπασιν ἔοικέ σοι οὐδὲν διηγεῖσθαι σαφὲς ὁ διηγούµενος, εἰ 
νεωστὶ ἡγῇ τὴν συνουσίαν γεγονέναι ταύτην ἣν ἐρωτᾷς, ὥστε καὶ ἐµὲ παραγενέσθαι. 
Ἔγωγε δή, ἔφη.1 Πόθεν, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων; οὐκ οἶσθ᾿ ὅτι πολλῶν ἐτῶν Ἀγάθων 
ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἐπιδεδήµηκεν, ἀφ οὗ δ᾿ ἐγὼ Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβω καὶ ἐπιµελὲς 
πεποίηµαι ἑκάστης ἡµέρας εἰδέναι ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃ ἢ πράττῃ, οὐδέπω τρία ἔτη ἐστίν; 
πρὸτοῦ δὲ περιτρέχων ὅπῃ τύχοιµι καὶ οἰόµενος τὶ ποιεῖν ἀθλιώτερος ἦ ὁτουοῦν, οὐχ 
ἧττον ἢ σὺ νυνί, οἰόµενος δεῖν πάντα µᾶλλον πράττειν ἢ φιλοσοφεῖν. καὶ ὅς, Μὴ 
σκῶπτ᾿, ἔφη, ἀλλ᾿ εἰπέ µοι πότε ἐγένετο ἡ συνουσία αὕτη. κἀγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Παίδων 
ὄντων ἡµῶν ἔτι, ὅτε τῇ πρώτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ ἐνίκησεν Ἀγάθων, τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ᾗ τὰ ἐπινίκια 
ἔθυεν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ χορευταί. Πάνυ, ἔφη, ἄρα πάλαι, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλὰ τίς σοι 
διηγεῖτο; ἢ αὐτὸς Σωκράτης; Οὐ µὰ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ… εἰ οὖν δεῖ καὶ ὑµῖν 
διηγήσασθαι, ταῦτα χρὴ ποιεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλως, ὅταν µέν τινας περὶ 
φιλοσοφίας λόγους ἢ αὐτὸς ποιῶµαι ἢ ἄλλων ἀκούω, χωρὶς τοῦ οἴεσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι 
ὑπερφυῶς ὡς χαίρω· ὅταν δὲ ἄλλους τινάς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοὺς ὑµετέρους τοὺς τῶν 
πλουσίων καὶ χρηµατιστικῶν, αὐτός τε ἄχθοµαι ὑµᾶς τε τοὺς ἑταίρους ἐλεῶ, ὅτι 
οἴεσθε τὶ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες. καὶ ἴσως αὖ ὑµεῖς ἐµὲ ἡγεῖσθε κακοδαίµονα εἶναι, 
                                               
344 Abridged to highlight the most important moments for my argument in a lengthy passage. 
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καὶ οἴοµαι ὑµᾶς ἀληθῆ οἴεσθαι· ἐγὼ µέντοι ὑµᾶς οὐκ οἴοµαι ἀλλ᾿ εὖ οἶδα. 
ΕΤ. Ἀεὶ ὅµοιος εἶ, ὦ Ἀπολλόδωρε· ἀεὶ γὰρ σαυτόν τε κακηγορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, 
καὶ δοκεῖς µοι ἀτεχνῶς πάντας ἀθλίους ἡγεῖσθαι πλὴν Σωκράτους, ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ 
ἀρξάµενος. καὶ ὁπόθεν ποτὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπωνυµίαν ἔλαβες τὸ µανικὸς καλεῖσθαι, οὐκ 
οἶδα ἔγωγε· ἐν µὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ· σαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις 
ἀγριαίνεις πλὴν Σωκράτους. 
ΑΠ. Ὦ φίλτατε, καὶ δῆλόν γε δὴ ὅτι οὕτω διανοούµενος καὶ περὶ ἐµαυτοῦ καὶ περὶ 
ὑµῶν µαίνοµαι καὶ παραπαίω; 
ΕΤ. Οὐκ ἄξιον περὶ τούτων, Ἀπολλόδωρε, νῦν ἐρίζειν· ἀλλ᾿ ὅπερ ἐδεόµεθά σου, µὴ 
ἄλλως ποιήσῃς, ἀλλὰ διήγησαι τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι. 
 
 
 Apollodorus: ‘He [Glaucon] said, “You know there was a gathering at Agathon’s 
when Socrates, Alcibiades, and their friends had dinner together; I wanted to ask you 
about the speeches they made on Love. What were they? [...]Were you there 
yourself?” 
 “Your friend must have really garbled his story,” I replied, “if you think this 
affair was so recent that I could have been there. ” 
 “I did think that,” he said. 
“Glaucon, how could you? You now very well Agathon hasn’t lived in Athens 
for many years, while it’s been less than three years that I’ve been Socrates’ 
companion and made it my job to know exactly what he says and does each day. 
Before that, I simply drifted aimlessly. Of course, I used to think what I was doing 
was important, but in fact I was the most worthless man on earth- as bad as you are 
this very moment. I used to think philosophy was the last thing a man should do.” 
“Instead of jeering at me,” he replied, “just tell me when the party took place.” 
“When we were still children, when Agathon won the prize with his first 
tragedy. It was the day after he and his troupe held their victory celebration.” 
“So it really was a long time ago,” he said. “Then who told you about it? Was 
it Socrates himself?” 
“Oh for God’s sake, of course not!” I replied[...]Well, if I’m to tell you 
[Friend] about it too- I’ll be glad to. After all, my greatest pleasure comes from 
philosophical conversation, even if I’m only a listener. All other talk, especially the 
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talk of rich businessmen like you, bores me to tears, and I’m sorry for you and your 
friends because you think your affairs are important when really they are totally 
trivial. Perhaps, in your turn, you think I’m a failure and, believe me, I think that what 
you think is true. But as for all of you, I don’t just think you are failures- I know it for 
a fact. 
Friend: You’ll never change Apollodorus! Always nagging, even at yourself! I do 
believe you think everybody, yourself first of all, is totally worthless, except, of 
course, Socrates. I don’t know exactly how you came to be called ‘the maniac’, but 
you certainly talk like one, always furious with everyone, including yourself... 
Apollodorus: Of course, my dear friend, it’s perfectly obvious why I have these 
views about us all; It’s simply because I am a maniac, and I’m raving!’ 
Friend: It’s not worth arguing about this now Apollodorus. Please just do as I asked: 
tell me the speeches.’ 
(Pl. Sym. 172b1-173e4)  
 
It is quite clear from this exchange that Plato is showing Apollodorus to be prone to 
unwarranted angry outburts. Glaucon’s query about whether Apollodorus was told of the 
symposium by Socrates himself345 seems to be a reasonable assumption, since Apollodorus 
has just mentioned that he is a close follower of Socrates.346 There does not appear to be 
anything particularly irritating or offensive about the question, but Apollodorus flies off the 
handle with the response ‘Oh for God’s sake, of course not!’.347 Additionally, we are told by 
Friend that this behaviour is typical of Apollodorus. He says Apollodorus is ‘always furious 
with everyone’348 and ‘always nagging.’349 Apollodorus then insults his companion by saying 
that all of his conversation bores him to tears and that he considers everyone to be total 
failures.350 However, in the same breath, Apollodorus claims that he loves philosophical 
conversation. In fact, it is the only kind of conversation he likes.351 So considering both 
Glaucon and his unnamed friend have asked him to indulge in some philosophical 
                                               
345 Pl. Sym. 173a10. 
346 Pl. Sym. 173a2. 
347 Pl. Sym. 173b1. Moore 1969, p.225 also finds the seemingly unjustified attacks on fleeting 
characters puzzling. Moore assumes this is a feature of the commonly assumed madness of 
Apollodorus. See also Neumann 1965. 
348 Pl. Sym. 173d6. 
349 Pl. Sym. 173d4. 
350 Pl. Sym. 173c5-d3. 
351 Pl. Sym. 173c3-5. 
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conversation with them, we might assume that this would put him in a good mood, yet still he 
is irrationally snappy and irritable.  
Furthermore, if we consider the layout of the introductory conversation, Plato is 
evidently going to some trouble to ensure that his readers realise that this irritability is an 
ongoing feature of Apollodorus’ character. The complicated structure in the introduction of 
having the simultaneous and overlapping conversations with both friends surely must have a 
point, but in reality, not much is added to the narrative by including the conversation with 
Glaucon in such detail. It just seems to complicate the exposition. Nussbaum suggests that 
the sudden widespread interest in this symposium that happened years ago could indicate the 
intended timing of the dialogue. She believes Apollodorus’ two retellings sandwich the news 
of Alcibiades’ assassination reaching Athens.352 In which case, the unnamed friend could be 
seeking out Apollodorus to hear the story in greater clarity.353 But even if Nussbaum’s 
assessment is accurate, which I suspect it may well be, the timing of the dialogue could have 
been conveyed just as successfully without recording the entirety of Glaucon and 
Apollodorus’ conversation. Plato could have quite happily just had Apollodorus speaking to 
the friend in the same irritable manner, and dropped in that this was the second time he had 
told the story, without going into all the detail of his previous conversation with Glaucon. But 
by setting out the exchange the way he has, we realise that this is not simply Apollodorus 
having a bad day. He is just as irritable a few days previously as he is now, even though on 
both occasions he is being asked to tell a story that he claims to enjoy talking about. So, this 
constant irrational bad mood is evidently at the forefront of Apollodorus’ characterisation in 
this dialogue.  
 
 
3.2. Summary 
It is clear that Apollodorus is comparable to the Timaean man with diseases of excess in his 
soul. His presentation confirms the symptomatic model that Timaeus suggests; one in which 
forgetfulness and stupidity occur simultaneously, but irritability and despondency, or 
rashness and cowardice, being opposing symptomatic poles of a disease in the same part of 
the soul, cannot manifest at the same time. Apollodorus is consistently presented as a poor 
philosopher, which in Plato’s view would encompass both forgetfulness and stupidity. Then 
                                               
352 Nussbaum 1986, p.169-70. 
353 Nussbaum 1986, p.170. 
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he is shown to experience irritability on the occasion of Symposium and despondency in 
Phaedo. This finding supports the conclusions drawn from Timaeus that only one in the pair 
of symptoms for Spirit and Appetites can occur on any one occasion, but on different 
occasions an individual is able to experience both of the symptoms as the satisfaction of the 
desire of that part swings between being excessive to being neglected.  
 
 
4. Clustering of symptoms 
So far, the symptoms of psychic disease, suggested by Plato in Timaeus and supported by the 
presentation of Apollodorus, have only been examined independently from one another. But 
in order to establish a positive correlation between depression in DSM-V and Plato’s 
understanding of psychic illness, he would have to demonstrate his recognition that these 
symptoms have the tendency to occur together, instead of treating them as separate symptoms 
that occur alone. If we return to Plato’s theory of the tripartite soul, it becomes apparent that, 
in fact, Plato envisaged these symptoms as necessarily occurring together.  
Due to the nature of the Platonic soul and the coexistence of the three parts, if one 
part of the soul were affected by the disease of excess, the other two parts would also 
experience a change in the satisfaction of their desires, even if only secondarily. For example, 
if Appetite was indulged excessively, Reason and Spirit would naturally experience neglect. 
The Platonic soul is described in terms of a delicate harmony between the three parts, so if 
one part is either excessively satisfied, or neglected, this necessarily has an effect on the other 
two parts, leading to the whole soul being in a disharmonious state. Therefore, although the 
pairs of symptoms in Timaeus can be thought of as specific to one part, in reality, if one part 
of the soul was experiencing a disease, we would expect that one symptom from each pair 
would manifest at the same time. For example, if Appetite was indulged to excess, Spirit and 
Reason would naturally be neglected,354 so the Timaean man would experience despondency 
(excess of Appetite), cowardice (neglect of Spirit), and forgetfulness and stupidity (neglect of 
Reason). Therefore, Plato presents a hydraulic symptomatic model in which it is impossible 
for any of the symptoms listed in Timaeus to manifest entirely alone. In doing so, Plato 
presents a situation in which symptomatic clustering must occur. This results in a much 
stronger positive correlation between Plato’s psychic disease and clinical depression. 
                                               
354 This is only one possible combination. It would be possible for both Appetite and Spirit to be 
indulged to excess and only Reason to suffer neglect. 
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Furthermore, in Timaeus Plato does not necessarily suggest that the list of symptoms 
detailed is exhaustive. There may well be other symptoms associated with the excessive 
satisfaction or neglect of different parts of the soul. Having established Apollodorus as a 
comparable characterisation of the Timaean man with a psychic disease, it is reasonable to 
look to the characterisation of Apollodorus for an example of Plato’s broader comprehension 
of the behaviours and moods brought on by diseases within the soul. When looking at 
Apollodorus’ characterisation in Symposium, he is also presented as exhibiting low self-
esteem and anhedonia, both of which are important symptoms in DSM-V’s categorisation of 
depression. In terms of associated parts of the soul, low self-esteem is likely to have been 
thought of as a deficiency in Spirit, and anhedonia the neglect of Appetite.  
First, in Symposium Apollodorus is presented as experiencing low self-esteem. 
Apollodorus and his unnamed companion both acknowledge that he tends to be very self-
deprecating. Apollodorus says ‘I used to think what I was doing was important, but in fact I 
was the most worthless man on earth’, and Glaucon mentions that ‘you think everybody- 
yourself first of all- is totally worthless.’ The term Plato actually uses in these instances is 
ἄτεχνος. Rather than worthless, translated literally this means unskilled. So, it would seem, 
from the context, that Apollodorus is actually saying that he believes everyone, himself first 
of all, to be completely unskilled in philosophy, except Socrates. This is not quite the same as 
thinking oneself completely worthless, unless, of course, the individual considered 
philosophy to be the only worthwhile pursuit. And indeed, it is confirmed by Apollodorus 
that he does feel this way: 
 
ὅταν µέν τινας περὶ φιλοσοφίας λόγους ἢ αὐτὸς ποιῶµαι ἢ ἄλλων ἀκούω…ὅταν δὲ 
ἄλλους τινάς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοὺς ὑµετέρους τοὺς τῶν πλουσίων καὶ χρηµατιστικῶν, 
αὐτός τε ἄχθοµαι ὑµᾶς τε τοὺς ἑταίρους ἐλεῶ, ὅτι οἴεσθε τὶ ποιεῖν οὐδὲν ποιοῦντες. 
  
My greatest pleasure comes from philosophical conversation...All other talk, 
especially the talk of rich businessmen like you, bores me to tears, and I’m sorry for 
you and your friends because you think your affairs are important when really they’re 
totally trivial. 
(Pl. Sym. 173c3-7) 
 
So, while Nehamas and Woodruff’s translation initially may be a misleading representation 
of the literal Greek, actually, the intention is the same. Apollodorus considers philosophy to 
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be the only worthwhile pursuit, and thinks himself totally unskilled at it, the result of which is 
that he considers himself worthless. This is reminiscent of DSM’s criterion of low self-
esteem, which specifies a person’s evaluation of his worth to be unrealistic. Apollodorus’ 
journey towards recollection is evidently less developed than Socrates’, but I am not sure that 
even Plato would deem him a totally worthless human being on this basis. He has accepted 
the teachings of Socrates and is trying to lead the virtuous life, which is an improvement on 
many of his peers. Apollodorus seems to be overly critical of his ability in this one aspect of 
his life, and by placing his life’s worth entirely on philosophic achievements he is neglecting 
to give appropriate value to his other responsibilities. By either refusing to acknowledge the 
honour he deserves in other areas of his life (be it family, political office, etc.) or in refusing 
to give these areas of his life due attention, thus losing the respect of his social equals, he is 
also neglecting the honorific desires of the spirited part of his soul, thus causing further 
psychic disease.  
Second, as modern readers, we might also detect DSM symptom ‘anhedonia’ in 
Apollodorus’ assertion that he only finds enjoyment in philosophical conversation. 
Anhedonia is the loss of enjoyment in activities that one used to enjoy. He admits that he 
used to think what he was doing was important,355 which would suggest he previously 
experienced enjoyment in other areas of his life, but that now he realises that these are totally 
trivial and his only enjoyment comes from philosophy. However, this assessment would 
probably not be problematic for Plato because, as far as he would be concerned, Apollodorus 
is right in this assessment that all mortal concerns are trivial, even if we would consider this 
change in someone’s behaviour to be indicative of another potential symptom. 
So, Plato’s characterisation of Apollodorus across Symposium and Phaedo presents 
him as experiencing memory problems or the inability to concentrate (which hinders his 
ability as a philosopher), irritability, despondency, low self-esteem, and anhedonia. These 
align with DSM-V symptoms impaired thinking/concentration, depressed mood, low self-
esteem, and anhedonia. Furthemore, it is clear that Plato recognised the tendency for these 
symptoms to occur together. His theory of the three parts of the soul ideally co-existing in a 
harmonious balance results in a hydraulic symptomatic model in which if one part of the soul 
is affected by a disease of excess, the other two parts will necessarily experience a change in 
the satisfaction of their desires as well. This is supported by Plato’s presentation of 
Apollodorus, since he exhibits symptoms associated with each part of the soul. Therefore, it 
                                               
355 Pl. Sym. 173a3-4. 
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is clear that Plato envisaged these symptoms as always occuring as a cluster, rather than 
independently. This shows a positive correlation with DSM-V’s categorisation of depression. 
 
 
 
 
5. The origin of psychic diseases 
The conclusion that Plato recognised the tendency for four symptoms of depression to occur 
together is, in itself, significant, but Plato’s contribution extends even further with his 
discussion of the origin of psychic illness in Timaeus. In the passage under examination 
(86b1-87a9) it seems that Plato is attributing the symptoms of psychic disease to a physical 
disease, caused by the bodily humors, that affects mental functioning. This would be in direct 
contradiction to one of the most consistent Platonic assertions that soul and body are of 
separate realms. So, in order to provide the most accurate interpretation possible of Plato’s 
meaning in this passage, I first need to ensure my translation is as true to the Greek as 
possible.  
 
 
5.1. Translational variations in Timaeus 86b1-87a9 
For this passage, I will depart from Zeyl’s translation that up until now I have been largely 
relying upon, except where indicated otherwise, and provide my own. However, I will also 
provide Zeyl, Cornford, and Bury’s translations, simply to highlight a few important points at 
which I deviate from their suggestions. In the opening sentence of 86b, there are variant 
translations, which are perfectly acceptable grammatically, but result in quite significant 
differences in interpretation of the passage. In this case, I will justify my choice of translation 
based on evidence from elsewhere in the text. Additionally, at 87a, the Greek has 
(presumably) been mistranslated, resulting in a misleading interpretation of Plato’s meaning. 
In both cases, I will underline the points at which my translation deviates and discuss my 
choices after presenting all the variant translations. 
Timaeus 86b1-87a9 reads as follows:356 
 
(86b) Καὶ τὰ µὲν περὶ τὸ σῶµα νοσήµατα ταύτῃ ξυµβαίνει γιγνόµενα, τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν διὰ 
σώµατος ἕξιν τῇδε. νόσον µὲν δὴ ψυχῆς ἄνοιαν ξυγχωρητέον, δύο δ᾿ ἀνοίας γένη, τὸ 
                                               
356 As presented in the 1929 Loeb edition.  
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µὲν µανίαν, τὸ δὲ ἀµαθίαν. πᾶν οὖν ὅ τι πάσχων τις πάθος ὁπότερον αὐτῶν ἴσχει, 
νόσον προσρητέον· ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας ὑπερβαλλούσας τῶν νόσων µεγίστας θετέον 
τῇ ψυχῇ· περιχαρὴς γὰρ 
(86c)    ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἢ καὶ τἀναντία ὑπὸ λύπης πάσχων, σπεύδων τὸ µὲν ἑλεῖν ἀκαίρως, τὸ 
δὲ φυγεῖν, οὔτε ὁρᾷν οὔτε ἀκούειν ὀρθὸν οὐδὲν δύναται, λυττᾷ δὲ καὶ λογισµοῦ 
µετασχεῖν ἥκιστα τότε δὴ δυνατός ἐστι. τὸ δὲ σπέρµα ὅτῳ πολὺ καὶ ῥυῶδες περὶ τὸν 
µυελὸν γίγνεται, καὶ καθαπερεὶ δένδρον πολυκαρπότερον τοῦ ξυµµέτρου πεφυκὸς ᾖ, 
πολλὰς µὲν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ὠδῖνας, πολλὰς δ᾿ ἡδονὰς κτώµενος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυµίαις καὶ 
τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τόκοις, ἐµµανὴς 
(86d) τὸ πλεῖστον γιγνόµενος τοῦ βίου διὰ τὰς µεγίστας ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, νοσοῦσαν καὶ 
ἄφρονα ἴσχων ὑπὸ τοῦ σώµατος τὴν ψυχήν, οὐχ ὡς νοσῶν ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἑκὼν κακὸς 
[κακῶς] δοξάζεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία κατὰ τὸ πολὺ µέρος 
διὰ τὴν ἑνὸς γένους ἕξιν ὑπὸ µανότητος ὀστῶν ἐν σώµατι ῥυώδη καὶ ὑγραίνουσαν 
νόσος ψυχῆς γέγονε. καὶ σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα ὁπόσα ἡδονῶν ἀκράτεια κατ᾿ ὄνειδος ὡς 
ἑκόντων λέγεται τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ 
(86e) ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζεται· κακὸς µὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδείς, διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἕξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώµατος 
καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφὴν ὁ κακὸς γίγνεται κακός, παντὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἐχθρὰ καὶ ἄκοντι 
προσγίγνεται. καὶ πάλιν δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς λύπας ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ διὰ σῶµα πολλὴν 
ἴσχει κακίαν. Ὅπου γὰρ ἂν οἱ τῶν ὀξέων καὶ τῶν ἁλυκῶν φλεγµάτων καὶ ὅσοι πικροὶ 
καὶ χολώδεις χυµοὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶµα 
(87a) πλανηθέντες ἔξω µὲν µὴ λάβωσιν ἀναπνοήν, ἐντὸς δὲ εἱλλόµενοι τὴν ἀφ᾿ αὑτῶν 
ἀτµίδα τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς φορᾷ ξυµµίξαντες ἀνακερασθῶσι, παντοδαπὰ νοσήµατα ψυχῆς 
ἐµποιοῦσι, µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ πλείω· πρός τε τοὺς τρεῖς τόπους 
ἐνεχθέντα τῆς ψυχῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἂν ἕκαστ᾿ αὐτῶν προσπίπτῃ, ποικίλλει µὲν εἴδη 
δυσκολίας καὶ δυσθυµίας παντοδαπά, ποικίλλει δὲ θρασύτητός τε καὶ δειλίας, ἔτι δὲ 
λήθης ἅµα καὶ δυσµαθίας. 
(Pl. Tim. 86b1-87a9) 
 
 
My translation 
 
(86b) The diseases of the body come about in this way. Those of the soul arise because of 
the bodily condition in the following way. We must accept that mindlessness is a 
disease of the soul, and there are two kinds of mindlessness: madness and ignorance. 
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Everything that someone suffers must be called a disease if it has one or the other (i.e 
madness or ignorance); and we must assume that excessive pleasures and pains are 
the greatest diseases of the soul. For when a man is joyful or, on the contrary, 
suffering with pain, 
(86c) scrambling to seize one of them in untimely ways, and avoid the other, he is not able 
to see or hear anything correctly, he is raving and, at that time, he is least able to 
partake in reason. If that seed becomes abundant and overflows around the marrow, 
and like a tree produces an inordinate quantity of fruit, he brings upon himself again 
and again many pangs and pleasures from his desires and their fruition, and because 
of these greatest pleasures and 
(86d) pains, he becomes mad for most of his life, and although his soul is in a diseased and 
frantic state because of his body, he will appear not as sick, but as willfully bad; but in 
reality, sexual licentiousness (e.g.) becomes a disease of the soul, for the most part, 
due to the condition of a single type, which flows in the body due to the porousness of 
the bones, and makes it moist. Indeed, almost all affections of the soul are unruly 
pleasures, but the man who is reproached is called willfully bad, but this reproach is 
not correct, for no one is bad willfully. The bad man becomes bad on account of the 
bad 
(86e) condition of his body and a lack of education, and in every case the things he does are 
hateful to everyone and happen to them unwillingly. And again, with respect to pains, 
in the same way the soul acquires a lot of badness because of the body. For whenever 
both acidic and salty phlegms and other bitter and bilious humors wander throughout 
the body without finding a vent, but are 
(87a) trapped inside and mixing together the vapour that they give off with the motion of 
the soul, they are in a blended state, and they induce all kinds of diseases of the soul, 
some greater and lesser, and some fewer and more. As the diseases are carried to the 
three places of the soul, according to whichever place they attack, they proliferate all 
kinds of irritability and despondency, and they proliferate rashness and cowardice, as 
well as forgetfulness and, at the same time, stupidity. 
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Zeyl’s translation (2000) 
 
The foregoing described how diseases of the body happen to come about. The 
diseases of the soul that result from bodily condition come about in the following 
way. It must be granted, surely, that mindlessness is the disease of the soul, and of 
mindlessness there are two kinds. One is madness and the other is ignorance. And so 
if a man suffers from a condition that brings on either one of the other, that condition 
must be declared a disease. 
We must lay it down that the diseases that pose the gravest dangers for the 
soul are excessive pleasures or pains. When a man enjoys himself too much or, in the 
opposite case, when he suffers great pain, and he exerts himself to seize the one and 
avoid the other in inopportune ways, he lacks the ability to see or hear anything right. 
He goes raving mad and is at that moment least capable of rational thought. And if the 
seed of a man’s marrow grows to overflowing abundance like a tree that bears an 
inordinately plentiful quantity of fruit, he is in for a long series of bursts of pain, or of 
pleasures, in the area of his desires and their fruition. These severe pleasures and 
pains drive him mad for the greater part of his life, and though his body has made his 
soul diseased and witless, people will think of him not as sick, but as willfully bad. 
But the truth about sexual overindulgence is that it is a disease of the soul caused 
primarily by the condition of a single stuff which, due to the porousness of the bones, 
flows within the body and renders it moist. And indeed, just about every type of 
succumbing to pleasure is talked about as something reproachable, as though bad 
things are willingly done. But it is not right to reproach people for them, for no one is 
willingly bad. A man becomes bad, rather, as a result of one or another corrupt 
condition of his body and an uneducated upbringing. No one who incurs these 
pernicious conditions would will to have them.  
And as for pains, once again it is the body that causes the soul so much 
trouble, and in the same ways. When any of a man’s acid and briny phlegms or any 
bitter and bilious humors wander up and down his body without finding a vent to the 
outside and remain pent up inside, they mix the vapour that they give off with the 
motion of the soul and so are confounded with it. So they produce all sorts of diseases 
of the soul, some more intense and some more frequent than others. And as they move 
to the three regions of the soul, each of them produces a multitude of varieties of bad 
temper and melancholy in the region it attacks, as well as of recklessness and 
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cowardice, not to mention forgetfulness and stupidity. 
 
Cornford’s translation (1937) 
 
 Such is the manner in which disorders of the body arise; disorders of the soul are 
caused by the bodily condition in the following way. It will be granted that folly is 
disorder of the soul; and of folly there are two kinds, madness and stupidity. 
Accordingly, any affection that brings on either of these must be called a disorder; 
and among the gravest disorders for the soul we must rank excessive pleasures and 
pains. When a man is carried away by enjoyment or distracted by pain, in his 
immoderate haste to grasp the one or to escape the other he can neither see nor hear 
aright; he is in a frenzy and his capacity for reasoning is then at its lowest. Moreover, 
when the seed in a man’s marrow becomes copious with overflowing moisture like 
the overabundance of fruitfulness in a tree, he is filled with strong pains of travail and 
with pleasures no less strong on each occasion (?) in his desires and in their 
satisfaction; for the most part of his life he is maddened by these intense pleasures and 
pains; and when his soul is rendered sick and senseless by the body he is commonly 
held to be not sick but deliberately bad. But the truth is that sexual intemperance is a 
disorder of the soul arising, to a great extent, from the condition of a single substance 
which, owing to the porousness of the bones, floods the body with its moisture. We 
might almost say, indeed, of all that is called incontinence in pleasure that it it (sic) 
not justly made a reproach, as if men were willingly bad. No one is willingly bad; the 
bad man becomes so because of some faulty habit of body and unenlightened 
upbringing, and these are unwelcome afflictions that come to any man against his 
will. 
  Again, where pains are concerned, the soul likewise derives much badness 
from the body. When acid and salt phlegms or bitter bilious humors roam about the 
body and, finding no outlet, are pent up within and fall into confusion by blending the 
vapour that arises from them with the motion of the soul, they induce all manner of 
disorders of the soul of greater or less intensity and extent. Making their way to the 
three seats of the soul, according to the region they severally invade, they beget many 
divers types of ill-temper and despondency, of rashness and cowardice, of dullness 
and oblivion. 
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Bury’s translation (1929)357 
 
Such is the manner in which diseases of the body come about; and those of the soul 
which are due to the condition of the body arise in the following way. We must agree 
that folly is a disease of the soul; and of folly there are two kinds, the one of which is 
madness, the other ignorance. Whatever affection a man suffers from, if it involves 
either of these conditions it must be termed “disease”; and we must maintain that 
pleasures and pains in excess are the greatest of the soul’s diseases. For when a man is 
overjoyed or contrariwise suffering excessively from pain, being in haste to seize on 
the one and avoid the other beyond measure, he is unable either to see or to hear 
anything correctly, and he is at such a time distraught and wholly incapable of 
exercising reason. And whenever a man’s seed grows to abundant volume in his 
marrow, as it were a tree that is overladen beyond measure with fruit, he brings on 
himself time after time many pangs and many pleasures owing to his desires and the 
issue thereof, and comes to be in a state of madness for the most part of his life 
because of those greatest of pleasures and pains, and keeps his soul diseased and 
senseless by reason of the action of his body. Yet such a man is reputed to be 
voluntarily wicked and not diseased; although, in truth, this sexual incontinence, 
which is due for the most part to the abundance and fluidity of one substance because 
of the porosity of the bones, constitutes a disease of the soul. And indeed almost all 
those affections which are called by way of reproach “incontinence in pleasure,” as 
though the wicked acted voluntarily, are wrongly so reproached; for no one is 
voluntarily wicked, but the wicked man becomes wicked by reason of some evil 
condition of body and unskilled nurture, and these are experiences which are hateful 
to everyone and involuntary. And again, in respect of pains likewise the soul acquires 
much evil because of the body. 
For whenever the humors which arise from acid and saline phlegms, and all 
humors that are bitter and bilious wander through the body and find no external vent 
but are confined within, and mingle their vapour with the movement of the soul and 
are blended therewith, they implant diseases of the soul of all kinds, varying in 
intensity and in extent; and as these humors penetrate to the three regions of the soul, 
                                               
357 This is almost identical to Lamb’s translation of 1925. I suspect the two either collaborated or Bury 
was highly influenced by Lamb’s. Even the grammatical errors are the same, as will be discussed 
later.  
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according to the region which they severally attack, they give rise to all varieties of 
bad temper and bad spirits, and they give rise to all manner of rashness and 
cowardice, and of forgetfulness also, as well as of stupidity. 
 
 
Translational variations 
 
86b1- ‘τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν διὰ σώµατος.’ 
 
1) Those of the soul arise because of the body in the following way. (Enright) 
2) The diseases of the soul that result from bodily condition come about in the following way. 
(Zeyl) 
3) Disorders of the soul are caused by the bodily condition in the following way. (Cornford) 
4) Those of the soul which are due to the condition of the body arise in the following way. 
(Bury) 
 
From the very opening of this account of psychic disease, there is scholarly 
disagreement about Plato’s meaning. At 86b1 he says ‘τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν διὰ σώµατος.’ This 
statement can be understood in two ways. Zeyl translates it as ‘the diseases of the soul that 
result from bodily condition’ (my italics).358 Bury’s translation is very similar, and Cornford 
strongly agrees with this reading, as expressed in his commentary.359 This reading allows for 
the possibility that diseases of the soul could result from something other than bodily 
condition. The statement here merely indicates that the diseases Timaeus will speak of 
presently do in fact come from a poor bodily condition. But Gill believes this reading to be 
inaccurate. He argues that the text should instead be translated as ‘diseases of the psyche 
arise because of the condition of the body in the following way’ (my italics),360 which would 
suggest that all psychic diseases only ever come about as a result of poor bodily condition. 
Gill believes this to be Plato’s intention, based on the fact that he does not see any evidence 
that Timaeus is referring to a subgroup of psychic diseases.361 Both interpretations are 
                                               
358 Pl. Tim. 86b. 
359 Cornford 1937, p.346 ‘‘It is not stated that all mental disorders are solely due to bodily states.’ 
360 Gill 2002, p.60. 
361 Gill 2002, p.60. Ahonen 2014, p.44 agrees with Gill’s argument on this.  
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grammatically accurate, but I find myself in agreement with Gill based on two main pieces of 
evidence.  
At 86e1-2 Timaeus does state that a lack of education can also contribute to psychic 
diseases; ‘διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἕξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώµατος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον,’ but there is no indication 
that bad education could be the solitary causation. It is the bodily condition and a lack of 
education that cause psychic diseases to arise, not the bodily condition or a lack of education. 
In fact, we might think of education as falling under the remit of bodily condition. Ostenfeld 
notes his surprise that in this statement at 86e1-2, psychogenic illness is not mentioned by 
Plato, and Lautner responds that this is because it does not exist.362 In its pure, fully 
disembodied state the soul is perfectly healthy. It only experiences bad health when trapped 
inside the human body. In the same way, the disembodied soul does not require education. 
Educational needs come from the presence of a body and the mortal distractions it brings 
with it. This interpretation is supported within Timaeus in Plato’s description of incarnation 
at 43a6–44d2. From the moment a soul is placed in a human body at birth, its revolutions are 
thrown into disorder and it is this disturbance of the psychic revolutions that the philosopher 
fights against for his entire life, struggling to achieve and maintain the order and perfection of 
the motion of the soul against the influences of the body. It is only mortal distractions that we 
need to recognise through the correct education and steel ourselves against, so it follows that 
Gill’s interpretation is most likely correct. Psychic diseases only ever occur as a result of the 
bodily condition. 
 
 
87a5- πρός τε τοὺς τρεῖς τόπους ἐνεχθέντα τῆς ψυχῆς 
There is a grammatical error in the usual translation of this sentence. I will quote a larger 
portion of the text to highlight the error.  
 
Ὅπου γὰρ ἂν οἱ τῶν ὀξέων καὶ τῶν ἁλυκῶν φλεγµάτων καὶ ὅσοι πικροὶ καὶ χολώδεις χυµοὶ 
κατὰ τὸ σῶµα πλανηθέντες ἔξω µὲν µὴ λάβωσιν ἀναπνοήν, ἐντὸς δὲ εἱλλόµενοι τὴν ἀφ᾿ 
αὑτῶν ἀτµίδα τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς φορᾷ ξυµµίξαντες ἀνακερασθῶσι, παντοδαπὰ νοσήµατα ψυχῆς 
ἐµποιοῦσι, µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ πλείω· πρός τε τοὺς τρεῖς τόπους ἐνεχθέντα τῆς 
ψυχῆς, 
 
                                               
362 Lautner 2011 p.27; Ostenfeld 1987, p.81 n.132.  
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1) For whenever both acidic and salty phlegms and other bitter and bilious humors wander 
throughout the body without finding a vent, they are trapped inside and mixing together the 
vapour that they give off, they are mixed up with the motion of the soul, and they induce all 
kinds of diseases of the soul, some greater and lesser in intensity and some greater and lesser 
in extent. As the diseases move to the three parts of the soul… (Enright) 
 
2) When any of a man’s acid and briny phlegms or any bitter and bilious humors wander up 
and down his body without finding a vent to the outside and remain pent up inside, they mix 
the vapour that they give off with the motion of the soul and so are confounded with it. So 
they produce all sorts of diseases of the soul, some more intense and some more frequent than 
others. And as they move to the three regions of the soul… (Zeyl) 
 
3) When acid and salt phlegms or bitter bilious humors roam about the body and, finding no 
outlet, are pent up within and fall into confusion by blending the vapour that arises from them 
with the motion of the soul, they induce all manner of disorders of the soul of greater or less 
intensity and extent. Making their way to the three seats of the soul… (Cornford) 
 
 
4) For whenever the humors which arise from acid and saline phlegms, and all humors that 
are bitter and bilious wander through the body and find no external vent but are confined 
within, and mingle their vapour with the movement of the soul and are blended therewith, 
they implant diseases of the soul of all kinds, varying in intensity and in extent; and as these 
humors penetrate to the three regions of the soul… (Bury) 
 
 
In the passage provided, 86e6-87a5, we are told that the humors mix with the motions 
of the soul and cause diseases of the soul, but the subsequent phrase appears to have mislead 
previous translators. Plato says, ‘πρός τε τοὺς τρεῖς τόπους ἐνεχθέντα τῆς ψυχῆς…’. This is 
an exceptionally important phrase in this passage, as it reveals how Plato envisaged the soul 
interacting with whatever it is that is producing its diseases, but this is often misinterpreted. 
The term in question is the participle ἐνεχθέντα (moving), which can be accusative, 
masculine, and singular or nominative/accusative, neuter, and plural. Therefore, χυµοὶ (the 
humors), which is nominative, masculine, and plural, cannot be the subject of ἐνεχθέντα. 
When ἐνεχθέντα is masculine, its number does not match χυµοὶ. Therefore, ἐνεχθέντα must 
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be referring to νοσήµατα (diseases) at 87a2, which is accusative, neuter, plural, and therefore 
agrees with ἐνεχθέντα in case, number, and gender. So, it is the diseases caused by the 
humoral vapours that move to the three regions of the soul. But this is often misrepresented. 
Bury openly inserts ‘as these humors penetrate’ into his translation, presumably to 
help make the process clearer for the reader, but as shown, this cannot be correct. Lamb 
(1925), Lautner (2011, p.28) and Ahonen (2014, p.45) do the same. Zeyl and Cornford, on 
the other hand, opt for ambiguity with ‘as they move’ and ‘making their way’ respectively. 
But, while Zeyl’s translation is sufficiently unclear so as to disguise his interpretation here, I 
suspect that Cornford, like Bury, was thinking of the humors or the humoral vapours making 
their way to the three seats of the soul. At 87a2, he chooses to translate νοσήµατα as 
disorders, which we do not usually associate with movement. Disorders tend to be a state of 
being in one particular part of the body, rather than something that can spread. So, I believe 
both Bury and Cornford have mistranslated this phrase,363 and Zeyl does not provide 
sufficient detail to make this important process clear to the reader. Therefore, in my 
translation I have chosen to include the following qualifying statement, ‘As the diseases 
move to the three parts of the soul…’. 
 
 
5.2. A physical origin? 
Now that an accurate translation of the passage in question has been provided, the origin of 
psychic diseases can be fully examined. We are told at 86e1-2 that these diseases of the soul 
come about as a result of poor bodily condition and a lack of education. Neither of these 
origins should be surprising to the Platonic scholar. Both a body in ill-health and a lack of 
education lead to the individual making choices against their rational desires. A sick body 
distracts from the study of philosophy, and the uneducated do not yet know the benefits of 
living the virtuous life. But, at 86a1-87a5, Plato appears to suggest that the diseased body has 
more of a direct role to play in causing psychic disease than simply providing a distraction 
from philosophic enquiry. Plato states: 
 
Ὅπου γὰρ ἂν οἱ τῶν ὀξέων καὶ τῶν ἁλυκῶν φλεγµάτων καὶ ὅσοι πικροὶ καὶ χολώδεις 
χυµοὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶµα πλανηθέντες ἔξω µὲν µὴ λάβωσιν ἀναπνοήν, ἐντὸς δὲ εἱλλόµενοι 
τὴν ἀφ᾿ αὑτῶν ἀτµίδα τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς φορᾷ ξυµµίξαντες ἀνακερασθῶσι, παντοδαπὰ 
                                               
363 As well as Lamb and Lautner. 
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νοσήµατα ψυχῆς ἐµποιοῦσι, µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ πλείω· πρός τε τοὺς 
τρεῖς τόπους ἐνεχθέντα τῆς ψυχῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἂν ἕκαστ᾿ αὐτῶν προσπίπτῃ, ποικίλλει µὲν 
εἴδη δυσκολίας καὶ δυσθυµίας παντοδαπά, ποικίλλει δὲ θρασύτητός τε καὶ δειλίας, ἔτι 
δὲ λήθης ἅµα καὶ δυσµαθίας. 
 
For whenever both acidic and salty phlegms and other bitter and bilious humors 
wander throughout the body without finding a vent, but are trapped inside and mixing 
together the vapour that they give off with the motion of the soul, they are blended, 
and they induce all kinds of diseases of the soul, some greater and lesser, and some 
fewer and more. As the diseases are carried to the three places of the soul, according 
to whichever place they attack, they proliferate all kinds of irritability and 
despondency, and they proliferate rashness and cowardice, as well as forgetfulness 
and, at the same time, stupidity. 
 (Pl. Tim. 86e5-87a9 Tr. Enright) 
 
Upon an initial reading, Plato appears to be suggesting that the physical, bodily humors, are 
capable of directly infecting the soul and causing diseases within the psyche. As mentioned, 
this interpretation of the passage would be in direct contradiction with one of the most 
consistent cross-corpus Platonic notions of soul and body distinctness.364 The soul and body 
can be, and are, extensively interwoven but there always remains a firm boundary between 
the two and they are incapable of truly mixing irreversibly.  We might expect the corporeal 
requirements such as nutrition, reproduction, and socialising to distract from the rational 
pursuits of the soul. We can even understand how a bad education and other unfavourable 
social factors may affect the individual’s judgement and cause them to act against the rule of 
Reason, causing imbalance between the parts of the soul, and thus, bad health in the psyche, 
but we would not expect the humors to be able to have any direct effect on the soul. 
However, the statement at 87a appears to suggest that the bodily humors are able to migrate 
across the boundary in order to enter and directly infect the soul in a way more suited to 
substances both belonging to the physical realm. This apparent departure from the Platonic 
norm of distinct body and soul has puzzled scholars and resulted in extensive explorations on 
the issue of Platonic dualism in order to explain how it is possible for the body to affect the 
                                               
364 Pl. Phd. 67-68a; Tim. 85e; Rep. 608d; 610a. 
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soul so directly.365 While these studies give interesting perspectives on the issue of body and 
soul interaction, the arguments suffer from the authors overlooking the crucial point of body 
and soul distinctness. In an attempt to rationalise this close mixing of body and soul, Carone 
argues that the soul becomes a corporeal substance.366 But the attempt to completely remove 
the issue of the boundary between physical and spiritual realms, by suggesting that the soul is 
itself a physical substance, thus permitting the bodily humors to enter the soul unrestricted, 
cannot be an accurate reading of Timaeus. Plato is explicit at 35a-41e about the fact that the 
human soul is not a substance. The constructional components of the human soul are the 
same abstract entities as those used by the demiurge to construct the soul of the universe: 
‘Being’, ‘the Same’ and ‘the Different’,367 but of a ‘second or third grade of purity.’368 So, if 
we are to take Plato at his word at 87a, an explanation needs to be considered that is 
consistent with these defining features of both entities, but still allows the humors to cause 
disease within the soul.  
When the demiurge constructed the body, the marrow was the first building block to 
be made from each of the four elements. It is only the marrow that interacts so closely with 
the soul, permitting life in the first place, and it is evidently considered by Plato to be the 
most important part of the body. Timaeus explains that marrow is created from ‘those 
triangles which, being unwarped and smooth, were originally able to produce fire, water, air 
and earth of the most exact form’369, or, in other words, the best copies available of 
perfection.370 Physical bodies can never have the perfection of the mathematical triangles, as 
explained by Timaeus at 53e; ‘we shall concede to no one that there are visible bodies more 
perfect than these’.371 Therefore, Plato shows the superiority of marrow among the parts of 
the mortal body. Furthermore, the amount of each primary body used in constructing the 
marrow is specified as σύµµετρα.372 This is usually ambiguously translated as ‘in due 
proportion’373 or ‘in the right proportions’,374 but σύµµετρα is used by Plato elsewhere to 
indicate actual symmetry.375 If this were Plato’s intention in his use of σύµµετρα at 73c, it 
                                               
365 For these discussions see Carone 2005; Gill 2002; Ostenfeld 1982; Sedley 1997 and 2000. 
366 Carone 2005, p.236-241.  
367 Pl. Tim. 35a. 
368 Pl. Tim. 41e. 
369 Pl. Tim. 73b. 
370 Cornford 1937, p.293. 
371 Pl. Tim. 53e. 
372 Pl. Tim. 73c. 
373 Pl. Tim. 73c. Tr. Cornford 1937, p.293 and Lamb 1925, 73b. 
374 Pl. Tim. 73c. Tr. Zeyl 2000, p.67. 
375 Pl. Tim. 66d, 87d; Phil. 66b Tr. Frede 1997; LSJ 1996, p.1679. 
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would seem that the best physical examples of the four elements are used in equal 
proportions to create a pure and symmetrical marrow in which to house the soul. The soul is 
always superior to the body for Plato,376 and so it follows that only the very best and purest 
part of the body is permitted to be in such close proximity with the soul.  
The soul, which gives structure and animation to the body, is ‘implanted in the marrow’377 
and bound within it.378 Life depends on the soul being anchored to the marrow and if the 
marrow becomes diseased, we are told that the illness is fatal.379 Upon death, the ‘life’s 
chains’380 which hold the soul within the marrow are loosened, releasing the soul, and the 
body dies.381 Because of the special status assigned to the marrow, in his refutation of 
Carone’s suggestion of a corporeal soul, Fronterotta suggests that the marrow is acting as a 
‘mediating element’382 between soul and body. He suggests that the marrow acts as a sponge, 
soaking up the soul and provides a bridge across the boundary separating the material and 
immaterial realms that Plato has been so insistent upon, without degrading the soul in any 
way to the corporeal realm.  
But, the fact remains that there is still a firm boundary separating the two. Even if the 
marrow is made from the most perfect visible copies possible of the four elements, its 
component parts are still not perfect. And, crucially, its component parts are still 
fundamentally different from the entities that make up the soul. Marrow is made from fire, 
water, air and earth; the soul is made from Being, the Same and the Different. So even if 
marrow were made from absolutely perfect examples of the elements, it is still not of the 
same realm as the soul.  
So, in order to try and gain a better understanding of this issue, and hopefully a more 
convincing conclusion, I will return to the text once again and look at two specific terms:  
 
Ὅπου γὰρ ἂν οἱ τῶν ὀξέων καὶ τῶν ἁλυκῶν φλεγµάτων καὶ ὅσοι πικροὶ καὶ χολώδεις 
χυµοὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶµα πλανηθέντες ἔξω µὲν µὴ λάβωσιν ἀναπνοήν, ἐντὸς δὲ εἱλλόµενοι 
τὴν ἀφ᾿ αὑτῶν ἀτµίδα τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς φορᾷ ξυµµίξαντες ἀνακερασθῶσι, παντοδαπὰ 
νοσήµατα ψυχῆς ἐµποιοῦσι, µᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ πλείω· πρός τε τοὺς 
                                               
376 Pl. Phd. 80a-b, 83a, 114c. 
377 Pl. Tim. 73c. 
378 Pl. Tim. 73c 
379 Pl. Tim. 84c. 
380 Pl. Tim. 73b. 
381 Pl. Tim. 84c, 85e 
382 Fronterotta 2007, p.234. 
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τρεῖς τόπους ἐνεχθέντα τῆς ψυχῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἂν ἕκαστ᾿ αὐτῶν προσπίπτῃ, ποικίλλει µὲν 
εἴδη δυσκολίας καὶ δυσθυµίας παντοδαπά, ποικίλλει δὲ θρασύτητός τε καὶ δειλίας, ἔτι 
δὲ λήθης ἅµα καὶ δυσµαθίας. 
 
For whenever both acidic and salty phlegms and other bitter and bilious humors 
wander throughout the body without finding a vent, but are trapped inside and mixing 
together the vapour that they give off with the motion of the soul, they are blended, 
and they induce all kinds of diseases of the soul, some greater and lesser, and some 
fewer and more. As the diseases are carried to the three places of the soul, according 
to whichever place they attack, they proliferate all kinds of irritability and 
despondency, and they proliferate rashness and cowardice, as well as forgetfulness 
and, at the same time, stupidity. 
 
 (Pl. Tim. 86b1-87a9 Tr. Enright) 
 
When describing the humoral vapours mixing with the motion of the soul, Plato uses the 
compound verb ἀνακεράννυµι, from the root verb κεράννῡµι, which means mix or blend. LSJ 
comments that the root verb is used most frequently to describe ‘diluting wine with water.’383 
So it is apparent that this term does seem to indicate that the two components involved are 
truly blended, irreversibly. To strengthen this association, at 35a, when discussing the 
construction of the world soul from Being, The Same and The Different Plato says:  
 
συνεκεράσατο εἰς µίαν πάντα ἰδέαν. 
 
He blended them all into one form. 
(Pl. Tim. 35a5) 
 
We know from the demiurge’s delegation of the creation of the human body to the Olympian 
gods at 41a-c that anything made by him is everlasting, so we can be sure that the 
components of the world soul are truly blended with one another, ensuring that all boundaries 
between component parts are removed, similar to the way in which two liquids might be 
mixed together. To convey this meaning, Plato uses another compound of κεράννῡµι at 35a5; 
                                               
383 LSJ [online] s.v. κεράννῡµι 
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συγκεράννυµι. When the components of a mixture can be extracted from one another, 
µίγνυµι and its compounds tend to be used. For example, when describing the combining of 
different elements to create parts of the body, Plato writes ‘µειγνὺς δὲ ἀλλήλοις’384  ‘he 
mixed them together.’ In this instance, although the component parts seem to be irreversibly 
blended to create a new singular form, an organ for example, because the human body is 
mortal we know that the parts of the body can be deconstructed into their components; this is 
what happens to the body after death. They may be very closely woven together spatially, but 
they are still very much independent entities and can be extracted from one another.  
However, the demiurge does make one statement that suggests that, actually, even the 
immortal things he himself creates are capable of being deconstructed at his will. At 41a8-9 
he says: 
 
ὧν ἐγὼ δηµιουργὸς πατήρ τε ἔργων, δι᾽ ἐµοῦ γενόµενα ἄλυτα ἐµοῦ γε µὴ ἐθέλοντος. 
 
Whatever has come to be by my hands cannot be undone, but by my consent. 
(Pl. Tim. 41a8-9 Tr. Zeyl.) 
 
So, if even divine beings are capable of being deconstructed, perhaps Plato envisaged that 
there is nothing in the universe that cannot be broken down into its component parts, even 
when they appear to have been blended (κεράννῡµι). In which case, we can still think of the 
humors as interacting with the soul spatially, but not actually crossing the boundary between 
the physical and spiritual realms.  
This conclusion means that some care must be taken when translating ἐµποιέω. Bury 
and Lamb choose ‘implant’, which is highly misleading. ‘Implant’ is defined as ‘to be set, 
fixed, or embedded in something’,385 but if the humors never actually combine with the soul, 
it would be wholly inaccurate to describe them as implanting a disease. ‘Produce’ is used as a 
more ambiguous translational alternative by Zeyl. Produce can be defined as ‘to bring into 
existence’ or ‘to make or manufacture’.386 The former implies slightly more indirect 
responsibility, but the latter definition would, like ‘implant’, imply direct causation. In line 
with Cornford, I would suggest that perhaps ‘induce’ is a better translational option in this 
instance. I view the interaction between the humors and the soul as more mechanical than 
                                               
384 Pl. Tim. 73c. 
385 OED. [Online]. 2014. s.v. implant.  
386 OED. [Online]. 2014. s.v. produce.  
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physical, since we know that the soul is considered to have spatial existence. Plato accounts 
for the shape of the human skull being spherical in that it accommodates the spherical 
revolutions of the soul.387  If this is the case, then the presence of the humors inside the area 
the soul occupies will change the shape of the available space, thus disrupting the revolutions 
of the soul. It is this disruption that is the cause of psychic disease. So, the humors, rather 
than implanting a disease, induce disease within the soul by affecting the motions, which 
aligns with Plato’s original description of the process. He says, ‘they are mixed up with the 
motion of the soul.’388 
In summary, the origin of psychic disease appears to be with the body’s capacity to 
disrupt the revolutions of the soul. This can be through physically invading and altering the 
space in which the soul can revolve, as seen with the humors, or by distraction from the 
pursuit of wisdom caused by a lack of control and excessive satisfaction of the irrational 
desires of Appetite and Spirit. Our judgement is impaired by our mortal senses leading to 
actions and behaviours that, in our folly, do not follow the desires of Reason.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the evidence examined from Timaeus and from the characterisation of Apollodorus 
in Symposium and Phaedo, I argue that there is a positive, but not complete, correlation 
between DSM-V’s categorisation of depression and Plato’s understanding of psychic illness. 
Through an examination of Timaeus and Apollodorus, Plato identifies behaviour associated 
with four of the nine DSM-V symptoms of depression; depressed mood, anhedonia, low self-
esteem, and impaired thinking/concentration. But in order to conclude that there is a positive 
correlation between DSM and Plato’s understanding of psychic illness, the identification of 
individual symptoms is not enough. Plato needs to demonstrate his awareness of the tendency 
for these symptoms to occur together. 
From Timaeus, Plato evidently envisaged each symptom in his identifiable pairs as 
only capable of manifesting individually at any one time. Each symptom arises as the result 
of either an excessive desire or the neglect of the desire of a particular part of the soul. 
Therefore, within the same part of the soul they cannot co-exist. An examination of the 
characterisation of Apollodorus confirms this conclusion. Apollodorus appears to be a 
                                               
387 Pl. Tim. 44d2-3; 69c-71a. 
388 Pl. Tim. 87a2. (italics added for emphasis) 
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characterisation of the Timaean man with a disease in his soul, and he exhibits despondency 
and irritability, which are both associated with a disease in the appetitive part of the soul, on 
separate occasions, within different dialogues.  
However, it is apparent that within this symptomatic model of opposing symptoms in 
a pair manifesting individually, Plato did recognise that symptoms from other pairs could, 
and would, occur together. The nature of the tripartite soul requiring harmony between the 
three parts results in a model in which if one part experiences excess, there must be a change 
in the satisfaction of the desires of the other two parts. This results in all three parts 
experiencing either excess or deficiency and presenting one of their symptoms. Therefore, 
Plato shows his understanding that these symptoms must occur as a collective, rather than 
individually.  
Furthermore, in Timaeus Plato gives psychic diseases a physical, bodily origin. If my 
interpretation of the passage at 86b1-87a9 is correct, psychic disease originates from the 
disruption of the revolutions of the soul, either caused by the bodily humors invading and 
altering the space in which the soul can revolve, or by a bodily distraction from the pursuit of 
wisdom caused by a lack of control and excessive satisfaction of the irrational desires of 
Appetite and Spirit. Our judgement is impaired by our mortal senses leading to behaviours 
that do not follow the rational desires of Reason.  
In sum, Plato identifies four of the nine symptoms of depression according to DSM-
V, including both key symptoms; he recognises the tendency for these symptoms to occur 
together and, in fact, his theory of tripartition ensures that they do always occur together in 
varying combinations; and, finally, he attributes these symptoms to a disease of the soul, 
which is ultimately caused by the body. This results in a convincingly positive correlation 
between DSM-V’s categorisation of depression and Plato’s understanding of psychic illness. 
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Chapter 4- Aristotle 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will argue that Aristotle gets to a similar, but more enhanced position than Plato. 
There is a strong, positive correlation between DSM-V’s categorisation of depression and 
Aristotle’s descriptions of the passionate dispositions he associates with women, 
melancholics, and old men.  
I begin with an explanation of the Aristotelian soul. Whereas Plato viewed 
psychological disturbance as being fundamentally a psychic imbalance, I will show that this 
is not the case for Aristotle. Because the living body is a synthesis, and the form (soul) and 
matter (body) of the living being cannot exist apart, Aristotle’s soul and body do not 
experience the same problems that distinctness brought with Plato’s soul. Sickness of the 
body can directly affect the soul in so much as it can cause the agent to fail to hit the mean, 
which affects the virtuous nature of the soul. I will then examine Aristotle’s description of 
akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics, to show his belief that a lack of emotional self-control had its 
roots in physiology. Through this description, it is clear that Aristotle recognises the 
existence of conditions that we would now think of as affective disorders.  
But affective disorders are a broad category and it is a great step from a general 
recognition of affective disorders to recognising depression specifically. However, I argue 
that through his descriptions of the clustering of symptoms associated with people with a cool 
physiology, Aristotle did recognise depression as a specific disorder. 
In order to isolate references from across the entire corpus in which Aristotle 
discusses the symptoms that we now associate with depression, it was necessary to perform 
etymological searches. This process revealed that, surprisingly, Aristotle very rarely uses 
penthos. This term translates as sadness, or grief, and was the term I expected to find most 
closely associated with prolonged sadness. Most surprisingly was the discovery that the word 
is not used in Rhetoric when Aristotle is directly discussing a range of human emotions. I 
briefly explore the possible reasons for this unexpected omission before moving on to 
examine the existing references. 
 The etymological searches for each symptom revealed a significant degree of 
clustering in relation to women, melancholics, and old men. Across the three groups, 
Aristotle identifies eight of the nine symptoms that DSM-V associates with depression. This 
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shows a significant degree of correlation between the modern categorisation of depression 
and Aristotle’s recognition of the condition. Furthermore, six of the eight symptoms 
identified by Aristotle appear in discussions about more than one of the groups (women, 
melancholics, old men), which suggests that Aristotle considered these passions to have the 
tendency to occur together. 
Additionally, while women, melancholics, and old men at first appear to be disparate 
groups of people, I note that it is the cool physiology they have in common that Aristotle 
viewed as the root cause of their shared passionate tendencies.  
These conclusions, drawn from the undisputed Aristotelian corpus, are then supported 
by the Pseudo-Aristotlelian Problemata 30.1.389 This text presents many of the same 
symptoms seen elsewhere in the undisputed corpus and explicitly associates them with a 
cooled physiology, either through the consumption of wine, or through ageing. 
 In line with my aims, I conclude that there is a strong correlation between DSM-V’s 
categorisation of depression and Aristotle’s recognition of those symptoms. He consistently 
clusters together eight of the nine DSM-V symptoms of depression, and it is apparent that he 
attributes these symptoms to people with a cool physiology.  
 
 
1. The Aristotelian soul 
Aristotle discusses, and makes reference to, his notion of soul in many of his texts, but it is in 
De Anima that he gives us the most precise, scientific exposition of the relationship between 
the soul and the body. In this section, I will use the discussion from De Anima in isolation to 
present as coherent an Aristotelian notion of the soul and its interaction with the body as 
possible. However, in subsequent sections, when drawing on discussions concerning the soul 
from other works, especially the Ethics, it must be noted that Aristotle does not apply the 
same scientific rigidity to his presentations of the relationship between soul and body. 
Depending on context he tends to be more flexible in his terminology, so I will endeavour to 
bear this in mind when drawing my conclusions.  
In Book II of De Anima, Aristotle states that he intends to start from the very 
                                               
389 I think it prudent to separate Problemata from the treatises for which authorship is not disputed as 
it will avoid too heavy a reliance on the former, and show that, even without the exceptional evidence 
30.1 offers, we can still draw the same conclusions about Aristotle’s conception of depressive 
disorder. van der Eijk 2005, ch.5 must take the credit for this methodology, although the focus of our 
arguments differ. Mayhew 2011, p.275. n.2. notes that van der Eijk’s methodology in this instance is 
‘a model of how to approach the Problems.’ 
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beginning, without building on the influence of others, in order to produce a new theory of 
the soul.390 It is with this statement that his readers are warned that the Aristotelian soul will 
likely differ significantly from Plato’s tripartite psyche. Aristotle begins by exploring how to 
describe the soul in terms of a substance. He begins the construction of his psychic theory by 
stating that a substance can be either of matter, of form, or a composite of both.391 Matter is 
any body comprised of the elements. Matter may (or may not) have the potential for life. A 
substance of form is the life-giving principle in living beings.392 So, matter can be the 
potentiality for life and form is actuality of life. Therefore, any living being (plant, animal or 
person) must be a combination of matter and form resulting in the third type of substance; the 
composite.393 Since the matter is the bodily substance with potential for life, Aristotle 
concludes ‘the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form’394 and, thus, the soul is ‘the 
principle of animal life’. 395 
Having begun his exposition by identifying the soul as a substance of form, Aristotle 
then argues that, in fact, the soul must be thought of as the essence or function of a thing, not 
as a physical substance. To illustrate this concept, he uses two analogies, an axe and an eye. 
Aristotle explains that the function of an axe is to chop wood. If an axe is incapable of 
chopping, then really it can no longer be thought of as an axe, but is just a piece of wood and 
metal.396 Likewise an eye without sight is no longer truly an eye. The functioning eye cannot 
exist without possessing sight, and sight cannot exist without an eye to perform the function. 
The same can be said of the soul and living body. The body cannot be said to be living 
without the soul, and the soul cannot provide life without a body, so the soul is the essence of 
the living body.  
Aristotle’s conclusion is that the soul is a hierarchy of faculties or powers, where the 
most basic must be possessed in order to obtain the higher faculties. The first psychic 
capacity is self-nutrition, which encompasses growth, digestion and reproduction. This 
capacity is the only one possessed by plants, the most basic of living bodies.397 The next 
faculty in the hierarchy is sensation and belongs to animals.398 Most animals also exhibit 
                                               
390 Arist. DA 2.1.412a1-5. 
391 Arist. DA 2.1.412a6-10. 
392 Arist. DA 2.1.412a9-10. 
393 Arist. DA 2.1.412a15-6. 
394 Arist. DA 2.1.412a20. 
395 Arist. DA 1.1.402a7. 
396 Arist. DA 2.1.412b13-15. 
397 Arist. DA 2.2.413a25-34. 
398 Arist. DA 2.2.413b1-4. 
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locomotion, another faculty. Finally, the soul of humans, the most complex living being, 
possesses the power of intellect in addition to the lower faculties of self-nutrition, sensation, 
and locomotion.399  
So, in De Anima, the soul and body exist as a composite and this unity of matter and 
form would allow for Aristotle to view psychological disturbances and bodily condition as 
being mutually affecting. However, the most detailed discussion of emotional disturbance 
occurs in relation to the akratic man in Nicomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle tends to be 
more flexible in his application of the theory of soul and body co-dependence. Therefore, I 
will examine how the physiology of the akrates affects their passions in Nicomachean Ethics 
specifically.  
 
 
2. The akrates 
The most direct examination of an agent who lacks emotional control is the akratic man of 
Nicomachean Ethics. As explored in Chapter 2,400 for Aristotle eudaimonia is achievable 
only by living one’s life in such a way that the activities of the soul are always ‘in conformity 
with virtue’.401 This virtue is having the disposition to always choose ‘a mean between two 
vices’402 in the activities of the soul, which are the passions felt and the actions taken.403 So, 
for an agent to be considered virtuous they must achieve a disposition towards appropriate 
feelings and actions, as guided by the reasoned judgement of their intellect, and practical 
wisdom so that they can always choose the mean, even in unfamiliar situations. Because of 
the significant role played by appropriate feelings in the ability for the agent to achieve 
virtue, emotional disturbance or imbalance is, unsurprisingly, a cause for concern within his 
treatises.  
In Nicomachean Ethics Book 7, Aristotle describes an agent who knows what he 
ought to do in order for his actions to be virtuous, but does something else, because he is 
governed by his emotions. This agent is called the akrates (the unrestrained, or incontinent 
man).404 Aristotle makes it abundantly clear in his descriptions of the akrates that the 
                                               
399 Arist. DA 2.3.414b19. 
400 Ch. 2, p.108-113 
401 Arist. EN. 1.7.1098a16. 
402 Arist. EN. 2.9.1109a21-22. 
403 Arist. EN. 2.6.1106b17. 
404 Arist. NE 7.3.1147a10 -24; 7.6.1150b17-23; 7.8.1150b31-36. 
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physiological condition of the individual can be responsible for their inability to control their 
emotions.405 This is expressed in the following statements:  
 
ἀλλ᾽ εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ µὴ δύναται 
ἀντιτείνειν, µὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον. 
 
We are surprised when a man is overcome by pleasures and pains which most men are 
able to withstand, except when his failure to resist is due to some innate tendency, or 
to disease.  
(Arist. NE 7.7.115011-13) 
 
οἱ [ἀλόγιστοι ] δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἢ µανίας νοσηµατώδεις. 
 
Those who lose their reason owing to some disease, such as epilepsy, or through 
insanity, are morbid. 
(Arist. NE 7.5.1149a10-12) 
 
πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήµων ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ 
περὶ οἰνωµένου καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν 
φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. 
  
If we ask how the unrestrained man’s ignorance is dissipated and he returns to a state 
of knowledge, the explanation is the same as in the case of drunkenness and sleep, 
and is not peculiar to failure of self-restraint. We must go for it to the physiologists. 
(Arist. NE 7.3.1147b5-8) 
 
 
These select statements make it apparent that the inability of the akrates to control his 
emotions can be attributed to his bodily condition. In the first statement, Aristotle notes that it 
is not surprising when an individual is overcome with emotion in the wake of disease, which 
suggests that emotional disturbance was readily associated with physical illness. The second 
                                               
405 All of the following works have informed my reading of these passages and highlight that sleep 
and drunkenness can be thought of as other examples of physiological conditions: Ahonen 2014; 
Destrée 2007; Francis 2011; Gosling 1993; Owens 1981; Pickavé and Whiting 2008. 
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assumes that disease can cause people to lose their reason, and in the third extract, the failed 
attempt to follow reason is compared to someone who is drunk or asleep, which are both 
conditions that Aristotle states elsewhere affect cognition through changes to the physiology 
of the body. On Sleep 456b17-27 describes the physiological change that brings about sleep. 
Aristotle suggests that ingesting food causes hot exhalations, which move upwards towards 
the brain, since the brain was believed by Aristotle to be an organ of heat regulation.406 As 
the head becomes heavier with the presence of these hot exhalations, the individual feels 
drowsy. The brain then cools the exhalations and they move back down towards the heart. 
This movement of cool exhalations back towards the heart brings on sleep. At 456b30, 
Aristotle comments that wine has the same effect on the body, causing hot exhalations 
leading to sleep, which suggests that drunkenness is similarly physiological. So it is clear that 
the two comparative states to akrasia in Nichomachean Ethics 7.3.1147b5-8 arise as a result 
of a physiological change, indicating to the reader that akrasia should also be thought of as 
arising as a result of a change in the bodily condition. And if this comparison were not 
enough, Aristotle explicitly states that one should look to the physiologists to find a cure for 
akrasia, confirming that he viewed emotional disturbance as a physiological issue.  
So, it is evident that Aristotle, through his presentation of the akrates and consistent 
with the hylomorphic theory of De Anima, viewed the physiological condition of the body as 
able to affect one’s ability to feel passions, and act, virtuously. Having established that 
Aristotle associated emotional disturbance with the bodily condition, I will now go on to 
assess his recognition of the symptoms that DSM-V categorises as depression, and their 
tendency to occur together in clusters. 
  
 
 
3.  Sadness in the Aristotelian corpus 
When considering an author’s conception of depressive disorder, the most obvious place to 
start is with their thoughts on sadness. But with Aristotle this immediately presents a 
problem. Aristotle discusses human emotion in great detail, particularly in Nicomachean 
Ethics and Rhetoric. The emotions are part of Aristotle’s group of pathe (passions). In 
Nicomachean Ethics the pathe include ‘appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, 
hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or 
                                               
406 Arist. GA 2.6.743b27-32; PA 2.7. 652b23-6; 653a11-17; 2.10. 656a20-5. 
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pain.’407 It is notable that Aristotle does not specify sadness in this list. The same is also true 
of the emotions examined in Rhetoric. Here, Aristotle examines anger, fear, confidence, 
shame, kindness, pity, indignation and envy, but again sadness is not discussed.408  This is a 
surprising omission to the modern reader. Since 1872,409 many attempts have been made to 
identify a number of emotions innate to the human experience and sadness is a consistent 
inclusion in these lists, regardless of how many or few emotions are included.410 The concept 
of an existence of certain innate emotions remains a hotly debated topic within the 
scholarship and is by no means universally accepted,411 but there have been studies 
conducted which aimed (with apparent success) to prove that participants from very different 
cultural backgrounds are still able to consistently identify seven basic emotions, including 
sadness, from a series of facial expressions.412  The emotions were anger, fear, surprise, 
sadness, disgust, happiness and contempt. Participants originated from 10 countries chosen 
for their religious and cultural differences and included a proportionate number of people 
from societies known to differ significantly in attitudes to emotional expression such as Japan 
and West Sumatra (Indonesia).413 Nevertheless, the results showed very similar percentages 
of correct emotion identification as previous studies performed using only participants from 
Western societies, with sadness being correctly identified by 85.8% of 554 participants.414 
These results indicate that a number of emotions are innate to humans and not culturally 
dependent. Furthermore, while the parameters and conclusions drawn by this study are 
disputed, interestingly it is never sadness that is debated as a basic, cross-cultural emotion. 
Scholars are sometimes unconvinced by the inclusion of emotions such as disgust and 
contempt,415 but as far as I have been able to ascertain, sadness is never disputed as a basic 
human emotion (where basic human emotions are an accepted phenomenon). Therefore, if 
                                               
407 Arist. EN. 2.5.1105b21-4. 
408 Arist. Rhet. 2.2.1378a31-2.11.1388b31. 
409 The year of Darwin’s publication Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, which began a 
scientific interest in the study of innate human emotion. 
410 Izard et al. 1980, p.168 claimed there to be 10 basic emotions, Ekman et al. 1986 said 7, Smith et 
al. 1997, p.229 said 6, Johnson-Laird et al. 1989 said 5 and Jack, R et al. 2014 have reduced it to 4. 
But in all cases the inclusion of sadness is not disputed. 
411 For example Lutz et al. 1986, p.405-36. Particularly p.414-7.  
412 Ekman et al. 1986, p.159-168; Levenson et al. 1991, p.28-35.  
413 Ekman et al. 1986, p.163-164. Japanese and West Sumatran attitudes are discussed in Ekman 1972 
and Heider 1984. Both cultures encourage the suppression of personal emotions, particularly in the 
presence of others. 
414 Ekman et al. 1986, p.164. These results replicated those found in Western studies undertaken by 
Ekman et al. 1969 and Izard, 1969.  
415 Ekman 1986; Jack, R et al. 2014; Wierzbicka, A. 1986. 
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sadness is thought to be an innate human emotion, it will have been an emotion felt by the 
ancient Greeks and so, if they felt sadness, it seems strange for Aristotle not to consider it 
when explicitly discussing emotions in Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, Politics and 
Rhetoric.  
Furthermore, the scarcity with which Aristotle uses the term penthos (which is most 
commonly translated as sadness or grief according to LSJ) is certainly striking. The only 
reference is at Rhetoric 1370b25 and here Aristotle is referring quite plainly about the grief 
(penthesi) felt at the loss of a friend. However, this relative absence of penthos and the non-
inclusion of sadness in his lists of pathe, does not necessarily mean that Aristotle was not 
concerned with sadness at all. 
Konstan has argued that Aristotle does not mention sadness in Rhetoric because 
modern conceptions of emotion cannot be retrojected onto ClassicalGreek society. He 
suggests that in the Classical period, emotions were thought to be a response to an action 
affecting social advantage or status, rather than any naturally occurring event, and that these 
emotions tended to be directed at a human agent.416 He believes that the reason behind 
Aristotle’s omission of sadness is that sadness tends to arise from situations outside the 
agent’s control and, therefore, it is not really an omission at all, but rather would simply not 
have been considered ‘part of the core set of emotions in the Classical period.’417 I find this 
argument difficult to accept for a number of reasons.  
First, I believe Konstan puts far too much weight on social advantage as an all-
consuming motivational force. I am certainly not denying the importance in Greek culture of 
pursuing and acting in favour of social advantage, but to suggest that even the Greeks’ 
physiological responses were entirely and exclusively steeped in struggles for status seems 
reductive of the complexity of the human emotional experience.  
Second, it must also be noted that Konstan’s objective is to examine the emotions as 
portrayed within Rhetoric. He comments that he does not believe Aristotle’s list is a 
consequence of the focus of Rhetoric,418 but I struggle to see how a convincing argument 
could be made which completely disconnects the content of the text (the particular emotions 
examined) with the aims of the text (to teach orators how to persuade their audiences through 
emotional evocation).419 When one thinks of the emotions an orator might wish to arouse 
                                               
416 Konstan 2006, p.38-40. 
417 Konstan 2006, p.40. 
418 Konstan 2006, p.39. 
419 Dow 2011, p.47 makes a similar point, ‘Aristotle’s aims are confined to what is required for a 
treatise on rhetoric.’ 
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within his audience in order to gain a persuasive advantage, sadness does not immediately 
spring to mind; pity perhaps, but not sadness. Pity suggests empathy for another’s misfortune; 
however, I perceive sadness to be a more self-orientated emotion. Sadness is felt at one’s own 
loss; pity at the loss suffered by another. Common definitions of sadness within emotion 
theory support this differentiation:  
 
A transient state of low mood that we all experience from time to time, following 
defeats and losses. 
(Keedwell 2008, p.xv) 
 
Typical causes [of sadness] are the commonplace circumstances of everyday life, but 
those which usually involve loss. 
(Strongman 1996, p.120.) 
 
When an affect is called sadness, what is meant is unpleasure that is connected with 
ideas of something (bad) that has already happened - for instance, loss of a person 
important in one's life or physical injury. 
(Brenner 1980, p.345.) 
 
The emotion that deals with loss is sadness or distress. 
(Plutchik 1980, p.29.) 
 
More importantly, Aristotle himself seems to make this distinction between sadness at a 
personal loss and pity at the loss of another himself at Rhetoric 1386a. He speaks of Amasis 
weeping at the sight of his friend begging, but not at the execution of his own son. Aristotle 
attributes this to the fact that the first sight was pitiful, but the death of his son was terrible.420 
So there is evidently an awareness of the difference between pitying the loss of another, and 
what is felt at your own loss. Therefore, it would be strange for the orator (especially a 
forensic orator) to be attempting to evoke sadness amongst his audience and much more 
useful to his purposes to evoke their pity instead, which is indeed an emotion explored by 
Aristotle in Rhetoric.421  
                                               
420 Arist. Rhet. 2.8.1386a17-25. 
421 Arist. Rhet. 2.8.1385b11. 
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Finally, in response to Konstan’s argument, when listing the emotions in Rhetoric and 
the Ethics, Aristotle by no means suggests that the emotions detailed are an exhaustive list.422 
He extends the breakdown of the passions to include ‘in general feelings that are 
accompanied by pleasure or pain.’423 This pain is clearly not limited to physical pain, since 
anger is associated with a slight against one’s honour, and this is considered to be an 
unpleasant or painful experience.424 So, sadness in relation to a natural loss over which one 
has no control might very well fit into this category. The loss one has suffered for which they 
feel sad is surely an unpleasant and painful experience.  
So, having concluded that sadness is not wholly relevant to the aims of Rhetoric and 
is not the focus in Nicomachean or Eudemian Ethics, I must examine the rest of the 
Aristotelian corpus to discover his thoughts on sadness, particularly prolonged sadness.  
 
 
4. Clustering of symptoms 
In order to illuminate any instances of Aristotle clustering together the symptoms that DSM-
V now categorises as indicative of depression and, furthermore, recognising their tendency to 
occur together, it was necessary to perform extensive textual searches for multiple Greek 
terms for each symptom. These were as follows:  
 
- Depressed mood: athumia, anelpistos, baruthumeo/baruthumia, dakruo, duselpis, 
dusthumia, katephes, klaio, kopheia, lupe, melancholia (which requires separate 
examination), odurtikos.  
- Irritability: duskolia, kineo, orge.  
- Anhedonia: anhedonos, akinetos, aorgesia, analgesia, narkao, psychros, rhathumia.  
- Fatigue: apoknaio, kopos, truo.  
- Sleep disturbance: agrupnia, koimao, opsikoitos, hupnotikos.  
- Appetite change: epithumia, peina.  
- Low self-esteem/guilt: aitia, mikropsychia.  
- Inability to concentrate: amathes, aphyes, nothes.  
- Suicidal thoughts: autosphages, apokteino.  
                                               
422 Fortenbaugh 2002, p.114 agrees that the definition of an emotion in Rhetoric ‘was not intended as 
a general definition covering all the emotions felt by all human beings.’ 
423 Arist. EN. 2.5.1105b23-4; Rhet. 2.1.1378a21-22. 
424 Arist. Rhet. 2.2.1378a31-2. 
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The entire Aristotelian corpus was searched for all uses of each term using the Thesaurus 
Linguae Graecae. This process provided hundreds of references. Most of these passages 
mentioned only the one specific symptom searched for, but there do exist some instances in 
which Aristotle clusters a number of the symptoms together. These passages appear 
specifically when Aristotle is discussing women, melancholics, and old men. I will present 
the relevant passages for each type of person and then discuss the symptoms in relation to the 
categorisation of DSM-V. 
 
4.1. Women  
Aristotle describes the passionate dispositions of women in the following way: 
 
διόπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς ἐλεηµονέστερον καὶ ἀρίδακρυ µᾶλλον, ἔτι δὲ φθονερώτερον καὶ 
µεµψιµοιρότερον καὶ φιλολοίδορον µᾶλλον καὶ πληκτικώτερον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ δύσθυµον 
µᾶλλον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος καὶ δύσελπι, καὶ ἀναιδέστερον καὶ ψευδέστερον, 
εὐαπατητότερον δὲ καὶ µνηµονικώτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἀγρυπνότερον καὶ ὀκνηρότερον καὶ 
ὅλως ἀκινητότεροντὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρεν καὶ τροφῆς ἐλάττονός ἐστιν. 
 
Woman is more compassionate than man, more easily moved to tears, at the same 
time is more jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and to strike. She is, 
furthermore, more prone to despondency and less hopeful than the man, more void of 
shame, more false of speech, more deceptive, and of more retentive memory. She is 
also more sleepless, more shrinking, more difficult to rouse to action, and requires a 
smaller quantity of nutriment. 
(Arist. HA 9.1.608b8-14) 
 
In his short description of the temperament of women in comparison to men, Aristotle 
describes women as easily moved to sadness, irritable, despondent, lethargic, as having 
trouble sleeping, and having an abnormal appetite. 
 
 
4.2. Melancholics 
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In the surviving texts up to and including Aristotle’s treatises, melancholia is not solely and 
unambiguously associated with depressive disorders, although there was a strong association 
between black bile and general emotional disturbance. However, even within the Hippocratic 
treatises, melancholia did sometimes incorporate depressive traits.425 While this connection is 
not made explicit within the Aristotelian corpus, it is apparent that Aristotle had a very clear 
notion that someone with unvirtuous passions could be experiencing a physiological 
imbalance in relation to their black bile. 
If we return to Aristotle’s theory of the akrates, we discover that this individual, who 
knows what they should do but does otherwise because of their unvirtuous passions, can be 
one of two types; impetuous or weak. Aristotle explains this distinction in the following way: 
 
οἱ µὲν γὰρ βουλευσάµενοι οὐκ ἐµµένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ 
τὸ µὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. 
 
The weak deliberate, but then are prevented by passion from keeping to their 
resolution; the impetuous are led by passion because they do not stop to deliberate. 
(Arist. NE. 7.7. 1150b17-23) 
 
Aristotle then provides some examples of the types of people who fall under the category of 
impetuosity: 
 
µάλιστα δ᾽ οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ µελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς: οἳ µὲν 
γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἳ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναµένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ 
ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ. 
 
It is the keen and the melancholic that suffer especially from the impetuous form of 
incontinence, for the former because of their quickness and the latter because of their 
violence of passions do not wait on reason, because they are apt to follow their 
imagination. 
 (Arist. NE. 7.7. 1150b25-8) 
 
                                               
425 See Ch.1 (3.3), p.57. 
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So, Aristotle’s views are clear. Hoi melancholikoi are akratic in the sense that they are slaves 
to their passions and do not stop to deliberate before acting. Their particular emotional 
tendencies are not examined further within this text, because the focus is on the akrates in 
general, of which the melancholic is only one example. However, the unusual character traits 
of hoi melancholkoi are described elsewhere in the corpus in the following way:  
 
οὐδ᾿ οἱ µελαγχολικοί· κατέψυκται γὰρ ὁ εἴσω τόπος, ὥστ᾿ οὐ γίνεται πλῆθος αὐτοῖς 
ἀναθυµιάσεως. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ βρωτικοὶ σκληροὶ ὄντες· ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδὲν 
ἀπολελαυκότα διάκειται τὰ σώµατα αὐτοῖς. 
 
Nor are the melancholic inclined to sleep much; for the region within is chilled, so 
that there is not much evaporation in their case. For this reason also they are inclined 
to eat much though they are spare; for their condition of body is as if they did not 
profit by their food. 
 (Arist. De Som. 457a27-9)  
 
Ὅτι δὲ σωµατικόν τι τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ ἀνάµνησις ζήτησις ἐν τοιούτῳ φαντάσµατος, 
σηµεῖον τὸ παρενοχλεῖν ἐνίους ἐπειδὰν µὴ δύνωνται ἀναµνησθῆναι καὶ πάνυ 
ἐπέχοντες τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ οὐκέτ᾿ ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀναµιµνήσκεσθαι οὐδὲν ἧττον, καὶ 
µάλιστα τοὺς µελαγχολικούς· τούτους γὰρ φαντάσµατα κινεῖ µάλιστα. 
 
That the experience is in some sense physical, and that recollection is the search for a 
mental picture in the physical sphere, is proved by the annoyance which some men 
show when in spite of great concentration they cannot remember, and which persists 
even when they have abandoned the attempt to recollect, especially in the case of the 
melancholic; for these are especially affected by mental pictures. 
(Arist. Mem. 453a15-20) 
 
In these extracts, hoi melancholikoi are described as having trouble sleeping and having an 
abnormal appetite and, in On Memory, Aristotle seems to describe a feeling of lingering 
irritability towards an event that is quite minor. He describes the irritability experienced by 
melancholic people upon failing to achieve the recollection of a memory, which persists 
despite abandoning the attempt.   
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The idea of melancholic people having problems with concentration is a common 
theme in their presentation. In On Divination in Sleep, Aristotle says: 
 
ἀλλ᾿ ὅσων ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ λάλος ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ καὶ µελαγχολική, παντοδαπὰς ὄψεις 
ὁρῶσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ κινεῖσθαι ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν ὁµοίοις 
θεωρήµασιν. 
 
Men whose nature is as it were garrulous or melancholic see all kinds of sights; for 
since they respond often to any kind of stimulus they chance upon visions similar to 
events, doing so by sheer luck.  
(Arist. On Divination in Sleep 463b16-20) 
 
τὸ δέ τινας εὐθυονείρους εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοὺς γνωρίµους περὶ τῶν γνωρίµων µάλιστα 
προορᾶν συµβαίνει διὰ τὸ µάλιστα τοὺς γνωρίµους ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων φροντίζειν· ὥσπερ 
γὰρ πόρρω ὄντων µάλιστα1 γνωρίζουσι καὶ αἰσθάνονται, οὕτω καὶ τῶν κινήσεων· αἱ 
γὰρ τῶν γνωρίµων γνωριµώτεραι κινήσεις. οἱ δὲ µελαγχολικοὶ διὰ τὸ σφόδρα, ὥσπερ 
βάλλοντες πόρρωθεν, εὔστοχοί εἰσιν. καὶ διὰ τὸ µεταβλητικὸν ταχὺ τὸ ἐχόµενον 
φαντάζεται αὐτοῖς· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ Φιλαιγίδου ποιήµατα καὶ οἱ ἐµµανεῖς ἐχόµενα τοῦ 
ὁµοίου λέγουσι καὶ διανοοῦνται, οἷον Ἀφροδίτην, καὶ οὕτω συνείρουσιν εἰς τὸ 
πρόσω. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἐκκρούεται αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις ὑφ᾿ ἑτέρας 
κινήσεως. 
 
For some cases of vivid dreams there are particular explanations; e.g., the fact that 
men have special foresight about their friends is because those who are great friends 
care deeply for each other: for just as they are especially apt to perceive and recognize 
each other at a distance, so too in the case of impulses; for the impulses of familiar 
friends are themselves more familiar. Melancholic people,426 because of their 
impetuosity, are (to use a metaphor) good marksmen when shooting from a distance; 
and because of their liability to change, the next image in the series comes rapidly 
before them; for just as the insane recite and con over the poems of Philaegides, such 
as the Aphrodite, in which the ideas are all associated; so the melancholic pursue the 
                                               
426 I have made a small adaptation to Beare’s translation from ‘choleric people’ to ‘melancholic 
people’ to reflect the Greek more accurately.  
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series of impulses. Also owing to their impetuosity one impulse is not easily banished 
from their consciousness by another. 
 
(Arist. On Divination in Sleep 464a29-b5) 
 
 
From these extracts we see that melancholic people were thought to suffer from an impaired 
ability to concentrate on the task at hand, due to their impatience or moving too fast between 
ideas and goals and struggling to stay focused on one stimulus. 
 Finally, Aristotle appears, albeit tangentially, to connect the melancholic man with 
low self-esteem and attempts at suicide. In Eudemian Ethics, when discussing the differences 
between good and incontinent men, he says, in relation to the akrates: 
 
ἀλλ᾿ ὁ πονηρὸς παρὰ φύσιν. ὁ δ᾿ἀγαθὸς οὔθ᾿ἅµα λοιδορεῖται ἑαυτῷ, ὥσπερ ὁ 
ἀκρατής…ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἐγκαλέσωσιν αὑτοῖς, ἀποκτιννύασιν αὑτούς ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς 
αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀγαθός. 
 
The bad man is unnatural. The good man never finds fault with himself at the moment 
of his act, like the incontinent...For it is clear that some identical portion of them is 
good; for when they blame themselves they kill themselves. 
(Arist. EE. 7.5.1240b22-7) 
 
 
Aristotle’s claim is that akratic men sometimes commit an act and then immeditely regret 
their actions. It is not specified whether or not this act is worthy of the self-blame they feel as 
a result, but this regret leads them to commit suicide. This is an extreme response to 
commiting an unvirtuous act, which suggests that the melancholics’ assessment of the 
severity of the situation and the extent of their guilt over such an event is unrealistic.  
 Overall, melancholics are presented as having trouble sleeping, having an abnormal 
appetite, having trouble concentrating, feeling irritable towards an event that is quite minor 
and having a tendency towards suicidal thoughts. 
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4.3. Old men 
In a lengthy passage within Rhetoric, Aristotle describes the passionate dispositions of old 
men. He assigns them the following emotional tendencies: 
 
δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐµπειρίαν. 
They are little given to hope owing to their experience.  
(Arist. Rhet. 2.13.1390a5) 
 
καὶ ζῶσι τῇ µνήµῃ µᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐλπίδι. 
They live by memory rather than by hope. 
(Arist. Rhet. 2.13.1390a6) 
 
ἧττόν τε ἄγανται πάντα ἢ δεῖ. 
They show an excessive lack of energy. 
(Arist. Rhet. 2.13.1389b18) 
 
οἱ θυµοὶ ὀξεῖς µὲν ἀσθενεῖς δέ εἰσιν. 
Their fits of anger are sudden but feeble. 
(Arist. Rhet. 2.13.1390a11) 
 
αἱ ἐπιθυµίαι αἱ µὲν ἐκλελοίπασιν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσιν. 
Of their passions some have ceased, while others are weak. 
(Arist. Rhet. 2.13.1390a12) 
 
These descriptions portray old men as despondent, lethargic, irritable and generally 
disimpassioned, which we might think of as anhedonic. In the same passage, old men are also 
said to be ‘small-souled.’427 In Nicomachean Ethics, The small-souled man (mikropsychos) is 
the man who is deficient in the virtue of pride and is opposed to the great-souled man 
(megalopsychos) who recognises his own great worth.428 The small-souled man is worthy of 
great respect but does not recognise his worth, which to modern readers can be thought of as 
low self-esteem.  
                                               
427 Arist. Rhet. 2.13.1389b25. 
428 Arist. NE 4.3. 
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4.4 Summary 
To summarise the findings of these examples, in his descriptions of the passionate tendencies 
of women, Aristotle describes women as; easily moved to sadness, irritable, despondent, 
lethargic, as having trouble sleeping, and having an abnormal appetite. He describes 
melancholic people as: having trouble sleeping; having an abnormal appetite; having trouble 
concentrating; feeling irritable towards an event that is quite minor; having a tendency 
towards suicidal thoughts. Melancholic people also appear to suffer from low self-esteem. 
Their suicidal thoughts stem from regret felt towards an unvirtuous action. Aristotle does not 
pass comment on whether or not suicide is an appropriate response to the action committed, 
but suicide does appear to be an extreme reaction almost regardless of the unvirtuous act. 
This suggests that the melancholics’ assessment of the severity of the situation and their 
subsequent guilt is unrealistic. This situation is reminiscent of the symptom that DSM-V 
describes as low self-esteem; unrealistically negative self-evaluation and feelings of 
worthlessness.429 Finally, he presents old men as; being despondent, irritable, lethargic, 
disimpassioned, and having low self-esteem.  
When aligning these descriptions with the symptoms identified in DSM-V, this is an 
impressively complete grouping of symptoms and a significant observation in terms of 
discovering if Aristotle identified a depressive type in his categorisation of human 
temperaments. Across the three groups, and with a considerable degree of overlap, Aristotle 
seems to have identified eight of the nine DSM-V symptoms of Major Depressive Disorder; 
depressed mood (which includes irritability), anhedonia, fatigue, appetite change, sleep 
disturbance, low self-esteem, the inability to concentrate, and suicidal thoughts. 
 
 
5. The cool physiological type 
Aristotle clearly displays his recognition that eight of the nine DSM-V symptoms of 
depression tend to occur together although, at first glance, the types of people who display 
these symptoms seem to be disparate. However, I will argue that in fact, women, 
melancholics, and old men are all representative of people who, according to Aristotle, share 
a common physiology. Each of these groups of people are described as having a cool 
physiology.  
                                               
429 DSM-V 2013, p.164. 
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The connection between the natural body temperature and the presence of certain 
character traits was a commonly accepted phenomenon in ancient thought. This thinking is 
shown by the Hippocratic author of Airs, Waters, and Places in the opening of the treatise: 
 
᾿Ιητρικὴν ὅστις βούλεται ὀρθῶς ζητεῖν, τάδε χρὴ ποιεῖν· πρῶτον µὲν ἐνθυµεῖσθαι τὰς 
ὥρας τοῦ ἔτεος, ὅ τι δύναται ἀπεργάζεσθαι ἑκάστη· οὐ γὰρ ἐοίκασιν ἀλλήλοισιν 
οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ διαφέρουσιν αὐταί τε ἐφ᾿ ἑωυτέων καὶ ἐν τῇσι 
µεταβολῇσιν·…ὥστε ἐς πόλιν ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκηταί τις, ἧς ἄπειρός ἐστι, διαφροντίσαι 
χρὴ τὴν θέσιν αὐτῆς, ὅκως κεῖται καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύµατα καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολὰς τοῦ 
ἡλίου. οὐ γὰρ τωὐτὸ δύναται ἥτις πρὸς βορέην κεῖται καὶ ἥτις πρὸς νότον οὐδ᾿ ἥτις 
πρὸς ἥλιον ἀνίσχοντα οὐδ᾿ ἥτις πρὸς δύνοντα. 
 
Whoever wishes to pursue properly the science of medicine must proceed thus. First 
he ought to consider what effects each season of the year can produce; for the seasons 
are not at all alike, but differ widely both in themselves and at their changes… 
Therefore, on arrival at a town with which he is unfamiliar, a physician should 
examine its position with respect to the winds and to the risings of the sun. For a 
northern, a southern, an eastern, and a western aspect has each its own individual 
property. 
(Hipp. Airs, Waters, and Places 1) 
 
As a result of this, it was thought that those living in a hot climate naturally had a cooler 
physiology,430 leading to particular passionate dispositions. For example, people of Asian 
origin were thought to be mild in nature, gentle, subservient, and generally lacking in spirit: 
 
τὰ ἤθεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἠπιώτερα καὶ εὐοργητότερα. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτων ἡ κρῆσις 
τῶν ὡρέων…[16] ὅτι ἀπολεµώτεροί εἰσι τῶν Εὐρωπαίων οἱ Ἀσιηνοὶ καὶ ἡµερώτεροι 
τὰ ἤθεα αἱ ὧραι αἴτιαι µάλιστα, οὐ µεγάλας τὰς µεταβολὰς ποιεύµεναι οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ 
θερµὸν οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἀλλὰ παραπλησίως. 
 
                                               
430 Arist. Prob. 14.16. 910b1-b6. ‘Human beings have a natural tendency which counteracts the effect 
of locality and season…The effect of hot regions upon their inhabitants is to cool them…but those 
who live in a cold climate become heated in their nature.’ 
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The character of the inhabitants [of Asia] is milder and more gentle. The cause of this 
is the temperate climate… [sec.16] The chief reason why Asiatics are less warlike and 
more gentle in character than Europeans is the uniformity of the seasons, which show 
no violent changes either towards heat or towards cold, but are equable. For there 
occur no mental shocks nor violent physical change, which are more likely to steel the 
temper and impart to it a fierce passion than is a monotonous sameness. 
(Hipp. Airs, Waters, and Places 12-16)  
 
This thinking that climate could have a direct effect on disposition was pervasive in 
subsequent Greek thought, including the thinking of both Plato and Aristotle.431 When 
discussing the nature of Asians, Aristotle offers a similar assessment to the author of Airs, 
Waters, and Places: 
 
τὰ µὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυµοῦ µέν ἐστι 
πλήρη…τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ µὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἄθυµα δέ, 
διόπερ ἀρχόµενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ· 
 
Those who live in a cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit...whereas the natives 
of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they 
are always in a state of subjection and slavery.  
(Arist. Pol. 7.6.1327b27-29) 
 
The hot climate, and hence cool body temperature of Asians results in a meek, gentle, and 
despondent disposition. This thinking seems to have influenced Aristotle’s views in relation 
to other groups thought to be physiologically cool; women, melancholics, and old men. 
 
5.1. Women 
It is widely accepted that the fundamental biological difference between men and women for 
Aristotle is that women have a naturally cooler body temperature.432 This difference is 
expressed in the following statements: 
 
                                               
431 Pl. Rep. 435e-36a; Ward 2002, p.20-2; Kerferd 1984, p.159. 
432Cline Horowitz 1976, p.183-213; Deslauriers 2009, p.216-19; Lange 1983, p.1-16; Tuana 1988, 
p.36; Tuana 1994, p.189-206. 
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αἴτιον δ᾿ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πολὺ διαφέρει τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος τῇ θερµότητι τῆς 
φύσεως. 
 
In human beings the male is much hotter in its nature than the female. 
(Arist. GA. 4.6. 775a5-6) 
 
ἀσθενέστερα γάρἐστι καὶ ψυχρότερα τὰ θήλεα τὴν φύσιν. 
 
Females are weaker and colder in nature. 
(Arist. GA. 4.6. 775a14.) 
 
Ἔχει δὲ τῶν ζῴων ἐγκέφαλον πλεῖστον ἄνθρωπος ὡς κατὰ µέγεθος, καὶ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων οἱ ἄρρενες τῶν θηλειῶν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν περὶ τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὸν πλεύµονα 
τόπον θερµότατον καὶ ἐναιµότατον. 
 
Man has the largest brain in proportion to his size; and it is larger in men than in 
women. This is because the region of the heart and of the lung is hotter and richer in 
blood. 
(Arist. PA. 2.7.653a25-30) 
 
 
As mentioned previously, Aristotle believed the function of the brain to be heat-regulation.433 
So if men have larger brains than women, for Aristotle this would suggest that men are 
naturally hotter than women, since their bodies require a larger heat-regulator. In light of this 
supposed fundamental biological difference, it is logical to assume that it is this coolness that 
was thought to be the primary cause of the kinds of differing emotional traits between men 
and women, such as those listed in History of Animals 9.1.608b8-14; easily moved to 
sadness, irritable, despondent, lethargic, having trouble sleeping, and having an abnormal 
appetite.  
 
 
 
                                               
433 Arist. GA 2.6.743b27-32; PA 2.7. 652b23-6; 653a11-17; 2.10. 656a20-5. 
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5.2. Melancholics 
From my conclusions in Chapter 1,434 it is fairly safe to say that by the fourth century, the 
term melancholia was thought synonymous with the excessive presence of black bile. In the 
descriptions of black bile within the Aristotelian corpus, it becomes apparent that he thought 
that at least one of the properties of black bile, if not the primary function, was that it cooled 
the body. He says:  
 
ἡ δὲ µέλαινα χολὴ φύσει ψυχρὰ οὖσα καὶ τὸν θρεπτικὸν τόπον ψυχρὸν ποιεῖ καὶ 
τἆλλα µόρια, ὅπου ἂν ὑπάρχῃ δυνάµει τὸ τοιοῦτον περίττωµα. 
 
Black bile also being by nature cold cools the nutritive region and other parts, 
wherever there is potentially a secretion of this kind.  
(Arist. De Som. 457a29-30)  
 
So, it is likely that those with excess black bile in their constitution would also have been 
thought to have a naturally cooler physiology.  
 
 
5.3. Old men 
Aristotle is concise and explicit in his views that age naturally cools the body. While 
discussing the temperament of old men in Rhetoric, he says the following in relation to their 
physical constitution: 
 
κατεψυγµένοι γάρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερµοί. 
 
They are chilled, whereas the young are hot. 
(Arist. Rhet. 2.13.1389b30) 
 
Rhetoric 2.12. discusses the passionate tendencies of young men with a warm bodily 
temperature, and 2.13 goes on to show the different tendencies exhibited by old men who, as 
Aristotle is careful to point out, are cooler. 
 
                                               
434 Ch. 1 (3.3), p.61-2. 
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5.4. Summary 
Of the eight DSM-V symptoms of depression identified in the clusters of symptoms 
attributed to women, melancholics, and old men, six of them are said to be experienced by at 
least two groups. These are as follows:  
 
- Despondency: Women, Old men. 
- Irritability: Women, Melancholics, Old men. 
- Fatigue: Women, Old men. 
- Trouble Sleeping: Women, Melancholics.  
- Abnormal Appetite: Women, Melancholics. 
- Low self-esteem: Melancholics, Old men. 
 
This strong degree of overlap between the passionate dispositions of these groups of people 
suggests that Aristotle must have considered the groups to share a particular quality that 
would cause these traits. It is apparent that this shared quality is a cool physiology. Women, 
melancholics, and old men are all consistently presented as possessing a cooler body than 
normal, and in the case of women and old men, this cooler physiology is explicitly identified 
as the cause of their passionate differences to men and young men, respectively, who have a 
warmer bodily temperature. So, it is reasonable to assume that it is the lower bodily 
temperature that is the cause of their shared passionate dispositions. 
So, it is evident that within the undisputed Aristotelian corpus, the author had a strong 
conception of the passionate typology of the cool individual. I will now go on to examine the 
pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata 30.1 in order to see if this text supports the conclusions 
drawn so far.  
 
 
6. Problemata 30.1 
The collection of books that make up Problemata are usually considered, in their entirety, to 
be pseudo-Aristotelian and composed by a number of different authors. In 1928, the closest 
Forster came to admitting some possibility of genuine Aristotelian input was that the books 
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‘appear to consist of… an Aristotelian element’435 and ‘in part from scraps of Aristotelian 
doctrine from the genuine works recast in problem form.’436 Other than that, he attributes 
Hippocratic, Theophrastean, and general Peripatetic influence on the works.437 However, 
more recently, scholars have suggested that there could be individual books within the 
collection that can claim genuine authorship. Mayhew, in his introduction to the most recent 
Loeb translation of Problemata, offers this alternative possibility: 
 
The Problems began as a work by Aristotle—who authored some chapters and 
perhaps directed the authorship of others—and over the years, and beyond his death, 
some material was added to this work and other material was removed or otherwise 
lost. On this interpretation, all of the ancient references are to the same work, but not 
all of that work survives. 
(Mayhew 2011, p.xxi.) 
 
 
Mayhew adds that in order to offer any real support to this possibility, a new commentary 
would need to be produced that examines of all of the books in the collection and that focuses 
on ‘language, content, methodology, philosophical presuppositions, similarities and 
differences with other ancient thinkers, etc.’438 To date, the only existing commentaries are 
on Books 11 and 19. On Problemata 30.1 specifically, there exists no such commentary as 
yet, but Mayhew notes his suspicion that this chapter could well be authentically Aristotelian, 
or at least closely based on something he wrote.439 In antiquity, at least, the work was thought 
to have been penned by Aristotle himself.440 While I do not aim to provide a commentary on 
the text here, I do intend to shed light on the similarities in thought between Problemata 30.1 
and the rest of the undisputed corpus, in relation to passionate tendencies that we might now 
associate with depression, and a cool physiology. 
Problemata 30.1 wonders: 
 
                                               
435 Forster 1928, p.165. 
436 Forster 1928, p.165. 
437 Forster 1928, p.165. 
438 Mayhew 2011, p.xxii. 
439 Mayhew 2011, p.274. 
440 Cicero Tusc. Disp. 1.33; Plutarch Lys. 2.5. 
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Διὰ τί πάντες ὅσοι περιττοὶ γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες ἢ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν ἢ 
ποίησιν ἢ τέχνας φαίνονται µελαγχολικοὶ ὄντες, καὶ οἱ µὲν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ 
λαµβάνεσθαι τοῖς ἀπὸ µελαίνης χολῆς ἀρρωστήµασιν? 
 
Why is it that all those men who have become extraordinary in philosophy, politics, 
poetry, or the arts are obviously melancholic, and some to such an extent that they are 
seized by the illnesses that come from black bile?  
(Ps-Arist. Prob. 953a10-14) 
 
The author’s solution to this problem explores his thoughts on the changeable temperature of 
black bile in comparison to the well-known effects brought on by other influences on bodily 
temperature. For example, it was widely thought that wine had a cooling effect on the 
body,441 so the passions brought on by drinking excess wine could be compared to the effects 
of cold black bile. The author himself makes this connection explicit: 
 
ὁ γὰρ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς µάλιστα φαίνεται παρασκευάζειν τοιούτους οἵους λέγοµεν τοὺς 
µελαγχολικοὺς εἶναι. 
 
A lot of wine appears to produce those qualities that we say are melancholic. 
(Ps-Arist. Prob. 953a33-4) 
 
This comparison is rooted in the observation that both the excessive consumption of wine and 
the presence of too much cold black bile give rise to the same passions and behaviours. But 
what is most interesting for my study is the pattern that continues to emerge from this text. 
The kinds of passions and behaviours that the author of Problemata 30.1 identifies as 
associated with cold black bile and the consumption of wine are almost identical to those 
identified by Aristotle as related to having a cool physiology, which are, in turn, very closely 
aligned with our modern classification of Major Depressive Disorder. The most pertinent 
extracts of this lengthy chapter read as follows:442 
                                               
441 Arist. De Somn. 456b30-32; Pl. Lysis 219e suggests that wine is an antidote for hemlock, which is 
described at Phaedo 63d-e as heating the body. See also Northwood 1998. 
442 I only include selected extracts of this lengthy passage here to highlight my main argument. 
However, the full text presents a strikingly precise description of a physical condition that we might 
now think of as depression. Therefore, I have included the entire passage in Appendix 3, along with 
the corresponding Greek text. 
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καὶ ἡ χολὴ δὲ ἡ µέλαινα φύσει ψυχρὰ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιπολαίως οὖσα, ὅταν µὲν οὕτως ἔχῃ 
ὡς εἴρηται, ἐὰν ὑπερβάλλῃ ἐν τῷ σώµατι, ἀποπληξίας ἢ νάρκας ἢ ἀθυµίας ποιεῖ ἢ 
φόβους, ἐὰν δὲ ὑπερθερµανθῇ, τὰς µετ᾿ᾠδῆς εὐθυµίας καὶ ἐκστάσεις καὶ ἐκζέσεις 
ἑλκῶν καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. 
 
Now black bile, being cold by nature and not on the surface, when it is in the 
condition mentioned, if it abounds in the body, produces apoplexy or torpor or 
spiritlessness or fear, but if it becomes overheated, it produces high-spiritedness with 
song, and insanity, and the breaking out of sores and such things.  
(Ps-Arist. Prob. 954a21-7) 
 
οἷον ὅσοις µὲν πολλὴ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐνυπάρχει, νωθροὶ καὶ µωροί, ὅσοις δὲ λίαν πολλὴ 
καὶ θερµή, µανικοὶ καὶ εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ καὶ εὐκίνητοι πρὸς τοὺς θυµοὺς καὶ τὰς 
ἐπιθυµίας, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ λάλοι µᾶλλον. 
 
Those in whom (the black bile) is considerable and cold become sluggish and stupid 
whereas those in whom it is very considerable and hot become mad, clever, erotic, 
and easily moved to spiritedness and desire, and some become more talkative.  
(Ps-Arist. Prob. 954a31-4) 
 
γὰρ οἱ πλείους τῶν µελαγχολικῶν, καὶ αἱ φλέβες ἐξέχουσιν· 
 
The majority of melancholic people are thin, and their veins stand out.  
(Ps-Arist. Prob. 954a8-10) 
 
 
ψυχροτέρα µὲν γὰρ οὖσα τοῦ καιροῦ δυσθυµίας ποιεῖ ἀλόγους· διὸ αἵ τ᾿ ἀγχόναι 
µάλιστα τοῖς νέοις, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ πρεσβυτέροις. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ µετὰ τὰς µέθας 
διαφθείρουσιν ἑαυτούς. ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν µελαγχολικῶν ἐκ τῶν πότων ἀθύµως 
διάγουσιν·… ὅσοις µὲν οὖν µαραινοµένου τοῦ θερµοῦ αἱ ἀθυµίαι γίνονται, µᾶλλον 
ἀπάγχονται. διὸ καὶ οἱ νέοι ἢ καὶ οἱ πρεσβῦται µᾶλλον πάγχονται· τὸ µὲν γὰρ γῆρας 
µαραίνει τὸ θερµόν, τῶν δὲ τὸ πάθος φυσικὸν ὂν †καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ µαραινόµενον 
θερµόν†. ὅσοις δὲ σβεννυµένου ἐξαίφνης, οἱ πλεῖστοι διαχρῶνται ἑαυτούς, ὥστε 
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θαυµάζειν πάντας διὰ τὸ µηθὲν ποιῆσαι σηµεῖον πρότερον. ψυχροτέρα µὲν οὖν 
γινοµένη ἡ κρᾶσις ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς µελαίνης χολῆς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ποιεῖ ἀθυµίας 
παντοδαπάς, θερµοτέρα δὲ οὖσα εὐθυµίας. 
 
For when it is colder than is fitting, it produces irrational despondency; this is why 
hanging (oneself) is most prevalent among the young, though it sometimes occurs 
among older men as well. Many kill themselves after drunkenness. And some 
melancholic people continue to be spiritless after drinking; for the heat of the wine 
extinguishes the natural heat… So those in whom despondency occurs when the heat 
is put out are more inclined to hang themselves. And this is why the young are more 
inclined than even the old to hang themselves; for old age puts out the heat, but for 
the young the condition is natural, †and so the heat is being put out by itself†. And 
among those people, when (the heat) is suddenly extinguished, the majority kill 
themselves, such that everyone is amazed because they gave no sign of it before. 
Therefore, when the mixture from the black bile becomes colder, as was said, it 
produces all kinds of spiritlessness, but when it is hotter, cheerfulness.  
(Ps-Arist. Prob. 954b36-955a16) 
 
ὁ γὰρ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς µάλιστα φαίνεται παρασκευάζειν τοιούτους οἵους λέγοµεν τοὺς 
µελαγχολικοὺς εἶναι, καὶ πλεῖστα ἤθη ποιεῖν πινόµενος, οἷον ὀργίλους, 
φιλανθρώπους, ἐλεήµονας, ἰταµούς· 
 
A lot of wine appears to produce those qualities that we say are melancholic, and 
when it has been drunk it produces most of the characteristics, namely, irascibility, 
benevolence, compassion, and recklessness.  
(Ps-Arist. Prob. 953a33-7) 
 
 
In these extracts, cold melancholics are said to experience: irrational despondency/persistent 
grief and are prone to tears; irascibility and apoplexy; cowardice; spiritlessness; sluggishness 
and torpor; stupidity; an abnormal appetite (suggested by claiming they are abnormally thin); 
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and are most likely to attempt suicide. These passionate tendencies are also compared to old 
men, confirming the connection between these dispositions and a cool physiology.443  
This is in direct comparison to hot melancholics who instead become: high-spirited 
with song; insane; clever; erotic (or easily moved to desire); and more talkative. All of the 
passions associated with cold black bile in Problemata 30.1 are also identified by Aristotle as 
being related to a cool physiology within the accepted genuine corpus. None of the passions 
brought on by hot bile in Problemata are listed among Aristotle’s collection of characteristics 
belonging to cool people. The only characteristics discussed by Aristotle that are not 
paralleled in the cool passions of Problemata 30.1 are low self-esteem (or being small-
souled) and sleeplessness. And the author of Problemata 30.1 includes agitation as an 
additional characteristic.  
This high degree of agreement between the genuine Aristotelian corpus and 
Problemata 30.1 enriches the picture established from the undisputed Aristotelian corpus 
alone. The breadth of passionate dispositions attributed specifically to cold melancholics 
shows the accuracy of my prior conclusions. It does seem reasonable to consider the 
character traits discussed across the corpus in relation to women, old men, and melancholics 
as being exhibited by a larger physiological type, rather than as specifically ‘womanly’ traits, 
for example. Any, and all, of these passions were thought to be associated with women, old 
men, cold melancholics, and indeed anyone else who had a cool physiology, either by nature 
or by changes to constitution. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Women, melancholics, and old men are identified by Aristotle as being particularly prone to: 
depressed mood and irritability; anhedonia; fatigue; appetite change; sleep disturbance; low 
self-esteem; the inability to concentrate; and suicidal thoughts. These passionate tendencies 
represent eight out of the nine symptoms of depression according to DSM-V. Furthermore, 
six of the symptoms are said to be experienced by more than one of the groups, which gives a 
significant degree of overlap and suggests that the groups share a common trait that cause 
them to have similar passionate dispositions.  
Aristotle’s theory of hylomorphism from De Anima, a theory that is consistent with 
the presentation of the akrates in Nicomachean Ethics, suggests that any condition that 
                                               
443 Ps-Arist. Prob. 954b36-955a16. 
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affects the virtue of the soul must also be thought of as a condition of the body. This includes 
disturbances in an individual’s passions. It is necessary, when transferring this theory to his 
other works, to note that Aristotle is more flexible with the interaction and co-dependence of 
soul and body elsewhere. So, it is difficult to say with any certainty that Aristotle always 
considered passionate disturbance to have direct connection to bodily condition. However, it 
does appear that the eight symptoms of depression that are recognised by Aristotle within the 
corpus were specifically associated with people who were thought to have a cool physiology. 
The significant degree of overlap between the symptoms exhibited by each group examined 
suggests that it was thought to be their cool physiology that caused those particular 
passionate disturbances.  
These conclusions are then reinforced by the discussions provided in Problemata 
30.1. This pseudo-Aristotelian text presents the notion that depressive passionate tendencies 
arise from a cool physiology in a way that is remarkably consistent with the undisputed 
Aristotelian corpus. This identification, across the entire undisputed and disputed corpus, of a 
specific physiology that is responsible for eight out of the nine symptoms we would now 
classify as a depressive disorder is a significant finding in the search for ancient recognition 
of clinical depression.  
In sum, Aristotle identifies an impressive eight out of nine symptoms that DSM-V 
associates with depression. He also clearly acknowledges the tendency for these symptoms to 
occur together as six of the eight symptoms are grouped together on more than one occasion. 
Finally, he specifically associates this group of symptoms with people who have a cool 
physiology. This demonstrates a strong, positive correlation between Aristotle’s 
understanding of the manifestations of depression and DSM-V’s categorisation of the 
disorder. This is a significant finding as it shows an understanding of depression as a fully 
realised condition in the ancient world. 
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Chapter 5 – Was philosophy of practical use in treating depression? 
 
Introduction 
Having examined Plato and Aristotle’s individual views, it remains to return to the point of 
enquiry for Chapter 1 and consider how these philosophical recognitions may have been of 
practical use to an individual in Athens seeking relief from the symptoms of depression. First, 
this chapter will briefly summarise the findings of Chapter 1 in relation to the options 
available to an Athenian resident seeking treatment for their symptoms of depression. Then I 
will present the treatments recommended by Plato in his Timaeus and I will note that these 
are in line with the conclusions regarding the physical origin of psychic illness as suggested 
at the end of Chapter 3. Then, the treatment recommended by Aristotle will be presented. 
Finally, I will consider how the treatments suggested by Plato and Aristotle may have 
actually been of benefit to an Athenian sufferer of depression, beyond the options already 
available to them.  
 
 
1. Pre-existing treatment options 
Chapter 1 examined the various treatment options available to an Athenian resident who was 
experiencing the symptoms of depression. An autonomous citizen for whom money was no 
obstacle had three main routes to explore in the search for an effective treatment. They could 
employ a secular physician who would likely attribute the symptoms to excessive black bile 
within the constitution. The physician could prescribe drugs or potions, or a change in 
regimen. To reduce black bile a diet of barley water was commonly prescribed, alongside a 
hot bath and gentle exercise on a daily basis.444 Alternatively, they might choose to seek the 
help of Asclepius, the god of healing. The surviving cure tablets found at the sanctuary of 
Asclepius at Epidaurus show that people did visit the sanctuary hoping to be cured of their 
chronic psychological disorders. So, this was an option for someone experiencing depressive 
symptoms.445 Finally, they could approach one of the many manteis or magoi of varying 
repute who resided in the city. Depending on whether a mantis was a ‘healer-seer’ or 
‘purifier’ they might aim to diagnose the illness and prescribe an appropriate cure or use 
magical techniques to cure the victim of their disease. The treatment provided by a magos 
                                               
444 See Ch.1, p.52-7. 
445 See Ch.1, p.70. 
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could have taken many forms. These included recommendations for drugs and potions, and 
performing a ritual or incantation which aimed to restore the favour of the gods.446 
 It is apparent that there already existed various treatment options for someone 
experiencing depression to try to relieve their symptoms. However, the evidence examined in 
Chapter 1 (3.3)447 does not indicate that the presence of even multiple symptoms of 
depression, according to DSM-V, would have been considered representative of one 
particular illness, but rather as a manifestation of a group of conditions brought on by an 
excess of black bile in the body. Furthermore, some of the intellectual elite of Athens are 
possibly less likely to have put their hope for a cure in a miracle cure from Asclepius or a 
magical ritual performed by a mantis or magos. Therefore, they may well have turned to the 
psychological writings of the philosophers for assistance in alleviating their symptoms. 
 
2. Plato’s recommended treatment 
In Chapter 3 I concluded that for Plato the origin of psychic disease lay with the body’s 
capacity to disrupt the revolutions of the soul, either through the presence of the humors 
physically altering the space in which the soul can revolve, or by distraction from the pursuit 
of wisdom caused by a lack of control over the irrational desires of Appetite and Spirit. I 
would expect the origin of a disease to be reflected in the suggested treatment options, so, if 
my conclusion is accurate, the treatment recommended by Plato should be focused on ridding 
the body of the humor that is causing the disruption in the revolutions of the soul. But, 
surprisingly, Plato’s advice instead centres, in the first instance, around strengthening the soul 
against distractions from the body. At 90b-c Timaeus claims: 
 
τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλοµαθίαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότι καὶ ταῦτα 
µάλιστα τῶν αὑτοῦ γεγυµνασµένῳ φρονεῖν µὲν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα. 
 
If a man has seriously devoted himself to the love of learning and to true wisdom, if 
he has exercised these aspects of himself above all, then there is absolutely no way 
that his thoughts can fail to be immortal and divine. 
(Pl. Tim. 90b8-c2) 
 
                                               
446 See Ch.1 (5.3) p.76. 
447 p.57-62. 
 184 
Unsurprisingly, in Plato’s opinion the ideal condition would be for the soul to be so perfectly 
in balance and disciplined in the pursuit of wisdom that any bodily condition would not affect 
its revolutions nor be able to strengthen its mortal desires against the rule of Reason. But 
where the humors are physically affecting the mechanical motions of the soul, which results 
in psychic disorder, surely there is nothing a soul could do to strengthen itself against such an 
event? Plato eliminates this potential issue by noting that a perfectly balanced soul entirely 
devoted to wisdom cannot exist without a well-conditioned and maintained body.448 He 
recommends that the devoted philosopher exercise his whole body so that a constant internal 
equilibrium is achieved and no badness can settle and breed disease.449 In that case the man 
with the well-balanced soul would also have a well-balanced body, and so humoral invasion 
of the soul’s space will not occur in the first place. However, where the individual has not 
properly cared for his body and a humor has occurred, Plato offers some advice on removal. 
He claims that first, ‘physical exercise is the best of those that purify and restore the body,’450 
then that gentle rocking, like that experienced in sea-travel, can aid in restoring the body’s 
natural equilibrium, and finally, if these methods do not help, ‘in occasional instance of dire 
need’,451 drugs may be used to purge the body of the afflicting humor.  
 So, Plato’s advice is to focus on the prevention of humoral imbalance in the first 
instance through regular exercise, then to continue with this as a method of restoring the 
body’s equilibrium, but if the illness is too severe, drugs may have to be used to eliminate the 
humor and allow the revolutions of the soul to return to normal. 
 
 
3. Aristotle’s recommended treatment 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Aristotle makes it clear that an individual can be considered an 
akrates if their physiological condition causes them to lose control of their passions.452 This 
is demonstrated through Aristotle’s descriptions of the emotional disturbances exhibited by 
melancholics, old men, and women which, according to Aristotle, are symptomatic of their 
cool physiological conditions. Aristotle’s advice regarding treatment of these symptoms is as 
follows: 
 
                                               
448 Pl. Tim. 88b8-10. 
449 Pl. Tim. 88d-89a. 
450 Pl. Tim. 89a. 
451 Pl. Tim. 89b2-3. 
452 See Ch. 4. (2), p.157-9. 
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πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήµων ὁ ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ 
περὶ οἰνωµένου καὶ καθεύδοντος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν 
φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. 
  
If we ask how the unrestrained man’s ignorance is dissipated and he returns to a state 
of knowledge, the explanation is the same as in the case of drunkenness and sleep, 
and is not peculiar to failure of self-restraint. We must go for it to the physiologists. 
(Arist. NE 7.3.1147b5-8) 
 
The physiologist that Aristotle recommends is a natural scientist rather than a physician. He 
advises approaching someone with a reasoned understanding of natural processes who can 
explain the cause of the ignorance. Some physiologists may have also had the practical skills 
required to then treat the sickness,453 but some may simply have been able to advise in a 
theoretical capacity. This aside, the implication is the same: that the symptoms have their 
origin in the bodily condition.  
 
 
4. Summary of the contributions of Plato and Aristotle 
Both Plato and Aristotle provide significant contributions to the existing ancient thought 
regarding these symptoms. Crucially, both philosophers identify the tendency for the 
symptoms discussed to occur together and give them a common origin. Plato identifies four 
of the nine DSM-V symptoms, including both key symptoms of depressed mood and 
anhedonia, and presents a hydraulic symptomatic model, which requires four of the Timaean 
symptoms to be exhibited at any one time. Aristotle associates eight of the nine DSM-V 
symptoms with one specific physiological condition: having a cool constitution. 
For the people who were experiencing these clusters of symptoms in the fifth and 
fourth centuries, the philosophers also provide a more holistic explanation for the cause of 
this condition, and practical ways by which one could go about treating it. For Plato, the 
cause is both an ethical failure to strengthen one's soul against bodily distraction and the 
failure to maintain optimum physical health. For Aristotle, the cause is in an overly cool 
physiology, but the physiological imbalance acts as an impediment to ethical development 
and so must be treated in order to continue in the pursuit of achieving virtue.  
                                               
453 Ar. Sens. 1. 436a17-b1; Resp. 27, 480b22-30. 
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These contributions to ancient thought concerning the experience of these symptoms 
must have been significant among those male members of the intellectual elite who were 
aware of these arguments, recognised the behaviours in themselves, and had the means and 
autonomy to pursue the recommended treatment options.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Before Plato and Aristotle contributed to the discussion on psychological disturbance, an 
Athenian resident who was experiencing the symptoms that DSM-V categorises as 
depression had various options: they could have turned to a physician, appealed to the god 
Asclepius, or paid a mantis or magos in the attempt to find a cure. All offered different 
methods of treatment, but none would have identified the symptoms experienced as related to 
one specific condition. Their treatments ranged from dietary changes and exercise, to magical 
rituals invoking the favour of the gods. With his discussions of psychic illness in Timaeus, 
Plato presents a new model of association between symptoms, in which they could not occur 
independently. He identified these psychological disturbances as being intrinsically 
connected and gave them an origin in the physical realm. By way of treatment, he suggested 
philosophical rigour to strengthen the soul, and then, if absolutely necessary, medical drugs 
to remove the offending humor. Aristotle then developed the notion of multiple psychological 
symptoms being thought of as manifestations of one specific condition, associates them with 
having a cool physiology, and recommended visiting a natural scientist to identify the 
specific cause of this physiological disorder.  
For the ancient sufferer of depression with debilitating symptoms, this distinction 
could have been important for them. Recognising both their emotional and physical ailments 
as interconnected, and to be recommended one course of treatment by well respected, 
educated members of the elite, could have been crucial steps towards feeling that they 
understood and, therefore, could manage their illness. 
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Conclusion 
 
I will begin with a brief summary of the findings of each chapter before going on to discuss 
the contributions of this thesis to the existing scholarship, and how the aims of the thesis have 
been met. 
 
1. Summary of findings 
I began with a justification for the research topic, since it is often suggested that depression is 
a product of post-industrial, urbanised living and the degeneration of the familial network, 
and thus not a condition that would have been experienced by people in ancient Athens. 
Depression is a complex illness that is still poorly understood, but I established that it is 
widely accepted across psychiatric and psychological scholarship that there is a genetic 
element to the condition, and that the rate of inheritance is too high for it to be the result of a 
random genetic error. Furthermore, while it is known that environmental factors and adverse 
life events do play a role in the manifestation of the illness, the studies conducted on the 
Amish population of Pennsylvania, which removed many unquantifiable environmental 
variables, show a similar rate of incidence to the worldwide average. Therefore, I am able to 
state with some certainty that depression would have been experienced by individuals in 
Classical Athens. 
 Having established that the search for recognition of depression in ancient sources is a 
valid exercise, I then presented the definition I would be using for depression. Since 
classifications vary between medical committees, and since the symptomatic categorisations 
change significantly between editions, I decided to use the classification of Major Depressive 
Disorder (MDD) as specified in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual- 5 (2013). This decision 
was made on the basis that DSM provides the most detailed descriptions of the 
manifestations of each symptom, which would be crucial in my lexical searches. 
 Chapter 1: ‘Historical context’ began by considering who out of the Athenian 
populace would be the most likely to recognise their depression as a condition worth seeking 
treatment for, who would be most able to seek treatment, and who would be the most likely 
to develop the condition in the first place. I concluded that recognition would have been 
directly linked to wealth. The wealthier an individual, the more leisure time they would 
enjoy, and the more likely they would be to consider their emotional well-being as worthy of 
concern. Treatment opportunities would be dependent on both wealth and sex. Wealthy men 
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of any status were probably the most able to seek whatever kind of treatment they desired, 
whereas wealthy, high-status, women might have experienced difficulties in receiving 
treatment due to the legal restrictions on how much money they could have in their 
possession, their restricted freedom of movement around the city, and their inability to invite 
male healers into their homes without their kyrios present. Therefore, poor, low-status women 
and wealthy men were probably the least restricted of their sexes in seeking treatment for 
their depression, should they identify their symptoms as requiring treatment.  
I then explored the lived experience of a male Athenian who felt their symptoms of 
depression were debilitating enough to warrant seeking treatment for their disorder and had 
the freedom and means to do so. I examined the surviving evidence for secular physicians, 
temple medicine, and magical healing, in order to show that residents of Athens did 
experience symptoms of psychological disorders, and that they did seek treatment for them.   
For secular healing, the most useful evidence is contained within the Hippocratic 
treatises. Through their descriptions of symptoms such as fear, despondency, delirium, and 
losing one’s wits, it is apparent that physicians acknowledged the existence of diseases with 
psychological symptoms. They also seem to have made a strong association between these 
diseases and an excess of black bile within the body. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that someone experiencing symptoms that DSM-V associates with depression might 
approach a secular physician for treatment, and that the physician would consider these 
symptoms to be within his treatment capabilities. 
Next, I considered temple medicine and specifically the cult of Asclepius. The most 
revealing evidence that survives from the sanctuaries of this healing cult are the large, stone, 
cure tablets recovered from the sanctuary of Asclepius at Epidaurus. These tablets reveal that 
people tended to come to the sanctuary to seek treatment from the god for chronic conditions. 
The surviving tablets do not provide any evidence of symptoms recognisably associated with 
depression, but there is evidence that conditions such as epilepsy, mutism, headaches, and 
insomnia were treated. Since other broadly psychological disorders were supposedly treated 
at the temple, the assumption that symptoms of depression may have been treated seems 
reasonable. 
Finally, I looked at magical healers, specifically manteis and magoi. There is no direct 
written evidence detailing the sorts of illnesses these healers were employed to treat, but 
considering they were thought to have a complex understanding of the gods, and sometimes 
knowledge of potions as well, it is reasonable to conclude that they would have been 
approached by people experiencing symptoms of depression.  
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In Chapter 2: ‘Plato and Aristotle’s cultural inheritance and philosophical responses to 
the ancient healing environment’, I first considered both philosophers’ responses to the 
healing methods discussed in Chapter 1. Both Plato and Aristotle held secular physicians in 
high regard. The secular physicians were elite, intellectual men who were thought to employ 
sound science and logic in their treatments, and so it is unsurprising that both philosophers 
generally present them in a favourable light. However, as a result of their differing theories 
on the cosmos, these two philosophers diverge in their thoughts on temple healing and 
magical healing. 
In his Timaeus Plato includes the anthropomorphic gods in his cosmology and 
appears to suggest that they are able to intervene in the mortal realm. As a result, the kind of 
intervention claimed by the cult of Asclepius, in which the god physically enters the temple 
and performs the treatment on the supplicant himself, would have been unproblematic for 
Plato. However, he is explicit in his contempt for magical healers and seers. He does not 
entirely discredit all diviners, but he is vehemently against the claims that the magoi have the 
ability to manipulate the gods and harness their power. On the other hand, Aristotle presents a 
very different vision in his cosmological descriptions and virtually excludes the traditional, 
anthropomorphic gods. I presented one possible interpretation of how the gods might fit into 
his theory by way of a sub-celestial, sur-mortal realm, but this is by no means definitive. I 
think it unlikely that Aristotle saw the gods as having the ability to intervene in mortal affairs, 
so I do not believe he would have been convinced by the claims of direct divine intervention 
either in Asclepiadic temple medicine or by the magoi. On the other hand, his few references 
to manteis are neutral and unrevealing, but if the gods were able to look favourably upon 
mortals who try to imitate the goodness of the divine, Aristotle might have thought some 
seers were capable of interpreting these signs from the gods.  
For both Plato and Aristotle, their primary point of concern was how to live 
virtuously. Therefore, it is likely that they would display a particular interest in people 
displaying the kinds of abnormal moods and behaviours that manifest with depression. 
Before going on to explore the philosophers’ contributions to the ancient understanding of 
psychological disturbance, I examined their respective theories on virtue. For both 
philosophers the crucial aspect of achieving virtue is balance. For Plato, virtue is the parts of 
the soul co-existing in a balanced internal harmony; for Aristotle, virtue is acting and feeling 
in a proportionate way, neither excessively nor deficiently, thus hitting the mean. The 
depressed person would certainly struggle to achieve this required internal harmony and so 
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we might expect the philosophers to pass comment on the behaviours and psychological 
disturbance exhibited by someone experiencing depression.  
 It is clear from the evidence examined from the works of Plato and Aristotle, that both 
philosophers did recognise features of depression. Their descriptions of the symptoms 
associated with psychological disorders exhibit a strong, positive correlation with DSM-V’s 
classification of Major Depressive Disorder. Furthermore, both philosophers acknowledge 
the tendency for these symptoms to occur together. 
In Chapter 3: ‘Plato’, I examined Plato’s contribution to the ancient understanding of 
psychological disturbance. In his Timaeus, Plato describes the symptoms of psychic diseases, 
and these align with four of the nine DSM-V symptoms, including both key symptoms 
(depressed mood and anhedonia). He associates the pairs of symptoms with particular parts 
of the tripartite soul, and presents a hydraulic symptomatic model, in which four Timaean 
symptoms are exhibited at the same time. This model demonstrates Plato’s recognition that 
the symptoms not only have the tendency to occur together but that they must occur together. 
These conclusions are supported by Plato’s characterisation of Apollodorus in Symposium 
and Phaedo where he appears to embody the Timaean man with a disease in his soul. 
Apollodorus displays problems with his memory and concentration, low self-esteem, 
anhedonia, and while on one day he is irritable, on another he is despondent. 
Plato’s recognition of four of the nine DSM-V symptoms and the acknowledgment 
that they occur together is already a significant contribution to ancient thought on the 
experience of these symptoms, but he takes this further. He describes the origin of psychic 
illness in Timaeus and, ultimately, attributes them to the presence of the physical, bodily 
humors. As the humors invade the space that the soul occupies, they disrupt the revolutions 
of the soul, throwing the soul into disorder, causing it to be distracted from following the 
desires of Reason, thus causing diseases within it. Plato’s conclusion that psychological 
disturbances arise within the soul, but as a result of the body being in an unhealthy condition, 
is an important step towards associating this cluster of symptoms with one specific illness. 
I performed the same exploration in relation to Aristotle’s writings in Chapter 4: 
‘Aristotle’. In a number of passages, Aristotle describes clusters of behavioural and 
emotional abnormalities that display a particularly strong correlation with DSM-V’s 
symptomatic categorisation of depression. In total, he identifies an impressive eight out of 
nine symptoms that DSM-V categorises as depression, and with the strong degree of overlap 
between the symptoms described in different passages, it is clear that he envisaged these 
symptoms as tending to occur together. Furthermore, these descriptions occur solely in 
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relation to women, melancholics, and old men, all of whom share a common trait in their 
bodily condition: they were all thought by Aristotle to have a naturally cool physiology. This 
suggests that Aristotle thought that this specific grouping of symptoms, of which eight agree 
with DSM-V’s nine, was caused by having a particular physiology. These conclusions are 
supported by the discussions of melancholia in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata 30.1. This 
text describes a very similar clustering of symptoms and explicitly attributes them to the cool 
physiology of the melancholic. The author also highlights the similarities in the 
melancholics’ behaviour to that of old men and asserts that it is the cool physiology of both 
types of people that causes their depressive passionate dispositions.  
In Chapter 5: ‘Was philosophy of practical use in treating depression?’ I considered 
how the conclusions of the philosophers may have affected the treatments sought by the 
wealthy, upper-class men of Athenian society who were most likely to have been alert to 
their depressive symptoms in the first place. I first noted that in Timaeus Plato recommends 
philosophical training in the first instance, to strengthen one’s soul against any bodily 
distractions but, if necessary, condones the use of drugs to rid the body of the humor that has 
invaded the locus of the soul. Aristotle is rather more straightforward in his 
recommendations, but less clear on the expected outcome. He simply states that the sufferer 
should see a physiologist. Presumably this physiologist would be able to reveal the cause of 
the symptoms to the sufferer and either provide a treatment himself, or point them in the 
direction of an appropriate physician.   
 
 
2. The contributions of this thesis to existing scholarship  
As discussed in the literature review of the Introduction, the area of research concerned with 
mental disorders in antiquity has been rapidly growing over the last fifty years or so. But 
despite the numerous publications in this field so far, this thesis has provided a new insight 
into the ancient understandings of depression.  
The universality of mental illnesses in the human experience, and the cross-cultural 
application of modern categorisations have been points of strong contention among classical 
scholars, including Pigeaud (1981), Padel (1995), Harris (2013), and Ahonen (2014). In the 
introduction to his 2013 edited volume, Harris asserts that the ancients avoided 
subcategorising specific syndromes, choosing instead to classify groups of disparate 
symptoms as different manifestations of one umbrella illness, such as melancholia or 
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mania.454 Harris uses this argument to explain why his contributors have tended to avoid 
direct comparisons between modern categorisations of specific mental illnesses and the 
descriptions of psychological disturbance found in ancient sources,455 choosing instead to 
focus on the larger questions of the perceived nature of mental illness in antiquity.456 
However, from a wide reading of psychiatric and anthropological studies of field research, I 
have shown, for the first time in classical scholarship, that based on the current scientific 
understandings of the origins and mechanisms of depression, it is reasonable to conclude that 
depression was experienced by individuals in ancient Greece in the same way that it is 
experienced today. Therefore, it is a worthwhile endeavour to look for evidence of 
recognition of this mental disorder in ancient texts. 
The few researchers who have chosen to focus on one condition, rather than general 
ancient conceptions of mental illness, tend to aim to improve our understanding of ancient 
categorisations of melancholy, madness, or insanity. The closest any scholar has come to a 
comparison between depression and the ancient conception of this illness occurs in Radden 
2000 and 2009, where she focuses on the extent to which depression can be equated with 
ancient melancholia. There is no attempt in existing scholarship to identify an ancient 
recognition of depression itself, independent from an association with melancholia. My 
demonstration that some ancient Greek thinkers did recognise depression is the main original 
contribution of my thesis.   
It is clear that the methodology I have employed challenges the views of many of my 
predecessors, especially in relation to universality and the application of modern 
categorisations of illnesses to the ancient world. But, as mentioned in the Introduction, my 
lexical approach to the Platonic and Aristotelian corpora was significantly influenced by 
Thumiger’s methodology in her paper in Harris’ edited volume (2013), ‘The Early Greek 
Medical Vocabulary of Insanity’. This paper, which represents part of the ongoing research 
Thumiger was performing for her 2017 monograph, presents a list of Greek terms for 
‘insanity’, which was then used to develop a broader understanding of what was meant when 
the Hippocratic writers spoke of ‘insanity’.457 I drew on this methodology in my own lexical 
approach. Thumiger uses a list of terms to build a broad picture of the meaning of insanity in 
antiquity, whereas I used almost synonymous terms to gain a more precise understanding of 
                                               
454 Harris 2013, p.1. 
455 The likes of which Harris claims have ‘plagued the study of mental illness in antiquity’ 2013, p.11. 
456 Harris 2013, p.1. 
457 Thumiger 2013, p.61. 
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each symptom I explored. By generating a list of Greek synonyms for the symptoms of 
depression, I was able to identify hundreds of potential references within the Platonic and 
Aristotelian corpora to behaviours and emotions that we now associate with depression. I 
could then search these references for useful passages for further examination.  
The notion that depressive illness simply did not exist in the ancient world and is a 
product of the modern world has been rife in classical scholarly opinion. Toohey (2005) 
offers one of the only direct challenges to this view and believes that the presence of 
evidence in the surviving ancient sources has been misrepresented.458 While I agree with 
Toohey’s overall conclusions that depression existed in the ancient world, the argument he 
presents contains a number of weaknesses that I was keen to avoid in my own study.  
Toohey considers the example of Orestes as presented by Aeschylus’ Oresteia and a 
vase painting by the Eumenides painter (Fig. 5) showing the purification of Orestes and 
argues that these sources show an awareness of someone in the ancient world experiencing 
depression without an identifiable causal life event:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Apuleian Red-figure Bell Krater. Eumenides Painter. 4th century B.C. The Louvre. 
The Purification of Orestes in Delphi. 
 
                                               
458 Toohey 2004, p.26. 
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Toohey argues that because a vase painting cannot depict a whole story, but rather only a 
single moment in time, we cannot assume from this single image that the forlorn looking 
Orestes is brooding over the murder of his mother. He thinks that we might choose to 
interpret the image in this way, but that the vase does not and cannot actually tell us that this 
is the correct interpretation. Therefore, Toohey maintains that the image might equally be 
interpreted as evidence for an ancient understanding of depressed states without a cause. 
While I welcomed Toohey’s attempts to overturn the opinions regarding depression in the 
ancient world that had dominated previous scholarship, I noticed that his argument was 
vulnerable on three fronts.  
First, I do not believe his chosen evidence for the existence of depressive conditions 
in the ancient world is as irrefutable as he believes it to be. Perhaps if the image on the vase 
showed an unidentified young man sitting alone, without a weapon in hand, looking 
relatively sorrowful, the argument might have some weight. But the painter has gone to great 
lengths to ensure his audience knows exactly who this young man is, and because of this, we 
know he has more reason than most to look so despondent.  The inclusion of the sacrificial 
pig being held up by Apollo and the sleeping Furies being roused by the ghost of 
Clytaemnestra is more than enough to identify this young man as the Orestes from the 
beginning of Aeschylus’ Eumenides, composed fifty years before this vase was painted.459  In 
the play, Orestes is hounded by the Furies in response to the murder of his mother, 
Clytaemnestra, and has fled to the sanctuary of Apollo to seek purification. Unable to 
perform the purification, Apollo makes the Furies drowsy to allow Orestes to escape to 
Athens. In this image, the ghost of Clytaemnestra is rousing the Furies from their sleep. It is 
undoubtedly Orestes being depicted and by including the image of the unfulfilled purification 
and the Furies being awoken by the ghost of Clytaemnestra, the audience can easily imagine 
why Orestes might look sorrowful. He is probably conflicted about the justification of the 
matricide he has performed, especially now that Apollo is unable to purify him and, in the 
meantime, he is destined to be hounded by the Furies for his crime. This surely cannot be 
described as a depiction of sorrow without a cause. The Eumenides painter, in my opinion, 
has made it very clear to the viewer why Orestes is looking so sorrowful.  
Second, Toohey fails to acknowledge many of the issues of the tragic genre. He 
attempts to diagnose Aeschylus’ character Orestes, as if the plays were non-fiction, historical 
                                               
459 The pig is mentioned at Aesch. Eum. 284 and 450, and Clytaemnestra rouses the Furies from their 
sleep at 94-139. 
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sources instead of a fictional characterisation used to display the variable nature and 
fallibility of humans,460 a characterisation that is deliberately fabricated in order to lend 
dramatic uncertainty to the plays. I am not suggesting that Aeschylus could not have intended 
to present Orestes as a depressive character type, but that Toohey, by not passing comment 
on the potential problems of the source material, and by only using one example, has made 
his conclusions less convincing. 
Third, Toohey’s linguistic imprecision is problematic. He presents this argument as a 
refutation of Padel’s position in Whom Gods Destroy (1995), that all melancholia before the 
eighteenth century was mad and that depressive melancholy did not appear until after this 
time.461 Toohey’s aim is to show that, contrary to popular scholarly beliefs at the time in 
2004, the condition of being depressed was recognised in antiquity. However, throughout this 
book, Toohey freely and interchangeably uses the terms ‘depression’, ‘depressed’, 
‘depressive’, and other related words, but he does not establish at any point whether he is 
referring to clinical depression, or if he is just using these terms to mean feeling sad for a 
long period of time.  
After recognising these three issues with Toohey’s argument, I have aimed to avoid 
falling foul of the same criticisms in this thesis. First, I have been careful not to ignore the 
context of statements. Although the lexical searches were used to identify relevant passages, I 
read the works cited in their entirety to ensure I did not overlook important contextual points. 
Second, I have been careful to consider the genres of my source material, and this was 
particularly important when examining the Platonic dialogues. It is crucial to remember that 
Plato is presenting characters, and possibly even caricatures, and we cannot know how far 
these are representative of the actual people they are based upon. Plato’s characterisations 
have a very particular purpose within his dialogues, and so we cannot say with any certainty 
that these character types represent the personalities of real people.  Third, I have been 
precise with my terminology throughout, differentiating Major Depressive Disorder (also 
called ‘clinical depression’, ‘depression’, and ‘depressive illness’) from the more general 
‘depressive disorders’, and keeping both clearly demarcated from the experience of feeling 
despondent or depressed, which may or may not be symptomatic of a clinical disorder. 
Through these methods, I have arrived at similar overall conclusions as Toohey, while 
avoiding the same weaknesses in my argumentation. 
                                               
460 Toohey 2004 p.23.  
461 Padel 1995 p.53-9, 224-7; Toohey 2004 p.26. 
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In terms of general contributions to the field, based on my wide reading of the 
evidence available from psychiatric studies, I presented an argument in favour of the 
universality of clinical depression - that we can reasonably assume that depression was 
experienced by people in the ancient world with a similar rate of incidence as today. 
Therefore, for the first time, I applied DSM-V’s categorisation of symptoms of depression to 
ancient descriptions of psychological disturbance. As a result, this thesis offers a precise 
account of the recognition of clinical depression in the Hippocratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian 
corpora, unlike any study currently available, and by approaching the disease from the 
symptomatic descriptions provided by DSM-V and comparing these descriptions to those in 
ancient texts, I do not blur the lines between feeling depressed and actual clinical depression.  
Furthermore, this thesis is unique in its extended focus on depression within the 
works of Plato and Aristotle. Since studies of depressive disorders in the ancient world tend 
to associate depression with melancholia, the primary bank of source material has been the 
Hippocratic corpus and other medical texts. On occasion, the Pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata 
30.1 is included in the collection of relevant medical source material (for example, Radden 
2000, Chapter 1) but the Platonic dialogues and undisputed Aristotelian corpus remain 
largely excluded, except from an occasional passing comment.462 My focus on these 
philosophers enriches the existing picture of the lived experience of depressive disorders, by 
providing a new perspective on the ancient recognition of depression, the perceived origins of 
this disorder, and the various treatments available for someone experiencing the associated 
symptoms.  
 
 
3. Coda  
Overall, I have shown that Plato and Aristotle made significant contributions to ancient 
thought on the symptoms now categorised as depression by DSM-V. The two main aims of 
this thesis were: first, to show that there are positive correlations between a modern 
categorisation of depression and Plato and Aristotle’s descriptions of the manifestations of 
psychological disturbance; and second, to show that both philosophers identify the tendency 
for these symptoms to occur together, thus recognising this cluster of symptoms as a specific 
illness or condition. 
                                               
462 Thumiger 2017 p.20 
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From my examinations of Timaeus 86b1-87a9, where Plato discusses psychic 
disturbance, and the characterisation of Apollodorus in Phaedo and Symposium, I showed 
that Plato identifies four out of the nine symptoms of depression as categorised by DSM-V: 
depressed mood, anhedonia, low self-esteem, and impaired thinking/concentration. I then 
argued that Plato envisaged each symptom in the pairs associated with Spirit and Appetites as 
only capable of manifesting one at a time, depending on whether that part was experiencing 
an excess or deficiency, while the two symptoms associated with a deficiency of Reason 
would always be present while the soul was diseased. So, with the exception of forgetfulness 
and stupidity, the two symptoms in a pair cannot co-exist, but Plato presents a hydraulic 
model between pairs of symptoms. The excessive satisfaction or neglect of the desires of one 
part of the soul necessarily results in a change to the satisfaction of the desires of the other 
two parts, i.e. if one part, e.g. Spirit, is experiencing excessive satisfaction, the other two, 
Reason and Appetites, experience neglect. This results in a symptomatic model which 
requires four symptoms to occur together. Therefore, Plato identifies four of DSM-V’s 
symptoms of depression, and then recognises that these symptoms occur together. This shows 
a positive symptomatic correlation with depression as categorised by DSM-V, and that Plato 
identified that these symptoms as representative of one specific illness.  
Through Aristotle’s descriptions of the passionate tendencies of melancholics, 
women, and old men specifically, he identifies eight out of the nine DSM-V symptoms of 
depression, which shows impressive insight. The considerable degree of overlap of symptoms 
between the groups shows that Aristotle recognised their tendency to occur together. 
Furthermore, Aristotle saw the passionate tendencies of these groups of people to be a result 
of their naturally cool physiology, which suggests that he also associated these symptoms 
with one specific bodily condition. 
 The recognition that these moods, physical changes, and behaviours, which had been 
previously thought of as disparate, should in fact be considered as symptomatic 
manifestations of one condition could have had a significant effect on the lived experience of 
depression to Plato and Aristotle’s contemporary audience, especially in relation to the 
treatment they may have sought. While both philosophers seem to recommend visiting a 
physician463 to address the physiological imbalance, Plato’s explicit recommendation of 
philosophic discussion to strengthen the soul was a new method of treatment for these 
psychological disturbances. It seems likely that Aristotle would have also supported this 
                                               
463 This is a last resort for Plato and Aristotle is less explicit. 
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approach. The suggestion of introspective reflection as a treatment for symptoms that 
correlate well with DSM-V’s categorisation of depression is reminiscent of the variety of 
talking therapies that are commonly recommended today; some of which, are reported as 
yielding excellent results. So, alongside the intellectual contributions both philosophers made 
in this area of ancient thought, they may have also provided effective practical advice for any 
of their audience members who recognised these tendencies in their own behaviours.  
 My study has implications for modern scholarship, since it offers convincing new 
evidence, against the skeptics, that depression was experienced in antiquity, and that there 
were individuals from the elite, intellectual circles of Athens who were alert to the tendency 
for these symptoms to manifest together. I hope that the observations of this thesis and the 
arguments presented will inspire future study into this important area of historical, cultural, 
and philosophical research which deserves further intensive discussion.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
Since The Nature of Man provides us with the clearest and most comprehensive description 
of the functioning of the humors within the body, it would be tempting to think of this as 
laying out the Hippocratic theory regarding the composition of the body and the cause of 
disease. However, the author himself alludes to variant theories that exist amongst fellow 
physicians; physicians that may or may not have been trained in the Hippocratic method, this 
information is not divulged. The author claims that most physicians believe man to be made 
of just one of the humors rather than a set combination of all four and that it is qualitative 
changes to this one humor that causes disease.464 He goes on to say that he has spotted a 
potential flaw with this reasoning and so will offer an alternative argument.465 The author 
himself acknowledges that his argument is a new way of thinking about bodily composition 
and disease that differs from what was believed and taught by most physicians currently. So, 
even if this argument were considered highly convincing, it would still take time for this to 
infiltrate established practice and become the new theory accepted by most physicians. Being 
unable to precisely date the emergence of this text, it is difficult to predict how widely 
accepted this new theory would have been at the time of Plato and Aristotle. Knowledge of 
the author could help with these problems of both estimating a date of publication and the 
extent to which established physicians were likely to take the arguments made seriously, but 
as with all Hippocratic treatises, authorship is contentious. 
The most popular contender in antiquity for authorial credit of this treatise was 
Polybus. This is attested by Aristotle in History of Animals III.3, 512b13-513a8, the 
Anonymus Londinensis papyrus 19.21 and Galen confirms that Polybus was still credited 
with authorship in his time.466 If this is the case, then we might assume that this text came 
into circulation anytime between about 380 B.C. (although it is unlikely to be this early based 
on a birth date of around 400 B.C.)467 and at least by the time Aristotle wrote History of 
Animals (i.e. before his death in 322 B.C.). Since we cannot date the text any more precisely 
than this, all we can say is that Plato may or may not have lived through its publication, and 
                                               
464 Hipp. Nature of Man 2. 
465 Hipp. Nature of Man 2. 
466 Gal. Hipp. On the Nature of Man 11-13. In fact, Galen expresses that he thinks that crediting 
Polybus is too cautious. He believes Hippocrates himself to be the author, and Anonymus Londinensis 
7.15 agrees. 
467 Lonie 1981, p.55. 
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Aristotle certainly did. However, I would argue that in light of the similarities found in 
Plato’s humoral theory presented in Timaeus, discussed above, it seems likely that he was 
familiar with the work. If Polybus were truly the author, then it would seem likely that his 
theory would have been taken very seriously and adopted by practicing Hippocratic 
physicians relatively quickly. Some believed him to be the son-in-law of Hippocrates himself 
and Joly points out that the use of only his name without any indication of his origin is a sure 
sign of his notoriety.468 But even if we doubt authorial authenticity,469 the fact remains that, 
by the time of Aristotle, this text was significant and current enough to warrant lengthy 
quotation in his lectures.470 Furthermore, there is some textual indication to suggest that this 
theory may have been adopted by other Hippocratic authors. In On Generation 4, Epidemics 
6.2. and 6.6 and throughout On Humors the authors assume humoral composition of the body 
and humoral imbalance to be the cause of disease. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
By the mean relative to us [I mean] that which is neither too much nor too little- and 
this is not one, nor the same for everyone.471 
(Arist. EN. 2.6. 1106a31-2) 
 
This statement detailing what is meant by the mean, could be, and by many scholars has 
been, taken to suggest that the mean is relative to the individual, but I believe this is 
problematic and a textual misinterpretation.472 In support of the interpretation for 
individualism, Aristotle’s discussion of the champion athlete, Milo, and a novice is often 
cited in which he claims that six pounds of food is likely to be too little for Milo, but too 
much for the beginner.473 The passage in question reads as follows: 
                                               
468 Joly 1980 p.39. 
469 As Smith 1979 p.220 does.  
470 Jouanna 1975, p.55. 
471 I have made my own amendments to Ross’ translations here for clarity. He uses ‘intermediate’ 
instead of the mean and ‘all’ instead of everyone or everybody.  
472 Hardie 1968, p.135; Kraut 2014; Leighton 1995, p.67-78; Lloyd 1968, p.76,82; Sherman 1989, 
p.37.  
473 Arist. EN. 2.6.1106a32-b4. 
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‘For example, let 10 be many and 2 few; then one takes the mean with respect to the 
thing if one takes 6; since 6-2=10-6, and this is the mean according to arithmetical 
proportion. But we cannot arrive by this method at the mean relative to us. Suppose 
that 10lb. of food is a large ration for anybody and 2lb. a small one: it does not follow 
that a trainer will prescribe 6lb., for perhaps even this will be a large ration, or a small 
one, for the particular athlete who is to receive it; it is a small ration for a Milo, but a 
large one for a man just beginning to go in for athletics. And similarly with the 
amount of running or wrestling exercise to be taken. In the same way then an expert 
in any art avoids excess and deficiency and seeks and adopts the mean- the mean, that 
is, not of the thing but relative to us.’  
(Arist. EN. 2.6. 1106a33-b7) 
 
 
This analogy has been interpreted as showing that the appropriate mean will differ between 
individuals. Leighton has argued that the athletes, as they differ in their athletic development, 
are intended to portray individuals at different stages of their moral development. 474 
Therefore, it would seem that the mean is broader for novices, and becomes narrower and, 
thus, harder to hit as the agent’s moral character becomes more developed. Brown rejects this 
interpretation and I agree that this is not compatible with Aristotle’s conception of virtue.475 
Arete is the quality possessed by the agent who performs all activities of the soul virtuously 
(i.e. hit the mean) all the time, and in the way a virtuous agent would perform them. This 
excellence is not relative to the stage you are at, it is the ultimate goal you are aiming for. A 
novice cannot achieve a lesser form of arete which allows for his short-comings due to the 
fact he is not as morally developed. By displaying these shortcomings, he is by definition not 
virtuous and there is no indication given by Aristotle that as one gets more experience in 
trying to hit the mean, the narrow the target becomes. There is one mean and hitting this 
particular mean is one of the necessary conditions for achieving virtue.  
I struggle to see how Aristotle could have intended to suggest there is an 
individualised mean. If the mean is specific to each of us as individuals then surely the 
normative force of the concept disintegrates. If the mean for you, where you are a virtuous 
                                               
474 Leighton 1992, p.55. 
475 Brown 1997, p.82. 
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agent who I wish to emulate, will never be the same as the mean for me, then how can I hope 
to learn from your example and hit the mean myself? Without any external reference points 
or guides, how will I know if and when I have actually hit the mean so that I can reproduce 
my actions in future similar situations? This seems to directly contradict Aristotle’s 
suggestion that we look to the man of practical wisdom for guidance on how to achieve virtue 
and seems to render Aristotle’s guidelines and examples within the Nicomachean Ethics 
useless. 476 Granted, he does admit that it is a general outline rather than an absolute step-by-
step, one size fits all, guide to achieving virtue,477 but if hitting the mean is going to be 
different for everyone, based on their emotional tendencies, or anything else about them, 
even general guidelines are likely to be completely unhelpful. It could be argued instead that 
Aristotle is referring to a mean relative to social status rather than us all as individuals. This 
is supported by his argument in Politics 1260a20: 
 
‘It is clear that there is excellence of character for all the above-mentioned [viz. ruler, 
ruled, male, female, child, slave], and temperance is not the same for a man as it is for 
a woman, nor is bravery or justice, as Socrates thought, but the one bravery is of a 
commanding sort, the other of a subordinate kind; and the same in the other 
excellences.’ 
(Arist. Pol. 1.13.1260a20.) 
 
Brown accepts the plausibility of this line of enquiry but is hesitant to insert arguments from 
Aristotle’s political works directly into his ethical treatises. Her reasoning for this, which I 
find valid, is that while Politics is concerned with the harmonisation of the roles of every 
member of a community in order to ensure its success, the ethical treatises are directed at 
individual improvement. 478 Specifically the kind of individual who would be likely to attend, 
and attempt to live by, Aristotle’s lectures; the mature, well-educated, well-born, male, 
Athenian citizen.479 Therefore, the suggestion that Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics is 
referring to a mean relative to one’s social position and so his audience will have to judge for 
themselves, based on their own station in life, is not compatible with the audience he would 
have been addressing in his lectures. All (or maybe it is safer to say a vast majority) of the 
                                               
476 Arist. EN. 2.6.1106b36-7a2. 
477 Arist. EN. 2.2.1104a1-2. 
478 Brown 1997, p.85. 
479 Arist. EN. 1.3.1095a2-3; 1.4.1095b3-6. 
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men in attendance would have considered themselves virtually equal in class and position,480 
with superiority likely based predominantly on age, and so to be told they must work out the 
mean for themselves based on social standing would surely have been unsatisfactory; the 
mean would still be the same for them all, so why could Aristotle not just tell them the 
parameters?    
Where Aristotle’s followers would have differed from one another, however, would 
have been in their political roles from year to year. Such responsibilities would likely alter 
the mean appropriate for the duration of the year holding political office. This notion of the 
mean changing depending on the role or job of an individual at any particular time seems to 
be compatible with Brown’s alternative interpretation of the Milo-Novice analogy, which I 
find more convincing. She suggests that rather than the athletes being viewed as the agents 
either having achieved virtue (Milo) or looking to begin on their journey to virtue (the 
novice), it is instead the trainer that should be interpreted as the agent. In this way, the trainer 
needs to have the skill and the practical wisdom to interpret what the appropriate amount of 
food is for particular athletes at different stages of their athletic development, or in other 
words, the agent needs to be able to judge the mean appropriately for different situations.481 
This interpretation renders the mean situationally dependent, which is far more compatible 
with Aristotle’s assertions within Nicomachean Ethics regarding how to achieve virtue and 
avoids the problematic inferences of individual relativity. Aristotle claims that the only way 
to achieve a virtuous mean is to ensure the passion or action is felt or performed ‘at the right 
times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, for the right aim and in the 
right way’482 and failure in any one of these criteria results in failing to achieve the virtue. 
This statement refers to the situation in which a passion or action would occur and so would 
support the notion of relativism on the basis of situation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
480 Pomeroy 1997, p.3 
481 Brown 1997, p.87-8. 
482 Arist. EN. 2.6. 1106b21-22. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Problemata 30.1: 
 
Διὰ τί πάντες ὅσοι περιττοὶ γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες ἢ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν ἢ ποίησιν ἢ 
τέχνας φαίνονται µελαγχολικοὶ ὄντες, καὶ οἱ µὲν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ λαµβάνεσθαι τοῖς ἀπὸ 
µελαίνης χολῆς ἀρρωστήµασιν, οἷον λέγεται τῶν [τε] ἡρωϊκῶν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα; καὶ γὰρ 
ἐκεῖνος ἔοικε γενέσθαι ταύτης τῆς φύσεως, διὸ καὶ τὰ ἀρρωστήµατα τῶν ἐπιληπτικῶν ἀπ᾿ 
ἐκείνου προσηγόρευον οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἱερὰν νόσον. καὶ ἡ περὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ πρὸ τῆς 
ἀφανίσεως ἐν Οἴτῃ τῶν ἑλκῶν ἔκφυσις γενοµένη τοῦτο δηλοῖ· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο γίνεται πολλοῖς 
ἀπὸ µελαίνης χολῆς. συνέβη δὲ καὶ Λυσάνδρῳ τῷ Λάκωνι πρὸ τῆς τελευτῆς γενέσθαι τὰ 
ἕλκη ταῦτα. ἔτι δὲ τὰ περὶΑἴαντα καὶ Βελλεροφόντην, ὧν ὁ µὲν ἐκστατικὸς ἐγένετο 
παντελῶς, ὁ δὲ τὰς ἐρηµίας ἐδίωκεν, διὸ οὕτως ἐποίησεν Ὅµηρος  
 
“αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ καὶ κεῖνος ἀπήχθετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, 
ἤτοι ὁ κὰπ πεδίον τὸ Ἀλήϊον οἶος ἀλᾶτο 
ὃν | θυµὸν κατέδων, πάτον ἀνθρώπων ἀλεείνων.”  
 
καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἡρώων ὁµοιοπαθεῖς φαίνονται τούτοις. τῶν δὲ ὕστερον Ἐµπεδοκλῆς 
καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ ἕτεροι συχνοὶ τῶν γνωρίµων. ἔτι δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν ποίησιν οἱ 
πλεῖστοι. πολλοῖς µὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων γίνεται νοσήµατα ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης κράσεως τῷ 
σώµατι, τοῖς δὲ ἡ φύσις δήλη ῥέπουσα πρὸς τὰ πάθη. πάντες δ᾿ οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς εἰσί, 
καθάπερ ἐλέχθη, τοιοῦτοι τὴν φύσιν. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν πρῶτον ἐπὶ παραδείγµατος 
προχειρισαµένους. ὁ γὰρ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς µάλιστα φαίνεται παρασκευάζειν τοιούτους οἵους 
λέγοµεν τοὺς µελαγχολικοὺς εἶναι, καὶ πλεῖστα ἤθη ποιεῖν πινόµενος, οἷον ὀργίλους, 
φιλανθρώπους, ἐλεήµονας, ἰταµούς· ἀλλ᾿ οὐχὶ τὸ µέλι οὐδὲ τὸ γάλα οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ οὐδ᾿ ἄλλο 
τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ἴδοι δ᾿ ἄν τις ὅτι παντοδαποὺς ἀπεργάζεται, θεωρῶν ὡς µεταβάλλει 
τοὺς πίνοντας ἐκ προσαγωγῆς· παραλαβὼν γὰρ ἀπεψυγµένους ἐν τῷ νήφειν καὶ σιωπηλοὺς 
µικρῷ µὲν πλείων ποθεὶς λαλιστέρους ποιεῖ, ἔτι δὲ πλείων ῥητορικοὺς καὶ θαρραλέους, 
προϊόντας δὲ πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ἰταµούς, ἔτι δὲ µᾶλλον πινόµενος ὑβριστάς, ἔπειτα µανικούς, 
λίαν δὲ πολὺς ἐκλύει καὶ ποιεῖ µωρούς, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐκ παίδων ἐπιλήπτους, ἢ καὶ ἐχοµένους 
τοῖς µελαγχολικοῖς ἄγαν. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ εἷς ἄνθρωπος µεταβάλλει τὸ ἦθος πίνων καὶ χρώµενος 
τῷ οἴνῳ ποσῷ τινί, οὕτω καθ᾿ ἕκαστον τὸ ἦθος εἰσί τινες ἄνθρωποι. οἷος γὰρ οὗτος µεθύων 
νῦν ἐστίν, ἄλλος τις τοιοῦτος φύσει ἐστίν, ὁ µὲν λάλος, ὁ δὲ κεκινηµένος, ὁ δὲ ἀρίδακρυς· 
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ποιεῖ γάρ τινας καὶ τοιούτους, διὸ καὶ Ὅµηρος ἐποίησε “καί µέ φησι δάκρυ πλώειν 
βεβαρηµένον οἴνῳ.” καὶ γὰρ ἐλεήµονές ποτε γίνονται καὶ ἄγριοι καὶ σιωπηλοί· ἔνιοι γὰρ αὖ 
ἀποσιωπῶσι, καὶ µάλιστα τῶν µελαγχολικῶν ὅσοι ἐκστατικοί. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ φιλητικοὺς ὁ 
οἶνος· σηµεῖον δὲ ὅτι προάγεται ὁ πίνων καὶ τῷ στόµατι φιλεῖν, οὓς νήφων οὐδ᾿ ἂν εἷς 
φιλήσειεν ἢ διὰ τὸ εἶδος ἢ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. ὁ µὲν οὖν οἶνος οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ποιεῖ περιττόν, 
ἀλλ᾿ ὀλίγον, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀεί, ἕως τις ἂν ᾖ· οἱ µὲν γὰρ θρασεῖς, οἱ δὲ σιωπηλοί, οἱ δὲ 
ἐλεήµονες, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται φύσει. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ὅ τε οἶνος καὶ ἡ 
φύσις ἑκάστου τὸ ἦθος· πάντα γὰρ κατεργάζεται τῇ θερµότητι ταµιευόµενα. ὅ τε δὴ χυµὸς 
καὶ ἡ κρᾶσις ἡ τῆς µελαίνης καὶ τὰ ὑποχόνδρια µελαγχολικὰ οἱ ἰατροί φασιν εἶναι. καὶ ὁ 
οἶνος δὲ πνευµατώδης τὴν δύναµιν. διὸ δή ἐστι τὴν φύσιν ὅµοια ὅ τε οἶνος καὶ ἡ κρᾶσις. 
δηλοῖ δὲ ὅτι πνευµατώδης ὁ οἶνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀφρός· τὸ µὲν γὰρ ἔλαιον θερµὸν ὂν οὐ ποιεῖ 
ἀφρόν, ὁ δὲ οἶνος πολύν, καὶ µᾶλλον ὁ µέλας τοῦ λευκοῦ, ὅτι θερµότερος καὶ 
σωµατωδέστερος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅ τε οἶνος ἀφροδισιαστικοὺς ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ὀρθῶς 
Διόνυσος καὶ Ἀφροδίτη λέγονται µετ᾿ ἀλλήλων εἶναι, καὶ οἱ µελαγχολικοὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι λάγνοι 
εἰσίν. ὅ τε γὰρ ἀφροδισιασµὸς πνευµατώδης. σηµεῖον δὲ τὸ αἰδοῖον, ὡς ἐκ µικροῦ ταχεῖαν 
ποιεῖται τὴν αὔξησιν διὰ τὸ ἐµφυσᾶσθαι. καὶ ἔτι πρὶν δύνασθαι προΐεσθαι σπέρµα, γίνεταί τις 
ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ παισὶν οὖσιν, ὅταν ἐγγὺς ὄντες τοῦ ἡβᾶν ξύωνται τὰ αἰδοῖα δι᾿ ἀκολασίαν· γίνεται 
δὲ δῆλον διὰ τὸ πνεῦµα διεξιέναι διὰ τῶν πόρων, δι᾿ ὧν ὕστερον τὸ ὑγρὸν φέρεται. ἥ τε 
ἔκχυσις τοῦ σπέρµατος ἐν ταῖς ὁµιλίαις καὶ ἡ ῥῖψις ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύµατος ὠθοῦντος 
φανερὸν γίνεσθαι.7 ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἐδεσµάτων καὶ ποτῶν εὐλόγως ταῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν 
ἀφροδισιαστικά, ὅσα πνευµατώδη τὸν περὶ τὰ αἰδοῖα ποιεῖ τόπον. διὸ καὶ ὁ µέλας οἶνος 
οὐδενὸς ἧττον τοιούτους ἀπεργάζεται, οἷοι καὶ οἱ µελαγχολικοὶ, πνευµατώδεις. δῆλοι δ᾿ εἰσὶν 
ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων· σκληφροὶ γὰρ οἱ πλείους τῶν µελαγχολικῶν, καὶ αἱ φλέβες ἐξέχουσιν· τούτου δ᾿ 
αἴτιον οὐ τὸ τοῦ αἵµατος πλῆθος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πνεύµατος. διότι δὲ οὐδὲ πάντες οἱ µελαγχολικοὶ 
σκληφροὶ οὐδὲ µέλανες, ἀλλ᾿ οἱ µᾶλλον κακόχυµοι, ἄλλος λόγος. περὶ οὗ δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς 
προειλόµεθα διελθεῖν, ὅτι ἐν τῇ φύσει εὐθὺς ὁ τοιοῦτος χυµὸς ὁ µελαγχολικὸς κεράννυται· 
θερµοῦ γὰρ καὶ ψυχροῦ κρᾶσίς ἐστιν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ τῶν δυοῖν ἡ φύσις συνέστηκεν. διὸ καὶ 
ἡ µέλαινα χολὴ καὶ θερµότατον καὶ ψυχρότατον γίνεται. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ πάσχειν πέφυκε ταῦτ᾿ 
ἄµφω, οἷον καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ὂν ψυχρόν, ὅµως ἐὰν ἱκανῶς θερµανθῇ, οἷον τὸ ζέον, τῆς φλογὸς 
αὐτῆς θερµότερόν ἐστι, καὶ λίθος καὶ σίδηρος διάπυρα γενόµενα µᾶλλον θερµὰ γίνεται 
ἄνθρακος, ψυχρὰ ὄντα φύσει. εἴρηται δὲ σαφέστερον περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς περὶ πυρός. ‘καὶ ἡ 
χολὴ δὲ ἡ µέλαινα φύσει ψυχρὰ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιπολαίως οὖσα, ὅταν µὲν οὕτως ἔχῃ ὡς εἴρηται, 
ἐὰν ὑπερβάλλῃ ἐν τῷ σώµατι, ἀποπληξίας ἢ νάρκας ἢ ἀθυµίας ποιεῖ ἢ φόβους, ἐὰν δὲ 
ὑπερθερµανθῇ, τὰς µετ᾿ᾠδῆς εὐθυµίας καὶ ἐκστάσεις καὶ ἐκζέσεις ἑλκῶν καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.’ 
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τοῖς µὲν οὖν πολλοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς καθ᾿ ἡµέραν τροφῆς ἐγγινοµένη οὐδὲν τὸ ἦθος ποιεῖ 
διαφόρους, ἀλλὰ µόνον νόσηµά τι µελαγχολικὸν ἀπειργάσατο. ὅσοις δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει συνέστη 
κρᾶσις τοιαύτη, εὐθὺς οὗτοι τὰ ἤθη γίνονται παντοδαποί, ἄλλος κατ᾿ ἄλλην κρᾶσιν· οἷον 
ὅσοις µὲν πολλὴ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐνυπάρχει, νωθροὶ καὶ µωροί, ὅσοις δὲ λίαν πολλὴ καὶ θερµή, 
µανικοὶ καὶ εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ καὶ εὐκίνητοι πρὸς τοὺς θυµοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυµίας, ἔνιοι δὲ 
καὶ λάλοι µᾶλλον. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς εἶναι τοῦ νοεροῦ τόπου τὴν θερµότητα ταύτην 
νοσήµασιν ἁλίσκονται µανικοῖς ἢ ἐνθουσιαστικοῖς, ὅθεν Σίβυλλαι καὶ Βάκιδες καὶ οἱ ἔνθεοι 
γίνονται πάντες, ὅταν µὴ νοσήµατι γένωνται ἀλλὰ φυσικῇ κράσει. Μαρακὸς δὲ ὁ 
Συρακούσιος καὶ ἀµείνων ἦν ποιητής, ὅτ᾿ ἐκσταίη. ὅσοις δ᾿ ἂν ἐπανεθῇ τὴν ἄγαν θερµότητα 
πρὸς τὸ µέσον, οὗτοι µελαγχολικοὶ µέν εἰσι, φρονιµώτεροι δέ, καὶ ἧττον µὲν ἔκτοποι, πρὸς 
πολλὰ δὲ διαφέροντες τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ µὲν πρὸς παιδείαν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τέχνας, οἱ δὲ πρὸς 
πολιτείαν. πολλὴν δὲ καὶ εἰς τοὺς κινδύνους ποιεῖ διαφορὰν ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις τοῦ ἐνίοτε 
ἀνωµάλους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς φόβοις πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν. ὡς γὰρ ἂν τύχωσι τὸ σῶµα ἔχοντες 
πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην κρᾶσιν, διαφέρουσιν αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν. ἡ δὲ µελαγχολικὴ κρᾶσις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν 
ταῖς νόσοις ἀνωµάλους ποιεῖ, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ ἀνώµαλός ἐστιν· ὁτὲ µὲν γὰρ ψυχρά ἐστιν 
ὥσπερ ὕδωρ, ὁτὲ δὲ θερµή. ὥστε φοβερόν τι ὅταν εἰσαγγελθῇ, ἐὰν µὲν ψυχροτέρας οὔσης 
τῆς κράσεως τύχῃ, δειλὸν ποιεῖ· προωδοπεποίηκε γὰρ τῷ φόβῳ, καὶ ὁ φόβος καταψύχει. 
δηλοῦσι δὲ οἱ περίφοβοι· τρέµουσι γάρ. ἐὰν δὲ µᾶλλον θερµή, εἰς τὸ µέτριον κατέστησεν ὁ 
φόβος, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπαθῆ. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ᾿ ἡµέραν ἀθυµίας· πολλάκις γὰρ 
οὕτως ἔχοµεν ὥστε λυπεῖσθαι, ἐφ᾿ ὅτῳ δέ, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιµεν εἰπεῖν· ὁτὲ δὲ εὐθύµως, ἐφ᾿ ᾧ δέ, 
οὐ δῆλον. τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πάθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιπόλαια λεχθέντα κατὰ µέν τι µικρὸν πᾶσι γίνεται· 
πᾶσι γὰρ µέµικταί τι τῆς δυνάµεως· ὅσοις δ᾿εἰς βάθος, οὗτοι δ᾿ ἤδη ποιοί τινές εἰσι τὰ ἤθη. 
ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ εἶδος ἕτεροι γίνονται οὐ τῷ πρόσωπον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ποιόν τι τὸ πρόσωπον, οἱ 
µὲν καλόν, οἱ δὲ αἰσχρόν, οἱ δὲ µηθὲν ἔχοντες περιττόν, οὗτοι δὲ µέσοι τὴν φύσιν, οὕτω καὶ 
οἱ µὲν µικρὰ µετέχοντες τῆς τοιαύτης κράσεως µέσοι εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη ἀνόµοιοι τοῖς 
πολλοῖς. ἐὰν µὲν γὰρ σφόδρα κατακορὴς ᾖ ἡ ἕξις, µελαγχολικοί εἰσι λίαν, ἐὰν δέ πως 
κραθῶσι, περιττοί. ῥέπουσι δ᾿, ἂν ἀµελῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὰ µελαγχολικὰ νοσήµατα, ἄλλοι περὶ ἄλλο 
µέρος τοῦ σώµατος·  καὶ τοῖς µὲν ἐπιληπτικὰ ἀποσηµαίνει, τοῖς δὲ ἀποπληκτικά, ἄλλοις δὲ 
ἀθυµίαι ἰσχυραὶ ἢ φόβοι, τοῖς δὲ θάρρη λίαν, οἷον καὶ Ἀρχελάῳ συνέβαινε τῷ Μακεδονίας 
βασιλεῖ. αἴτιον δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάµεως ἡ κρᾶσις, ὅπως ἂν ἔχῃ ψύξεώς τε καὶ θερµότητος. 
ψυχροτέρα µὲν γὰρ οὖσα τοῦ καιροῦ δυσθυµίας ποιεῖ ἀλόγους· διὸ αἵ τ᾿ ἀγχόναι µάλιστα 
τοῖς νέοις, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ πρεσβυτέροις. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ µετὰ τὰς µέθας διαφθείρουσιν ἑαυτούς. 
ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν µελαγχολικῶν ἐκ τῶν πότων ἀθύµως διάγουσιν· σβέννυσι γὰρ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου 
θερµότης τὴν φυσικὴν θερµότητα. τὸ δὲ θερµὸν τὸ περὶ τὸν τόπον ᾧ φρονοῦµεν καὶ 
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ἐλπίζοµεν ποιεῖ εὐθύµους. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς µέθην πάντες ἔχουσι προθύµως, 
ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς εὐέλπιδας ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας· τὸ µὲν γὰρ γῆρας 
δύσελπί ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ νεότης ἐλπίδος πλήρης. εἰσὶ δέ τινες ὀλίγοι οὓς πίνοντας δυσθυµίαι 
λαµβάνουσι, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν δι᾿ ἣν καὶ µετὰ τοὺς πότους ἐνίους. ὅσοις µὲν οὖν 
µαραινοµένου τοῦ θερµοῦ αἱ ἀθυµίαι γίνονται, µᾶλλον ἀπάγχονται. διὸ καὶ οἱ νέοι ἢ καὶ οἱ 
πρεσβῦται µᾶλλον πάγχονται· τὸ µὲν γὰρ γῆρας µαραίνει τὸ θερµόν, τῶν δὲ τὸ πάθος 
φυσικὸν ὂν †καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ µαραινόµενον θερµόν†. ὅσοις δὲ σβεννυµένου ἐξαίφνης, οἱ 
πλεῖστοι διαχρῶνται ἑαυτούς, ὥστε θαυµάζειν πάντας διὰ τὸ µηθὲν ποιῆσαι σηµεῖον 
πρότερον. ψυχροτέρα µὲν οὖν γινοµένη ἡ κρᾶσις ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς µελαίνης χολῆς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, 
ποιεῖ ἀθυµίας παντοδαπάς, θερµοτέρα δὲ οὖσα εὐθυµίας. διὸ καὶ οἱ µὲν παῖδες εὐθυµότεροι, 
οἱ δὲ γέροντες δυσθυµότεροι. οἱ µὲν γὰρ θερµοί, οἱ δὲ ψυχροί· τὸ γὰρ γῆρας κατάψυξίς τις. 
συµβαίνει δὲ σβέννυσθαι ἐξαίφνης ὑπό τε τῶν ἐκτὸς αἰτιῶν, ὡς καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τὰ 
πυρωθέντα, οἷον ἄνθρακα ὕδατος ἐπιχυθέντος. διὸ καὶ ἐκ µέθης ἔνιοι ἑαυτοὺς διαχρῶνται· ἡ 
γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ οἴνου θερµότης ἐπείσακτός ἐστιν, ἧς σβεννυµένης συµβαίνει τὸ πάθος. καὶ µετὰ 
τὰ ἀφροδίσια οἱ πλεῖστοι ἀθυµότεροι γίνονται. ὅσοι δὲ περίττωµα πολὺ προΐενται µετὰ τοῦ 
σπέρµατος, οὗτοι εὐθυµότεροι· κουφίζονται γὰρ περιττώµατός τε καὶ πνεύµατος καὶ θερµοῦ 
ὑπερβολῆς. ἐκεῖνοι δὲ ἀθυµότεροι πολλάκις· καταψύχονται γὰρ ἀφροδισιάσαντες διὰ τὸ τῶν 
ἱκανῶν τι ἀφαιρεθῆναι· δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ µὴ πολλὴν τὴν ἀπορροὴν γεγονέναι. ὡς οὖν ἐν 
κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, διὰ µὲν τὸ ἀνώµαλον εἶναι τὴν δύναµιν τῆς µελαίνης χολῆς ἀνώµαλοί εἰσιν 
οἱ µελαγχολικοί· καὶ γὰρ ψυχρὰ σφόδρα γίνεται καὶ θερµή. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἠθοποιὸς εἶναι 
(ἠθοποιὸν γὰρ τὸ θερµὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν µάλιστα τῶν ἐν ἡµῖν ἐστίν) ὥσπερ ὁ οἶνος πλείων καὶ 
ἐλάττων κεραννύµενος τῷ σώµατι ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος ποιούς τινας ἡµᾶς. ἄµφω δὲ πνευµατικά, καὶ 
ὁ οἶνος καὶ ἡ µέλαινα χολή. ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἔστι καὶ εὔκρατον εἶναι τὴν ἀνωµαλίαν καὶ καλῶς πως 
ἔχειν, καὶ ὅπου δεῖ θερµοτέραν εἶναι τὴν διάθεσιν καὶ πάλιν ψυχράν, ἢ τοὐναντίον διὰ τὸ 
ὑπερβολὴν ἔχειν, περιττοὶ µέν εἰσι πάντες οἱ µελαγχολικοί, οὐ διὰ νόσον, ἀλλὰ διὰ φύσιν. 
 
 
 
‘Why is it that all those men who have become extraordinary in philosophy, politics, 
poetry, or the arts are obviously melancholic, and some to such an extent that they are seized 
by the illnesses that come from black bile, as is said in connection with the stories about 
Heracles among heroes? Indeed, he seems to have been of this nature, and this is why the 
ancients named the illnesses of epilepsy “sacred disease” after him. And his insanity 
regarding his children and the eruption of sores that occurred before his disappearance on 
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Mount Oeta prove this; for in many cases this occurs as a result of black bile. And these sores 
also afflicted Lysander the Spartan before he died. Further, there are the stories about Ajax 
and Bellerophon, of whom the former went completely insane, whereas the latter sought 
deserted places, which is why Homer wrote (of Bellerophon) in this way: 
 
But when indeed he was hated by all the gods, 
 
Verily over the Aleian plain he wandered alone, 
 
Devouring his spirit, avoiding the path of men. 
 
 
And many other heroes have obviously suffered in the same way as these men. Now 
in later times, of the well-known people there are Empedocles, Plato, Socrates, and many 
others. Further, there are most of those connected to poetry. For in many such men diseases 
have come from this sort of mixture in the body, whereas in others their nature clearly 
inclines toward these conditions. So they are all, generally speaking, as has been said, such 
with respect to their nature. 
Now the cause should be grasped if we first make use of an example. For more than 
anything else, a lot of wine appears to produce those qualities that we say are melancholic, 
and when it has been drunk it produces most of the characteristics, namely, irascibility, 
benevolence, compassion, and recklessness; but neither honey nor milk nor water nor any 
other such thing does this. One can see that it brings about all sorts of effects, by observing 
how it gradually changes the drinkers; for finding them chilled and silent when they are 
sober, having a bit too much to drink makes them more talkative, while even more makes 
them eloquent and bold, and, proceeding to action, they become reckless; still more drinking 
makes them hubristic, and then insane; and a lot more relaxes them and makes them stupid, 
like those who are epileptic from childhood, or even very near the melancholic. Therefore, 
just as an individual changes his character by drinking and using wine in a certain quantity, 
so there are certain people corresponding to each character. For just as one man is 
temporarily when he is drunk, so some other is by nature—one is talkative, another agitated, 
and another prone to tears; for wine produces in some people such qualities, and this is why 
Homer writes: “And he says that I swim in tears, being heavy with wine.” And indeed, they 
sometimes become compassionate and savage and silent; for some remain silent, especially 
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those melancholic persons who are insane. And wine also makes people affectionate; a sign 
of this is that the one who is drinking is induced to kiss those whom, because of appearance 
or age, no one would kiss when sober. Therefore, wine produces extraordinary results, not for 
a long time, but briefly, whereas nature produces them permanently, for as long as someone 
exists: for some people are bold, others silent, others compassionate, and others cowardly, by 
nature. So it is clear that wine and nature produce the character of each person by the same 
means; for all of these are achieved under the regulation of heat. Now certainly both the juice 
(of the grape) and the mixture of black bile contain breath; and this is why the physicians say 
that pulmonary afflictions and abdominal afflictions are melancholic. And wine, with respect 
to its power, contains breath. This is why wine and the mixture (of black bile) are similar in 
nature. And the foam shows that the wine contains breath; for oil, though it is hot, does not 
produce foam, whereas wine produces a lot, and red wine more than white, because it is 
hotter and has more body. For this reason wine works as an aphrodisiac, and Dionysus and 
Aphrodite are correctly said to be with each other, and the majority of melancholic people are 
lustful. For sexual excitement involves the presence of breath. A sign of this is the penis, in 
that its expansion is produced quickly from a small size, owing to being inflated. Even before 
seed is able to be emitted, a certain pleasure occurs in the case of children, when they are 
near puberty, in rubbing their private parts owing to licentiousness; this becomes clear 
because of the breath passing through the channels through which the moisture later travels. 
The outflow of the seed in intercourse and its ejection is obviously due to pushing by the 
breath. So those foods and drinks, which produce breath in the region around the private 
parts, are with good reason aphrodisiacs. And this is why red wine more than anything makes 
people have such a condition, just like melancholic people, (namely) containing abundant 
breath. Now these are clear in some cases: for the majority of melancholic people are thin, 
and their veins stand out; and the reason for this is the quantity not of blood, but of breath; 
but why all melancholic people are neither thin nor dark, but only the evil-humored ones, is 
another story. 
But we prefer to treat what we’ve been discussing from the beginning, that in nature 
already such a humor—the melancholic—is mixed: it is a mixture of hot and cold; for its 
nature consists of these two things. And this is why black bile becomes both very hot and 
very cold. For the same thing can naturally be affected by both of these, for instance, even 
water, which is cold: if however it is sufficiently heated, as when it is boiling, it is hotter than 
the flame itself, and stone and iron made red-hot become hotter than the coal, though they are 
cold by nature. But these things have been spoken about more clearly in the work On Fire. 
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Now black bile, being cold by nature and not on the surface, when it is in the condition 
mentioned, if it abounds in the body, produces apoplexy or torpor or spiritlessness or fear, but 
if it becomes overheated, it produces high-spiritedness with song, and insanity, and the 
breaking out of sores and such things. In most people, therefore, arising from their daily 
nutrition, it produces no differences in character, but only brings about some melancholic 
disease. But those in whom such a mixture has formed by nature, these straightaway develop 
all sorts of characters, each difference in accordance with the different mixture; for instance, 
those in whom (the black bile) is considerable and cold become sluggish and stupid, whereas 
those in whom it is very considerable and hot become mad, clever, erotic, and easily moved 
to spiritedness and desire, and some become more talkative. But many too, owing to this heat 
being near the location of the intelligence, are affected by diseases of madness or inspiration, 
whence come Sibyls and Bakides and all the inspired persons, when (the condition) comes 
not through disease but through natural mixture. Maracus the Syracusan was even a better 
poet when he was insane. But those in whom the excessive heat is relaxed toward a mean, 
these people are melancholic, but they are more intelligent, and they are less eccentric, but 
they are superior to the others in many respects, some in education, others in arts, and others 
in politics. And in the face of danger, such a state produces great variation because many of 
the men are sometimes inconsistent in the presence of fears. For as their body happens to be 
with respect to such a mixture, so they differ in themselves. Now the melancholic mixture is 
itself inconsistent, just as it produces inconsistency in those with the (melancholic) diseases; 
for like water, it is sometimes cold and sometimes hot. So when something fearful is 
announced, if it happens when the mixture is colder, it makes the person cowardly; for it 
paves the way to fear, and fear cools. Those feeling great fear prove this: for they tremble. 
But if the mixture is hotter, the fear brings it down to the moderate level, and (makes the 
person) in possession of himself and unaffected. And so it is with respect to daily 
spiritlessness; for we are often in a condition of feeling grief, though for what reason we are 
unable to say; and sometimes we are in a cheerful condition, but why is not clear. Such 
affections and those called superficial come to be in everyone to some small extent, for some 
of their capacity is mingled in everyone; but those in whom they are deep, these people are 
already this type with respect to their characters. For just as people come to be different in 
appearance not by having faces, but by having a certain type of face, some beautiful, some 
ugly, and some having nothing extraordinary in this respect (those who are naturally 
average), so too, those having a small share of such a mixture are average, whereas those 
sharing in much of it are unlike the majority. For, if their condition is quite saturated, they are 
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very melancholic, whereas if it is mixed in a certain way, they are extraordinary. But if they 
are careless, they incline toward melancholic diseases, different people in a different part of 
the body: indeed, in some the signs are epileptic, in some apoplectic, and in others, there is 
strong spiritlessness or there are fears, whereas in some there is too much boldness, for 
instance, as happened to Archelaus, king of Macedonia. The mixture is cause of such power, 
according to how much cold and heat it contains. For when it is colder than is fitting, it 
produces irrational despondency; this is why hanging (oneself) is most prevalent among the 
young, though it sometimes occurs among older men as well. Many kill themselves after 
drunkenness. And some melancholic people continue to be spiritless after drinking; for the 
heat of the wine extinguishes the natural heat. But heat around the region in which we think 
and hope makes us cheerful. And for this reason everyone is eager to drink to the point of 
drunkenness, because a lot of wine makes everyone hopeful, just as youth does children; for 
old age is hopeless, whereas youth is full of hope. There are some few people who while 
drinking are seized with despondency, for the same reason some are such after drinking. So 
those in whom despondency occurs when the heat is put out are more inclined to hang 
themselves. And this is why the young are more inclined than even the old to hang 
themselves; for old age puts out the heat, but for the young the condition is natural, †and so 
the heat is being put out by itself†. And among those people, when (the heat) is suddenly 
extinguished, the majority kill themselves, such that everyone is amazed because they gave 
no sign of it before. Therefore, when the mixture from the black bile becomes colder, as was 
said, it produces all kinds of spiritlessness, but when it is hotter, cheerfulness. And this is 
why children are more cheerful, whereas the old are more despondent. For the former are hot, 
the latter cold, since old age is a sort of cooling. But it happens that the heat is suddenly 
extinguished by external causes, just as things heated in fire (are cooled) contrary to nature, 
like coals when doused with water. And this is why some people kill themselves out of 
drunkenness; for the heat from the wine is foreign, and when it is extinguished this condition 
results. And after sexual intercourse most people are more spiritless, but those who emit a lot 
of residue with their seed are more cheerful; for they are relieved of residue and of an excess 
of breath and heat. But those (others) are often more spiritless; for they cool down when they 
have had sexual intercourse, because they are deprived of something significant; and this is 
clear from the fact that the outflow (of seed) is not great. 
So, to sum up, because the power of the black bile is uneven, melancholic people are 
uneven; for (the black bile) becomes both very cold and very hot. And because it is character-
forming (for of the things in us, the hot and cold are especially character-forming), just like 
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wine being mixed in the body in greater or lesser amounts, it produces certain qualities of 
character in us. Now both wine and black bile are full of breath. But since it is possible that 
what is uneven is well tempered and in a fine condition, and when it should be the disposition 
is hotter and then again cold, or the opposite owing to there being an excess, all melancholic 
people are extraordinary, not owing to disease but owing to nature.’ 
(Arist. Problemata 30.1. 953a10-955a40) 
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